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2010 Military Intelligence Hall of Fame Inductees

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Purpose: ***THE VANGUARD*** is the official journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) for its members and sponsors. The quarterly journal serves as a professional forum for sharing knowledge, preserving history, and honoring civilian and military members of the Corps.

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MICA Scholarships

The 2010 Military Intelligence Corps Association college scholarship campaign recently concluded. Once again, this year, all of the submitted application packets were well prepared and extremely competitive. We were very impressed with the caliber of the applicants and all should be justifiably proud of their achievements. We wish all of you the very best in your future academic endeavors and encourage applying for the scholarship again in 2011.

We extend our congratulations to the following individuals who were selected for receipt of a MICA scholarship for 2010:

Ruth Quinn, Toby Cruz, Molly Spessert, Jocelyn Shaver, Joseph McGreachy, Erin Larcom, Sarah Laszok

*** New Scholarship for Excellence in Intelligence Analysis ***

MICA is pleased to announce the creation of an annual scholarship to recognize the professional excellence of two of the Corps' most outstanding Intelligence analysts. A group of former senior Intelligence officers have combined their resources to create a fund to recognize and promote this unique scholarship effort. MICA is the executive agent and steward for this scholarship program.

All intelligence analysts are eligible for the scholarship award. The focus, however, is on mid-grade civilians, NCO's, and Warrant Officers assigned to units or agencies actively conducting analysis to support Commanders. Two scholarships will be awarded each year. Each scholarship award will be in the amount of $10,000. Awardees are required to use the award to further their advanced analysis education on the concepts, theory, and techniques supporting analysis.

To be selected, an analyst must be nominated by their chain-ofcommand. The nomination form can be obtained at MICA's website (micorps.org) under the Advanced Analysis scholarship folder. All nominations must be submitted by 1 October 2010.
Requirements for nominated individuals wishing to compete for these scholarships can be downloaded from the MICA website (micorps.org) under the Advanced Analysis scholarship folder. Individuals competing for the awards must complete and submit all scholarship requirements by 1 November to be eligible for the award. Submission packets can be sent in either hard or soft copy to one of the following:
Hard Copy: Military Intelligence Corps Association
P.O. Box 13020
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85670-3020
Soft Copy, Email to: Execdir@micorps.org
MICA will convene a five person board to evaluation submissions.

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Notes from the President

For those who could not attend the various functions associated with the Hall of Fame, we have documented those events in this iteration of The Vanguard. We hope that from our effort one gets an appreciation

of the importance that the Hall of Fame week has become in capturing our past and providing a vision for a bright future.

Our scholarship program for deserving spouses and dependents is now in its tenth year. Our most recent awardees are listed in this issue of The Vanguard. The Corps Association congratulates each of these awardees. I would like to extend our sincere appreciation to SGM Bova of OCMI for his efforts to oversee, lead, and administer the selection process. In the ten years of the scholarship program we have never seen the quality of resumes and intellectual talent that was found in this year's scholarship candidates.

I have used this forum to repeatedly encourage the membership to support the Military Intelligence Museum. The current museum does not have sufficient space to display the numerous items that are being offered. My primary concern is that we are not able to adequately capture the contribution of Military Intelligence Professionals to our Nation and our Army in this time of war. Giving to the museum ensures that the history being made by Military Intelligence professionals can be displayed for all to see and understand.

As Major General Custer departs command, he has generously expressed that those considering a memento or other gift to honor his service instead donate to the Military Intelligence Museum. The Corps Association is deeply honored that Major General Custer has made this kind offer.

As difficult operations in Afghanistan continue, our thoughts remain with all, but especially those intelligence professionals going into harm's way each and every day. We pray for and await your safe return.

Larry D. Bruns
National President
Military Intelligence Corps Association

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Once each submission has been reviewed, the scholarship board will contact each nominee to set up an interview date and time. Interviews will begin on 8 November and will be conducted by telephone or network meeting capabilities. Nominees should plan on at least one hour to complete the interview process.
The committee will report its results to the MICA executive committee who will make the award announcement NLT than 30 November 2010. Awardees will be recognized and awarded their scholarships at the Intelligence Warfighter Summit (IWS) scheduled for 7-9 December 2010.

The Problem of the Lone Wolf: Limitations in Intelligence

By 2LT Sally White

Introduction

In the early afternoon of November 5th, 2009, Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan walked into the Soldier and Family Readiness Center at Ft. Hood, Texas, drew two handguns from his coat, and opened fire. By the time the shooting stopped ten minutes later, there were thirteen dead and fortytwo injured Soldiers and civilians.
Within the next few days, several disturbing details emerged regarding Hasan's religious associations and past behavior. Hasan had been briefly investigated for online posts in which he praised suicide bombers; he had told colleagues of his belief that the war on terror was a war on all Muslims; he also allegedly said that more Muslims should attack U.S. troops for what they were doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that there should be more attacks like the June 1 shooting at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas.[1] Several times Hasan had made email contact with radical cleric

Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam known for his ability to market anti-American jihad to Western audiences.[2] The day after the attack, al-Awlaki praised Hasan's actions, and said that the only way a Muslim soldier could justify being in uniform was if he attacked other American soldiers.[3]

In hindsight, the fact that officials knew of these warning signs and yet failed to stop the shootings may seem like government negligence. However, the point of this article is not to condemn U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies for failing to apprehend a criminal before he turned violent. Rather, it will examine the unique challenges that the lone wolf militant poses to the American security apparatus, and why such challenges should be of concern to the intelligence professional. I will conclude with recommendations on how to mitigate future threats.

The Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance

The terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 were the most spectacular this country has ever seen, but over the course of American history, 9/11-style attacks—those perpetrated by large, well-organized groups with a clear leadership hierarchy—have been the exception rather than the rule.[4] On the contrary, most terrorist attacks in the U.S. have come from so-called "lone wolf" operatives: those who are inspired by a larger cause but who plan and act alone.[5]

The increasing popularity of lone wolves in the U.S. is part of a larger trend toward "leaderless resistance." The concept was first explored in the early 1960s by American intelligence officer Ulius Louis Amoss, who saw leaderless resistance as the primary means through which the Communists would take over the U.S. In 1992, Klansman Louis Beam popularized the leaderless model as a way for the white supremacist movement to continue its struggle against the federal government despite an overwhelming imbalance in power and resources. In contrast to the traditional pyramid scheme of organization, with the mass at the bottom of a tapering chain-of-command, leaderless

resistance is based on unity of purpose rather than unity of organization. Information is made available through a central ideological outlet, and individuals, cells, and committees act based on their own situational determinants.[6]

A leaderless organizational structure provides several advantages for the movement's operatives. First of all, as Beam noted, the shared ideology of the people involved in a resistance movement cause them to react to given situations in generally similar ways. There are exceptions, of course—Zarqawi's censure by Al-Qaeda in Iraq being one of the most notable—but for the most part, a leaderless movement maintains a degree of coordination even in the absence of a central command. Secondly, lack of communication between cells, and the lack of awareness that other cells even exist, makes a leaderless organization far more difficult for government intelligence agencies to penetrate than one that is more conventionally organized. Governments will often become aware of new militant groups only when one of their members contacts an informant or an individual who is already under government scrutiny.[7] However, the near complete-isolation of leaderless groups makes this sort of identification extremely difficult. In addition, the isolation of cells in a leaderless movement means that detection and infiltration of one cell will have little to no effect on the others, providing a nearimpeccable operational security in an era in which uncovering networks constitutes the main thrust of

counterterrorism investigations.

The advantages that leaderless resistance provides to isolated cells of people are magnified when those cells further degenerate into lone wolf operatives. While many lone wolf attacks, such as those of the Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh [aided by Terry Nichols], are perpetrated by deranged individuals acting on their own fabricated ideologies, the greatest threat to the U.S. today comes from a leaderless Islamic movement that inspires self-styled Jihadists to

conduct solitary attacks in any manner possible.[8] First of all, while we may be able to identify the Islamic leaders who propagate violent messages, such as radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki, their Constitutional right to free speech protects them from punishment unless there is evidence that a specific law has been broken. Even when suspected individuals are monitored by government agencies, it is difficult to distinguish between individual extremists who intend to commit violent acts, and those who simply preach hate.[9]

Additionally, because lone wolves by their nature minimize their associations with others, they are invulnerable to what has become the primary weakness of other terror organizations: infiltration by government authorities or betrayal by cell members.[10] The difficulty of targeting a lone operative is illustrated by the case of Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski. Between 1978 and his arrest in 1996, Kaczynski conducted sixteen attacks in which he mailed homemade explosives to an assortment of executives, lobbyists, and college professors. Although authorities had a large amount of evidence, Kaczynski's isolation enabled him to elude the most expensive manhunt in FBI history for nearly eighteen years.[11]

One final noteworthy advantage that applies to radical Muslim lone wolves: the emphasis on martyrdom within the radical Islamic community causes a decrease in the attacker's expectation of survival that precludes the need for extensive force protection measures. With no regard for the consequences of their actions, lone Islamic terrorists can afford to be far more reckless-and thus, far more violent-than their secular counterparts.[12]

Intelligence Limitations

As happened with Nidal Hasan, most lone wolves come to the attention of authorities before they attack. However, intelligence limitations make it tactically impossible for a government to identify every aspiring terrorist and preempt every act of violence.

An understanding of these limitations begins with an understanding of domestic intelligence investigations. The first step in an intelligence investigation, called a preliminary inquiry, takes place when there is suspicion of crime but no evidence that a law has been broken.[13] A preliminary inquiry provides the FBI agent with a limited window of time in which to investigate a suspect. If, in this window of time, the agent cannot find any indication of criminal activity, the inquiry is closed. It is only if the agent finds probable cause of crime that the FBI will open a full-fledged criminal investigation.[14]

While this procedure may seem unduly limiting, it is important to consider the reasons that the restrictions were imposed. First and foremost is the problem of finite resources. The U.S. government's ability to collect intelligence has long exceeded its capacity to analyze it.[15] This problem has only gotten worse with increases in technology. For example, according to the Department of Justice, as of March, 2005, the FBI had 707,742 hours of untranslated Arabic from various wiretaps and intercepts. Considering there are only 8,760 hours in a year, it would take linguists decades to translate, even if they worked 24 hours a day.[16]

When confronted with such an overwhelming amount of information, analysts are understandably going to focus most of their attention on confirmed threats rather than prospective ones. Information related to a terrorist superstar like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, for example, is going to receive far more attention than information on a Muslim Army Major with no criminal background. Yet even in cases in which the clues are not hidden under mountains of unprocessed intelligence or shrouded by linguistic and cultural barriers, the ability to detect ambiguous crimes is made exceedingly difficult in a free and open society. Many pre-operational activities that look like incontrovertible evidence in retrospect are well within the bounds of the Constitution, and thus warrant little attention prior to the crime-the anti-

American statements of radical Imams, for example, or the purchase of a hand gun by a man with no criminal record. Thus, even when the FBI does find cause for a preliminary inquiry, they are frequently limited to monitoring the person's activities and

waiting for a law to be broken. By this point, of course, it is too late.[17]

An additional restriction relates to the FBI's post-9/11 anxiety over its own image. The FBI's controversial history of domestic intelligence activities, as well as the increasing scrutiny under which its past behavior has fallen, have made the FBI especially mindful of Americans' right to privacy and other civil liberties.[18] Many leads are based on faulty information or the misidentification of the suspect; while the former problem has always plagued intelligence agencies, the confusion caused by the transliteration of Arabic names only makes the latter problem more difficult.[19] This is why many investigations tend to proceed slowly: if the suspect is guilty, investigators do not want to tip him off, and if he is not, they do not want to sully his reputation (or, more importantly, their own) in pursuit of an innocent American citizen or U.S. person.

Recommendations

The uncomfortable truth in the war against jihadists is that there is no such thing as complete security.[20] It is impossible to identify every aspiring militant and preempt every potential act of violence even in the most tyrannical police states; the difficulty is amplified further in those societies that value civil liberties and the rule of law. However, in spite of the challenges associated with countering individual acts of terrorism, there are several ways in which the law enforcement and intelligence communities can improve their ability to prevent terrorist attacks.

Increased Emphasis on Countersurveillance

Every act of terrorism, no matter how sudden or random it may seem, is the culmination of a six-stage attack cycle: target selection, planning,

deployment, attack, escape, and exploitation.[21] Though the complexity of each stage may vary based on the nature of the attack and the capabilities of the individual/group conducting it, all potential attackers have to go through a similar operational cycle—and it is in the early stages of target selection and planning that the terrorists are most vulnerable.[22] Before a terrorist launches his attack, he must first survey the target to determine its vulnerabilities. Regardless of how long the surveillance takes, its conduction leaves the criminal momentarily exposed and vulnerable to detection. The unique vulnerability that the operative must assume during surveillance makes countersurveillance—the process of detecting and mitigating hostile surveillance—vital to attack prevention.[23]

Successful surveillance is exceedingly difficult even by trained professionals because so many of the behaviors necessary to master it run contrary to human nature.[24] The surveillance process is especially dangerous for lone wolves: because they do not have others to assist them. Solo surveillants are forced to reveal themselves time and again.[25] Due to a lack of training, many will likely commit multiple errors throughout the process. An awareness of what surveillance looks like will make these telltale errors much easier to detect, and thus the attacks much easier to thwart.

Target the How with Protective Intelligence

Targeting terrorist surveillance methods falls under the umbrella of a term called protective intelligence. Protective intelligence is a type of proactive collection whereby agencies study how a future terrorist attack might occur rather than who is responsible for one that already happened.[26] While it is good to punish those who cause an attack, it is far more important to prevent the attack from actually happening. By studying how terrorist attacks are conducted, authorities will be better prepared to recognize the indications that an attack is underway, and thus will be more likely to stop it in its early stages instead of

having to respond to its aftermath.

An example of protective intelligence that is related to countersurveillance would require studying a terrorist's pre-operational surveillance techniques- identifying surveillant perches, for example, or possible covers for action and status. By determining when an individual is conducting surveillance on a planned target, protective intelligence can help authorities interdict plots before the attack is even allowed to launch. Above all, protective intelligence will enable the intelligence and law enforcement communities to be proactive in preventing terrorist acts rather than reactive in punishing perpetrators.[27]

Every Citizen a Sensor

The Army created the "Every Soldier a Sensor" program in 2004 to reflect the shortcomings of technology-based collection platforms in an unconventional environment. Regardless of how sophisticated satellites or UAVs become, technology

will never be able to substitute for the most critical aspect of intelligence analysis: a genuine understanding of human behavior. A similar phenomenon exists in the civilian world. Improvements in physical security measures, such as bullet-proof windows and closed circuit television (CCTV) have become a psychological crutch for those they intend to protect. False belief in the capabilities of physical security measures induces a sense of complacency in the general population that ultimately increases their vulnerability to attack.[28]

Implementation of the Every Citizen a Sensor program will only be successful, however, if it is accompanied by an acknowledgement, on the part of the citizenry, that government agencies cannot stop every threat. Much of the finger-pointing that follows successful terrorist attacks arise because of unrealistic expectations of what the government can do. If ordinary citizens can acknowledge the shortcomings inherent to any government collection agency, they will be more inclined to fulfill their own roles as counter-surveillants and human collectors.

Because of the limitations in technological-based collection systems, any effective security program should supplement its technology platforms with reliable human intelligence. Technology cannot think as humans can; it can record threats but it cannot evaluate them.[29] Just as the limitations of the military's intelligence arm led to the creation of the ES2 program, so should the limitations of the government's counterterrorism ability lead to the education of ordinary citizens on their role in the information collection process. Educating citizens of their role in the fight against terrorism will only enhance the ability of government agencies to thwart terrorist attacks.

Don't Ignore the Obvious

One of the most maddening aspects of the Hasan case has been the reluctance of Army and political leaders to acknowledge the role of radical Islam. There is a difference between avoiding conclusions based on an incomplete intelligence picture and avoiding conclusions based on an aversion to uncomfortable political realities. It would be both foolish and dangerous to discount the role of religion in the Hasan case: doing so might better preserve the diversity that has now become more valuable than human life, but it would come at the expense of our ability to understand what it is that truly threatens us. The fact that all pre-incident investigations on Hasan were eventually dismissed by the FBI does not reflect federal negligence; this article's previous discussion on the intelligence investigation process should make it clear that the dismissal was as much a product of limited resources as anything else. However, the tepid reactions of our political and military leadership in the aftermath of the shooting does reflect an urgent need to reassess who and how we target. The Khalid Sheikh Mohammeds of the world-the terrorist leaders who sit in far-off redoubts planning spectacular attacks on the U.S. -are no longer the greatest threat to American security. Virtually all of the Islamic terrorist plots that American authorities have uncovered in

recent years were planned by homegrown militants, not jihadist leaders in Pakistan.[30] Najibullah Zazi, the airport shuttle driver who was arrested in New York this September with the charge of conspiring to detonate bombs, came to the U.S. in 1999. The six individuals convicted in December of conspiring to attack U.S. military personnel at Ft. Dix were mainly ethnic Albanians who came to New Jersey in the 1980s. Zakaria Amara, the leader of the Toronto cell that planned to blow up skyscrapers in Canada, was born in a Toronto suburb. Mike Leiter, the Director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, said in Congressional testimony in September 2009 that the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab includes dozens of ethnic Somali recruits from the U.S.[31]

Homegrown terrorists like Hasan self-radicalize by spending vast amounts of time reading violent Islamic propaganda on the internet. Current law dictates that a violent ideology is protected speech that requires an actual criminal act to warrant surveillance. This mentality is outdated and dangerous. Our recent history with homegrown terrorists has proven that violent, Jihadist speech is just as threatening to our peace and security as a violent act. In this context, our obsession with going out of our way to protect such speech under the First Amendment is not only foolish, but unprecedented: never has the free speech clause been extended to expression that threatens substantial harm to society.[32]

The recent history of terror inspired by Jihadist ideology makes one wonder how, when there is a clear legal precedent against speech meant to incite violence, Islamic propaganda is allowed to proliferate so openly. First Amendment law has overcome many issues in the past, but it has never before dealt with a

prolific ideology whose aim is to destroy the American way of life.[33] It is time to reassess how much risk we are willing to take in upholding the right to free speech.

Conclusion

The Hasan shooting was an egregious breach of the trust that has bound armies for centuries; it should be seen as nothing less than a tragedy. However, the most important aspect of the shooting for the intelligence community to consider was how it exposed a number of systemic weaknesses in our intelligence collection process, and our inherent vulnerability to lone wolf terror attacks. Applying realistic solutions to each weakness will enhance our ability as intelligence professionals to protect the U.S. military, the American people, and the American way of life.

2LT Sally White graduated in 2009 from the U.S. Military Academy. She is currently assigned to B Company, 1/82 BSTB, Fort Bragg, NC.

Endnotes

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30 Henninger, Daniel. “Hasan, Not KSM, Is Our Real Problem.” The Wall Street Journal. 19 Nov 2009.
31 Scott Stewart and Fred Burton. “Paying Attention to the Grassroots.” STRATFOR Global Intelligence. 5 Aug 2009.
32 The 1942 Supreme Court case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire established that so-called “fighting words”---intentionally provocative speech meant to incite a violent reaction---do not fall under the purview of Constitutionally protected speech. “Such utterances,” Justice Frank Murphy wrote, “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”36 Brandenburg v. Ohio, in 1969, further declared punishable any speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”37 Limitations on fighting words were modified slightly during the rapid political and cultural transformation of the 1960s and 1970s, but the intent emerged unscathed with the decision of the 1971 case Cohen v. California: although the case upheld Cohen’s right to wear a jacket with the words, “Fuck the Draft” on the back, the case maintained a prohibition on speech that is likely to incite a violent reaction. All information taken from The Oyez Project at http://www.oyez.org.
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Pre-Deployment Source Operations Training for Maneuver Commanders

By 2LT Sean Gahagan

In the modern counterinsurgency (COIN) fight, tactical commanders rely more heavily on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to achieve situational awareness, situational understanding, and the actionable intelligence necessary to be effective in their area of operations (AO). Much of HUMINT's value in COIN is provided by military source

operations (MSO), which can only be conducted by certified and trained personnel. However, a lack of understanding may lead some commanders to unwittingly conduct unauthorized source operations or underutilize their MSO assets. The consequences of both of these mistakes can be detrimental to a unit's operational success. Unauthorized source operations can ruin careers. To provide deploying commanders with the education and training they need to avoid MSO pitfalls, the Army must make better use of resources and training programs such as those already in place at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), by providing a new class specifically on MSO to deploying maneuver commanders and their battle staffs.

In the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the population is the center of gravity. Both operations and intelligence efforts must shift their focus primarily towards the populace in order to be successful. In his classic work on COIN warfare, LTC David Galula describes the population as the "new ground" (Galula 4). His description challenges the conventional perception of what constitutes key terrain. He goes on to state, "Politics becomes an active instrument of operations [in counterinsurgency]" COL Ralph Baker recounts holding bi-weekly meetings with local leaders within his AO as a Brigade Combat Team commander (Baker 23). Using these key leader engagements as a political instrument to gain counterinsurgency's key terrain, commanders often meet with local leaders and liaison officers on a regular basis. Concurrently, the general populace is also a critical source of intelligence in counterinsurgency. In a previous article on the subject, CPT Raven Bukowski describes HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) as "two of the most important capabilities a maneuver commander can leverage when conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations" (Bukowski 5). Maneuver commanders often rely

on HUMINT source operations for some of the most valuable information on insurgent networks and intentions, leading to significant actionable intelligence. Without sufficient understanding of MSO, maneuver commanders may undermine their HUMINT asset capabilities. To mitigate this possibility and improve MSO effectiveness, it is absolutely necessary that maneuver commanders be given sufficient MSO training prior to deployment. The need for this training is expressed in the observations of many with HUMINT experience. Ryan Bareilles, a former Counterintelligence (CI) Special Agent, deployed with a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) of the 173d ABCT to Afghanistan in 2005, observes "people who were not qualified to conduct source operations were conducting source operations" and "commanders tried to run locally employed persons as sources without coordination or approval" (Bareilles). In regard to leveraging MSO, he states that if maneuver commanders do not how to employ the MSO assets they are allocated, "they're shooting themselves in the foot!" This former MSO manager's frustration is evident. Additionally, Pete Swolak, a G/S2X Contract Instructor with MSO experience, states that "there is a critical need for basic understanding by maneuver commanders. Without it, true synchronization with operations is impossible" (Swolak). In order to avoid issues and achieve better synchronization with MSO, better educational training must be provided to maneuver commanders.

A poor understanding of MSO may also lead to legal consequences, disrupt or complicate ongoing MSO, and may deprive HUMINT collectors of valuable new sources. According to HUMINT collection doctrine, authority to conduct MSO is limited to HUMINT collectors, CI, and other select personnel who are trained and certified (FM 2-22.3). Strong emphasis on the Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) concept in recent years may have inadvertently encouraged tactical soldiers to attempt their own source operations.

Considering this potential confusion, a USAIC training packet on tactical questioning clarifies, “A

key difference between MSO and ES2 is that MSO involves intent to elicit information from a source by a specific collection plan or methodology” and “an authority to task the source” (Tactical Questioning Training Packet). The manual goes on to describe the difference between sensitizing and tasking, and then describes the “Ask, Don’t Task” rule. In this manual and other supporting documents, leaders can find a basic description of their authorities with respect to liaison, local contacts, and their limitations when conducting MSO. Nevertheless, this information can be underemphasized with many tactical leaders, opening the door to continued unauthorized source operations.

A poor understanding of MSO can also lead to the disruption of ongoing military source operations. Within the MSO system, sources are deconflicted, synchronized, and vetted. Unauthorized source operations outside of the official system are not deconflicted, and according to FM 2-22.3, “may result in compromise of assets and interruption of collection operations and potentially unintended casualties.” To avoid these consequences, including potentially career-ending legal ramifications, maneuver commanders must receive better training on source operations as part of their pre-deployment preparation.

To achieve this objective, maneuver commanders must receive dedicated military source operations training in a block of instruction, which could be condensed to less than half of a day’s training. The training must include HUMINT/MSO authorizations, limitations, appropriate time and manner to hand off sources to HUMINT collection assets, the MSO process (to include vetting sources), and the integration of MSO into tactical operations as a force multiplier. The training programs in place for leaders rotating through the NTC and JRTC already include

instruction on intelligence capabilities. However, MSO specific instruction needs to be added as a new stand-alone course. Because these training centers already employ MSO personnel, they are the ideal location for an MSO training session. By drawing upon the existing resources of NTC and JRTC, the Army can better equip maneuver commanders to guide and direct their HUMINT assets to effectively execute MSO in support of their unit's tactical missions and objectives.

The establishment of these pre-deployment MSO classes at NTC and JRTC will provide maneuver commanders with the legal awareness necessary to avoid accidentally conducting unauthorized source operations. This small change to pre-deployment training will allow deploying maneuver commanders to better utilize their MSO assets and effectively improve interactions with local contacts and into the fold of formal HUMINT collection. With this focused training, maneuver commanders can better leverage the instruments of both operations and intelligence on counterinsurgency's "new ground".

2LT Sean Gahagan graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 2009 with a B.S. in Physics Honors and a Minor in Terrorism Studies. He is currently assigned to 8th STB, 8th TSC, Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

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2010 MI Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony

On 24 June 2010, the following five leaders were inducted into the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame during a ceremony held at Fort Huachuca.

Major General Barbara G. Fast

Major General Barbara G. Fast was one of the last members of the Women's Army Corps when she earned her direct commission as a Second Lieutenant, Military Intelligence in 1976 and subsequently attended the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Her first assignment as a Second Lieutenant was as the Assistant Operations Officer for Training and Education, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Munich, Germany. Soon thereafter she served as the Officer in Charge, Soviet Orientation Team, 5th Military Intelligence Company. Before returning back the U.S., Captain Fast held positions as the Battalion Assistant S3 (Operations), 18th Military Intelligence Battalion, as well as the Commander of the Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 18th Military Intelligence Battalion, Munich, Germany.

In February 1982, CPT Fast reported to Fort Hood, Texas where she would assume duties as the Chief of Intelligence Production Section, 303rd Military Intelligence Battalion. In June of 1983, CPT Fast was selected over numerous combat arms nominees to become the first female to hold the position as Aidede-Camp to the Deputy Commanding General, III Corps. After 15 months, she returned to the 303rd Military Intelligence Battalion as the Adjutant. In 1984, CPT Fast headed to Alexandria, Virginia where she served first as the Professional Development Officer, later, as the Captain's Assignment Officer, and then finally as the Special Operations Assignment Officer at the US Army Military Personnel Center.

In July 1987 Major Fast was assigned as the

Chief of the Advanced Systems Section, J2, US European Command at Stuttgart, Germany. After two years Major Fast became the Executive Officer of the 18th Military Intelligence Battalion, Munich, Germany. While assigned to Munich she also served as first the Deputy and then later as the Chief of the Intelligence Division, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. In 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Fast assumed the position of commander of the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas. Two years later, after concluding her second command, LTC Fast became the Division (G2) of the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas. In 1996, Colonel Fast took on a third command position, this time for the 66th Military Intelligence Group (Provisional) in Augsburg, Germany. Colonel Fast, after returning to the United States, embarked upon a new position as the Associate Deputy Director for Operations/ Deputy Chief with the Central Security Service, National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Maryland. In 2001, as a Brigadier General, she assumed duties as the Director of Intelligence, J2, returning to the US European Command in Stuttgart, Germany where she served another two years. Following her time in Germany, Brigadier General Fast arrived at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, where she had began her career 25 years earlier. There she served as the Assistant Commandant of the US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. While in this position she deployed to Iraq to become the C2 for Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom. After returning from Iraq, Major General Fast resumed her position as the Assistant Commandant of the US Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) before becoming the Commanding General, USAIC and Fort Huachuca.

Major General Fast’s final assignment was as the Chief of Staff Deputy Director of the Army Capability and Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia. In May 2008, Major General Fast retired from active duty in the US Army after serving honorably for 32 years. Major General Fast is a graduate of the Military

Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Intelligence Staff Officer Course, Tactical Surveillance Officer, Defense Sensor Interpretation and Training, Combined Arms and Service Staff School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the US Army War College. She holds Bachelor of Science degrees in German and Spanish from the University of Missouri, a Master of Science degree in Business Administration from Boston University, and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Central Missouri State University. Major General Fast's awards and badges include the Defense Superior Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the

Brigadier General Richard T. Ellis

Brigadier General Richard T. Ellis was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, Military Intelligence in 1978 and reported to Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His first assignment as a Second Lieutenant was serving as the Foreign Area Officer and later Intelligence Contingency Fund Class A Agent, 500th Military Intelligence Group, United States Army Japan, Camp Zama. In August 1980, First Lieutenant Ellis assumed duties as the Administration Officer of the 149th Military Detachment, 500th Military Intelligence Group. In August 1981 he returned to 500th Military Intelligence Group, United States Army Japan, Camp Zama, Japan as the Assistant Operations Officer/ Team Chief of the Foreign Liaison Detachment. Upon his return to the U.S. in 1982, First Lieutenant Ellis attended the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course at Fort Huachuca. In March 1983, after promotion to Captain, he headed to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, assuming duties as the Counterintelligence Team Chief and later the Intelligence Officer of 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Joint Task-11, Honduras.

After approximately two years, CPT Ellis became the Chief of Combined Security Element and Assistance Intelligence Officer of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta Force) (Airborne), Fort Bragg. In January 1989, CPT Ellis took command of Charlie Company, 313th Military Intelligence Battalion (Airborne), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In December 1989 he deployed to Panama for Operation Just Cause.
In January 1990, he took command of the Area Operations Element, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta) (Airborne), Fort Bragg.
In August 1992 Major Ellis took command of U.S. Army Foreign Intelligence Activity, Detachment K, Korea and in December 1993 he took command of United States Army Foreign Intelligence Activity, Detachment B, Fort Meade, Maryland. After over two years of command, Major Ellis took on the position of the Senior Instructor of the Special Training Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Washington, DC. Less than three years later in 1997, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis again took a command position, this time as commander of the at 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg.
In July 1999, LTC Ellis returned to Washington, DC to serve as the Director of Intelligence, Office of Military Support. During his year there he served as the Intelligence Officer (J-2), U.S. Intelligence Cell, U.S. European Command, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, Stabilization Force (SFOR), OPERATION JOINT FORGE, Bosnia.
Once Lieutenant Colonel Ellis returned from deployment he attended the National War College, Fort Mc Nair, Washington, DC. After the completion, Colonel Ellis took his seventh command position, this time with the 650th Military Intelligence Group, U.S. Europe, SHAPE, Belgium. In June 2004, Colonel Ellis returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina to serve as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2, XVIII Airborne Corps, deploying as the J-2, Multi-National

Corps-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. In August 2006, he became the Director of Intelligence, J-2, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida. As the J-2, he led efforts to transform and improve the HUMINT capabilities of our nation into a more relevant and integrated community in the current fight on terrorism. Brigadier General Ellis served at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Washington, D.C. for nearly a year before moving on to his final assignment.

Brigadier General Ellis' final assignment was as Deputy Director, National Clandestine Service for Community Human Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. On May 4, 2009, Brigadier General Richard Ellis died on Active Duty after having served honorably for 31 years.

Brigadier General Ellis' civilian education includes a Bachelor of Art in Criminal Justice and Political Science from the University of Nevada and a Master of Science in National Security and Strategic Studies from the National War College.

Brigadier General Ellis' military education include the Ranger Course, Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Personnel Management Staff Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Service Star, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Service Ribbon, the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the Army Superior Unit Award.

Officer, Military Operations Training Course, Special Forces Qualification Course, Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), Jumpmaster, the Command and General Staff College, and National War College.

Brigadier General Ellis' awards and badges include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (3 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Meritorious Service Medal (2 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Joint Service

Commendation Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster), the Army Commendation Medal (2 Oak Leaf Cluster), the Joint Service Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (2 Stars), the Bronze Assault Arrowhead, the NATO Medal, and posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Intelligence Medal, and the Knowlton Award. Brigadier General Ellis' badges include the Special Forces Tab, the Ranger Tab, Master Parachutist Badge (Combat Star), and the Honduran Parachute Badge.

Colonel John Lansdale, Jr.

Colonel John Lansdale was commissioned as an Artillery Second Lieutenant, in 1933 while serving as a member of the Army Reserves. After commissioning, 2LT Lansdale attended Harvard Law School and was later promoted to First Lieutenant in 1937. In May 1941, 1LT Lansdale received a letter from former roommate, and future Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Frank McCarthy. McCarthy warned of the upcoming war and suggested he request a call to active duty to serve in the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff. On June 10, 1941, 1LT Lansdale would report for active duty to the Investigations Branch of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

In February 1942, Captain Lansdale reported to Dr. James B. Conant, who was at the time president of Harvard, and Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. It was at this assignment that CPT Lansdale learned of the efforts being made in the race to develop the Atomic Bomb. He was charged with securing the intelligence behind these efforts at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, Berkley, CA. In September of the same year General Leslie Groves recruited CPT Lansdale to aid in the atomic bomb project renamed the Manhattan Project under new responsibility of the U.S. Army. He was charged with the mission of establishing a

branch of military intelligence personnel. These "Silent Warriors" of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), were charged with maintaining the secrecy and security of the Manhattan Project, under the auspices of the U.S. Engineer Office, Manhattan District. Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale's official title was Director of Intelligence and Security, Manhattan Project.

During his time as director, LTC Lansdale completed several other missions vital to the project's success. In June and July of 1945, Colonel Lansdale headed a small mission to Brazil aimed at negotiating the purchase of monazite sands. He led a subsequent mission to London and Sweden in order to obtain kolm deposits, a substance reportedly rich in Uranium. Colonel Lansdale would also lead the Alsos Mission, which actively participated in the recovery of Uranium ore in Germany as well as several prominent German scientists including Werner Heisenberg and Otto Hahn. In January 1946 approximately 325 Counter Intelligence Corps personnel still remained in the Manhattan Project Security and Intelligence Group commanded by Colonel Lansdale. His postwar duties included the establishment a London based liaison office with British Intelligence, before returning to his civilian career as a lawyer at Squire, Sanders and Dempsey, LLP in Cleveland, Ohio.

In the mid-50s, Colonel Lansdale served as a defense witness for the scientific director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, Manhattan Project, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Dr. Oppenheimer was accused of participation in Communist Party activities, therefore making him a traitor and a spy. Years earlier, it was Colonel Lansdale alongside General Groves that had made the decision to award Dr. Oppenheimer his clearance. Later many would recount his testimony as the most famous moment in the courtroom, and it became the basis for the Broadway play "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer." It is reported that during Colonel Lansdale's five years of active service, from 1941 to 1946, he rarely took a single day of

leave, showing his austere devotion to the project, the mission, and his country.
Colonel Lansdale's civilian education includes a bachelor's degree from the Virginia Military Institute and a law degree from Harvard Law School.

Colonel Lansdale's award and badges include the U.S. Legion of Merit and the Order of the British Empire, Degree of Commander (CBE) from England.

Colonel Daniel Baker

Colonel Daniel F. Baker enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1970 and was commissioned in 1976 as a Second Lieutenant, Military Intelligence attending the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His first assignment was as the Deputy Officer in Charge, Army Security Agency (ASA) Company, 201st Military Intelligence Battalion, Wurzburg, and Stuttgart, Germany. He later moved to Augsburg and assumed duties as the Operations Officer of the ASA Company, 201st MI Battalion. In February of 1981, Captain Baker returned to Fort Huachuca, assuming duties as the Branch Chief/ Senior Instructor of the Advanced Individual Training Company, USAIC. He served as the Commanding General's Aide de Camp, and Commander, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st School Brigade. It is here that he revitalized training and incorporated students in the Officer Basic Course as junior leaders, a change that remains in effect today. After four years in Arizona he headed to Turkey where he served as the Officer in Charge of Space Operations (Hippodrome), Field Station Sinop, from February 1985 to January 1986. In February 1986, CPT Baker was assigned to the Army Staff, HQ Department of the Army as both Staff Action Officer and the Staff Action Control Officer. In June 1989, Major Baker returned to Germany as the Intelligence Officer, 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment, Nurnburg Germany. In June 1990, he took command of the 502nd Military Intelligence Company and conducted combat operations in Iraq during Operation Desert

Storm. In November 1991, Major Baker assumed the duties of the Deputy Regimental Executive Officer of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. After three years in Germany, Lieutenant Colonel Baker took command of the 124th Military Intelligence Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Stewart Georgia. Here LTC Baker built and tested the first Analysis and Control Element (ACE) in the Army. He pioneered this new military intelligence concept developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures that became the basis for subsequent Army doctrine.

He left command in June 1994 to serve approximately three years at the Pentagon. While at the Pentagon, LTC Baker held positions such as the Intelligence Coordination Officer (Europe), J-2 Joint Staff/ Defense Intelligence Agency for two months before transitioning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Officer. 15 months later he filled the role of Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Assistant for seven months followed directly by the position of the Assistant J-2.

In June 1998 Colonel Baker assumed command of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Fort Gordon Georgia. Two years later, in July 2000, Colonel Baker became the Intelligence Officer (G2) for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 3rd United States Army/Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) at Fort McPherson Georgia.

Colonel Baker’s final assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence/ Intelligence Officer (J-2), Coalition/Joint Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) at Camp Doha, Kuwait for eight months. In December 2002, Colonel Baker retired from active duty in the US Army after having served honorably for 32 years. He continued his intelligence career as a member of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2 contract support staff.

Colonel Baker’s civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from Northwestern University, a Master of Art degree in Management from Webster University, and a

Master of Science degree in National Security from the National Defense University.
Colonel Baker's military education includes the Defense Language Institute (Russian), Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Basic Electronic Warfare/ Cryptologic Officer Course, Combined Arms Service Staff (CAS3), the Command General Staff College, and the National War College.
Colonel Baker's awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal (9th Award), Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award (2nd Award), Valorous Unit Award, Army Good Conduct Medal, National Defense Service Medal (3rd Award), Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal (3 Bronze Service Stars), Armed Forces Reserve Medal, Noncommissioned Officer's Professional Development Ribbon, Army Service

MG Barbara Fast BG Richard Ellis
COL John Lansdale, Jr.
COL Daniel Baker CSM Scott Chunn

Military Intelligence Hall of Fame Inductees for 2010

2010 Military Intelligence Hall of Fame Week Activities

Hall of Fame guests and attendees warm up for Golf Scramble hosted by MICA's Fort Huachuca Chapter.
Post historical tour included visit to Garrison Commander's home hosted by Lynn Faulkner, on right, wife of COL Timothy Faulkner.
Cavalry Riding Demonstration consisting of a pistol charge, carbine, and cannon fire at Wren Arena, June 23.
MG (RET) Fast delivers keynote address during MI Hall of Fame Luncheon at Libby Army Airfield.

was notified of his selection to Sergeant Major and

appointed to Command Sergeant Major. Once he returned to Fort Lewis, he assumed duties as the Command Sergeant Major, 109th Military Intelligence Battalion. After the inactivation of 109th in May 1991, CSM Chunn was assigned as the CSM of the 14th Military Intelligence Battalion, 201st Military Intelligence Brigade. CSM Chunn subsequently served as the Brigade Command Sergeant Major for the 201st Military Intelligence Brigade before moving to 524th Military Intelligence Battalion, 501st Military Intelligence Brigade in Korea in 1993 and later served as the Brigade CSM. In March 1995, CSM Chunn assumed duties as the CSM, 748th Military Intelligence Battalion in San Antonio, Texas. After ten months, CSM Chunn was reassigned to Fort Meade, Maryland and served as the CSM of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade from 1996 to 1998.

CSM Chunn's final assignment was as the CSM, U.S. Army Intelligence School and Fort Huachuca. It was during his time in this post that he initiated the Enlisted Assignment Council and a local chapter of the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club. He also established the Doctor Mary Walker, recognizing outstanding service for volunteers and the Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Doug Russell Award Program, recognizing junior MI enlisted soldiers. In January 2001, Command Sergeant Major Chunn retired from active duty in the US Army after serving honorably for 30 years.

CSM Chunn's civilian education includes a Bachelor's Degree in Liberal Arts from the University of the State of New York and a Master's Degree in Management from the University of Phoenix.

CSM Chunn's military education includes the Airborne Sensor Specialist Course, the Basic Leadership Course, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer's Course, the Criminal Investigation Course, Instructor System Development Course, and the Sergeant Major

Academy.
CSM Chunn's military awards and badges include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with seven oak leaf clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Army Achievement Medal, the Good Conduct Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon (4th Award), Kuwait Liberation Medal (SA), Kuwait Liberation medal (KU), Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, and Army Staff Identification Badge.

Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn

Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn enlisted in April 1971 and reported to the Airborne Sensor Specialist Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His first assignment would be as a Specialist Five serving as an Aerial Sensor Specialist, Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon, Fort Wainwright, Alaska. In 1974 he was assigned as a Counterintelligence Coordinator at the 9th Military Intelligence Company, Fort Lewis, Washington.
After two and an half years, SP5 Chunn assumed duties as an Aerial Sensor Specialist for the 73rd Combat Intelligence Company, Stuttgart, Germany.
In 1980, SSG Chunn left Germany and returned to Fort Huachuca, Arizona serving as an Instructor and later Senior Instructor for Bravo Company, 2d Battalion, 1st School Brigade. During his time as an Instructor, SSG Chunn was twice honored as Instructor of the Quarter. He also served as the First Sergeant for the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) Company and as a project NCO for the New Systems Training Office.
After four years at Fort Huachuca SFC Chunn return to Germany in 1984 and was assigned as the Battalion Operations Sergeant for the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion, Wiesbaden. In July 1985, 1SG Chunn became the 1SG, Alpha Company, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion. In 1987, MSG Chunn was assigned to the 7th Infantry Division

(Light), Fort Ord, California with duty as the Intelligence (G-2) Operations Sergeant. In January 1988 MSG Chunn served as the G-2 Sergeant Major and seven months later assumed duties as the 1SG of Alpha Company, 107th Military Intelligence Battalion. In 1989 he was selected for the U.S. Army Sergeant Majors Course.
Upon graduating from the Sergeant Majors Course in January 1990, MSG Chunn was assigned as the I Corps Tactical Operations Center Support Element Sergeant Major, Fort Lewis, Washington. In March 1990, he deployed in support of Team Spirit, Republic of Korea (ROK), and while deployed.

Medal (10th award), the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Service Ribbon, the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon, the National Defense Service Medal, and the Senior Aircraft Crewmember Badge.

Captain Charles Bailey awarded LTG Sidney Weinstein Award

As part of the MI Hall of Fame week activities, MG John Custer presented the LTG Sidney Weinstein Award for excellence in Military Intelligence to Captain Charles Bailey. The annual award recognizes a company grade MI officer to honor the late general’s significant contributions to the modern MI Corps. CPT Bailey is the third recipient of the honor. CPT Bailey enlisted as an Counterintelligence Agent upon graduation from Keene State College. In January 2003 he was commissioned as an Infantry Officer after graduating from Officer Candidate School. During a 2006 deployment to Mosul, Iraq he was wounded by an improvised explosive device while leading a reconnaissance platoon. After recovery he was posted to U.S. Army Europe as an MI officer serving with distinction for the past three years. As

a Company Commander he was responsible for providing significant human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) support to ongoing operations in Europe, Africa and to deployed forces in Southwest Asia. He is currently a tactical intelligence officer in U.S. Army Alaska. His father Robert Bailey attended the award ceremony.

New Barracks Complex Named for LTG Weinstein

A ribbon cutting ceremony to commemorate the new 111th MI Brigade barracks complex in honor of LTG Sidney Weinstein was held on June 24, 2010 in conjunction with other MI Hall of Fame week events. MG Custer, LTG Weinstein's widow Pauline, and other family members participated in the ceremony. Weinstein Village houses barracks, battalion headquarters space, a dining facility, and other stuctures. LTG Weinstein served as Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School as well as the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence/G-2. His significant efforts transformed the Military Intelligence branch into a key combat support component of the Army and intelligence community.

NCO of Influence: Recognizing SFC Monte Nelson

By SFC Berryman

SFC Monte Nelson is one of U.S. Army Pacific's most distinguished analysts specializing in the counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency dynamics of Indonesia and the Philippines. SFC Nelson's numerous deployments to Southeast Asia, tenure as the Military Liaison Element (MLE) analyst for Special Forces operations in Jakarta, and senior positions serving the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and Special Operations Command Pacific

(SOCPAC) have earned him a well respected position amongst analysts across the Pacific Theater. These skills enabled him to train, coach, and mentor me as a young SSG to become one of PACOM's most distinguished analysts as well. Together, they have helped strengthen the Department of Defense position in Southeast Asia, and provide the necessary intelligence and understanding required to resume military cooperation with Indonesian armed forces and police.

In 2005, both SFC Nelson and I arrived at the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. Our section served both the group HQs as well as subordinate battalions with analysis pertaining to Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) environments, strategic campaign plans as well as USCENTCOM Theater deployments. At that time 1st SFG (A) influence in the Pacific Theater was limited to supporting counterinsurgency operations in the southern Philippine islands with minimal engagement with other host nation forces on a diplomatic level outside strictly prescribed military cooperation agreements. Since that time, intelligence provided by the 1st SFG (A) staff has drastically increased the Group commander's ability to leverage intelligence and operational assets against increasing threats throughout the AOR. Progress was hard earned with numerous roadblocks set by the U.S. Department of State, senior commands, and host nation entities wary of cooperating directly with the U.S. military. However, a strong team of analysts, led by CW3 Matt Martin, SFC Nelson, and three other young, determined NCOs built a foundation of trust within this community for years to last.

I came to the 1st SFG (A) after five years serving as an infantryman with little to no real analytic skills or knowhow. I quickly discovered, however, that working for SFC Nelson would be both incredibly challenging and frustrating. As senior analyst, SFC Nelson's Soldiers thrived or failed in a world of deadlines. On any given day, one could expect

anywhere from three to five deadlines to complete intelligence products, many having to be briefed soon after completion. Soldiers learned that determination and focus did not end when the workday was over, but had to be maintained during free time to remain competitive. Finished products were heavily scrutinized, many being completely discarded while analysts watched SFC Nelson quickly duplicate and refine unsatisfactory work. Watching the deftness and accuracy of his efforts gave the analysts both a direct example of how the task should be completed as well as confidence in the fact the seemingly impossible deadlines could be met with success.

SFC Nelson designed each day around the intelligence process. Therefore, his Soldiers lived in a deployed environment at home station, learning that the intelligence cycle never stops, only getting refined through continual dedication and effort. Contrary to a typical MI unit, SFC Nelson's Soldiers began creating useful products on a daily basis, garnering both appreciation and recognition from the intelligence community as an emerging source of critical information on the PACOM AOR. However, basic leader tasks were rarely sacrificed. SFC Nelson's Soldiers learned various ways to coach, train, and mentor when time was unavailable. His actions reflected one that had a true respect for time, and what could be accomplished when it was maximized to the fullest. In this way he not only accomplished his duties as an analyst, but served his subordinates with critical performance enhancing training as well. Inter-office problems were solved adeptly, with great respect for each individual. For a young NCO from the infantry, his tactics seemed soft at first, but through personal experiences found the methods to capitalize on an individual's desire for mutual respect proved to be far more effective than typical Army mentorship.

Surprisingly, the intelligence professionals led by CW3 Martin and SFC Nelson were also known for outstanding fitness. Since most of the day was

spent performing intelligence tasks pertaining to

each analyst’s area of interest, SFC Nelson knew that PT was his most advantageous opportunity for team building. Through challenging and creative fitness events, SFC Nelson’s team grew extremely competitive and fit which had a direct effect on each analyst’s performance in intelligence tasks. However, an office climate set by warm, friendly, and respectful personalities made this an incredibly positive dynamic for all, and one that each Soldier in turn attempted to contribute to. In this environment, periods of stress were met with determination and positive attitudes leading to a constant increase in effectiveness and efficiency.

SFC Nelson motivated all of his Soldiers to seek personal and professional growth. During his tenure as 1SFG (A) senior analyst, his soldiers enjoyed fast promotions, were nearly all enrolled in college courses, and one went on to attend the Warrant Officer Course. Once SFC Nelson himself left for WOC, his subordinates were forced to step up and become more engaged as leaders. SFC Nelson’s training made this transition very fluid, in fact, productivity continued to increase after his departure. Since then, 1SFG (A) has become an influential party in the fight against the Al Qaeda throughout the region where the group previously had little to no influence. The Group has begun investing heavily in intelligence analysts, ensuring that they are integral parts of JCET operations and DoD planning in regards to PACOM with confidence that they provide an added benefit to any tactical or strategic mission.

It is clear that SFC Nelson’s success is not only reflected in his Soldiers, but in the success of 1SFG(A)’s growth in the fight against terror and insurgency throughout USPACOM. His soldiers have gone on to fill challenging positions in several theaters of operation, and are each becoming success stories of their own. The ability to learn and train as a new intelligence analyst under an NCO like SFC Nelson

is critical to developing capable analysts who can meet the challenges and deadlines brought on by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and who can earn the confidence of a command by providing timely and accurate intelligence far beyond the capabilities expected of junior NCOs and Soldiers.

Intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic

By MAJ Brian Guenthenspberger

Protecting lines of communication (LOC) in any military conflict is of critical importance and often a challenge. Survival of many may depend on this key task, but to do it in the vast operating area of the Atlantic Ocean is difficult at best. To do it effectively requires a combination of many efforts but in its basic form it requires intensive reconnaissance and security operations as well as the ability to close with and destroy any threat. Success requires, much like any military operation, timely and accurate intelligence to detect and identify threats and support operational requirements.

It was not just military tactics that resulted in Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II. Efforts such as large shipbuilding operations were also essential. However, good intelligence was still crucial throughout the campaign. As stated by historians Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, the Battle of the Atlantic "involved massive industrial resources, the exploitation of modern technology, and the decisive intercession of intelligence during critical periods of the battle."[1] This article describes how the U.S and its Allies used intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic to overcome the tactics and intelligence techniques the Germans used to track down allied convoys.

Although the official U.S. Navy battle streamer for the Second World War Atlantic Campaign only covers from 1941 to 1945, the battle lasted much longer.[2] "The Battle of the Atlantic lasted from 3 September

1939 through the end of the war in Europe.”[3] Although the U.S. did not technically enter the war until 7 December 1941, the merchant shipping convoys acting as Great Britain’s lifeline were under constant threat early in the war. By the time World War II was raging in Europe, the British depended on the majority of their sustenance from imports carried on American merchant ships. Additionally, their ability to secure those merchant convoys was seriously degraded due to the small size of the pre-war U.S. and British Navies. The Canadians were in the same situation. The Lend-Lease Program developed between the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom (and later the U.S.S.R.) had the U.S. lease the other two navies a sizeable number of naval vessels from America’s mothball fleet to bring their navies up to strength.

The influx of additional ships initially hurt the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy. Although it greatly bolstered Britain and Canada’s ability to put fleets to sea to protect convoys and combat the German Kriegsmarine, the majority of the vessels were antiquated and lacked the current radar and radio equipment. In the case of the Royal Canadian Navy, which increased in size twenty-fold in a three year time span, it initially “led to inefficiency at sea and heavy losses to Canadian escort convoys.”[4] In other words, a significant learning curve for the rapidly growing navies was experienced.

Allied naval forces learned many early operational lessons concerning their two most important missions - how to move convoys across the Atlantic safely while commanding and controlling them in such a way as to avoid detection; and how to collect and integrate all information on enemy movements in a timely manner to counter and destroy their capabilities. Until about mid-1940, effective British tactics against the U-Boat threat were significantly lacking. They had no air cover from the Royal Air Force, were not able to put Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities into the fleet fast enough, and

were at a loss to defeat the German commerce raid tactics that the Kriegsmarine and Admiral Dönitz's U-boats largely employed during this time period. After May 1940, it only got worse for the British. The German's had gained valuable ports in France and Norway, providing them with greater access to the primary Allied shipping lanes. Britain's limited escort capabilities also had many constraints. "Because of the shortage of convoy escort vessels and the belief that the U-boats would confine their activities to the Western Approaches, it was decided that until the deficiency had been made up, transatlantic convoys would be escorted only as far as longitude 20° west when ships would disperse and proceed at their best speed direct to their destinations."[5] This proved disastrous, as proven by the fact that "of 217 merchant ships lost to U-boats in the last half of 1940, only 73 (roughly a third) occurred in convoys."[6] It did not take long for the Allies, mainly the British, to realize that convoys had a better chance for survival when escorted during their entire trip. This time period whittled away at the Allied merchant fleet, and

proved the U-boat's lethal capabilities. Additionally, it caused the U.S. to get more involved. By the end of 1940 the Lend-Lease program was fully underway and by the summer of 1941, U.S. shipyards were producing Liberty ships to replenish the merchant fleet. One significant moment for the Allied effort was the sinking of the German battleship Bismarck on 28 May 1941. This was a testament to the close coordination between British intelligence analysts and operational planners. "The Admiralty's close proximity to its centers of intelligence and analysis proved a priceless advantage, one which enabled it to recover most of the ground lost in the thirty hours or so that Bismarck was outside the British net."[7] Escorted convoys came in all types and sizes throughout the course of the Atlantic Campaign. Many talented ship captains constantly adjusted their convoy tactics to maximize security along their

route. These tactics, techniques, and procedures were commonly disseminated throughout the Allied fleets to spread effective practices for use by other convoys. An example is Royal Canadian Navy Commander J.D. Prentice, one of Canada's more notable Atlantic skippers. He distributed "Hints" memos that "advised escort commanders how best to use their ships and groups in different situations,"[8] for convoy commanders to put in their tactics books.[viii] This practice was common among the Allies but not always adhered to as we'll see later in the case of the Americans.

Since intelligence often drives operations, evolving tactics and doctrine for ASW in the Atlantic levied significant intelligence requirements for the Allies. By the winter of 1940-1941, Allied use of radio intercepts, radar, and direction finding equipment gave appropriate warning of pending U-boat operations. This told the Allies several things. First, that the Germans were monitoring Allied radio traffic as well, and were able to break British codes due to the fact that German deployments of U-boat wolf-packs coincided with that of British convoy movements. Additionally, being able to identify and triangulate German radio traffic alerted the Allies of pending movements, and their limited radar ability allowed them to be tracked to a certain extent.

As is the case with all technological advances, the systems constantly evolved and both sides were in a race to keep their radar capabilities current, as well as codemaking and codebreaking capabilities. This, combined with improved escort tactics, started giving Allied convoys the initiative and not a moment too soon. By "April 1941 shipping losses were such that meat and eggs had virtually vanished from the tables of British families."[9]

In late spring 1941, Allied escorts started sinking U-boats, and by the following summer, convoys were being escorted the entire length of their journey. Additionally, two other critical occurrences happened during this timeframe. First, as a result of

a U-boat seizure, an Enigma machine was captured allowing the Allied Cryptologists at Bletchley Park an opportunity to break the Germans most recent codes. Second, "in May 1941, as a result of the celebrated capture of the U-110, it reconstructed the grid of the whole North Atlantic and most of the Mediterranean."[10] What this did was to not only allow the Allies to decrypt German Enigma traffic, but also to translate the German's unique map coordinate system as well. Alan Turning and the rest of Bletchley Park was a flurry of activity with its latest captured intelligence. "In March, Turning and his machine, the ancestor of all computers, enabled the codebreakers at Bletchley Park to decipher all of Dönitz's submarine communications for the month of February. By May they were reading his signal traffic with a delay of only three to seven days."[11] The rest of 1941 witnessed the Allies stepping up the campaign against the German U-boat wolf-packs. It would not be until the U.S. entered the war officially before the German Navy regained an advantage.

As America was still assessing the entirety of the damage of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany declared war on America and among its first targets was American merchant shipping on the American Atlantic coast. Initially, the U.S. did not adopt a convoy policy, and it was costly for the American merchant industry. "Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, formed the view that weakly escorted convoys would merely provide more plentiful targets than individually sailed ships, and so left America's coastwise traffic to its fate." By the time they American Navy realized their error in August of 1942, the American merchant fleet had lost 609 ships sunk off the American coast. German losses were only 22 U-boats.[12]

There were other Allied shortcomings during the first part of 1942 that supplemented the Kriegsmarine's "Happy Time" as they targeted American coastal

shipping lanes. The German B-dienst had cracked

the British code, and was exploiting it regularly. Additionally, the German Navy tightened up internal security with regards to their four-disc Enigma machine. “The result was that between 1 February 1942 and the following December, Bletchley lost its way into Enigma altogether, with a calamitous impact on sinkings.” The British, in good faith as well as in an effort to reduce ship sinkings, sent senior intelligence officers to America to close the knowledge gap among the Allies. British Commander Roger Winn coordinated directly with the Americans. As a result he “improved cooperation among British, American, and Canadian operational centers eventually helped but it took time to develop the necessary level of expertise on the western side of the Atlantic, and that time was paid for in lost ships and seaman.”[13] The American Navy insisted on learning the hard way, and only later, reluctantly, fell in line with the British and Canadians in intelligence sharing.

By the end of 1942, the convoy battles were pushed away from the American coast and “the great confrontations of the U-boat pack and the convoy escort were largely limited to the mid-Atlantic air gap.”[14] Air cover was still lacking for both sides at this point. The resulting tactical shifts amongst the Allies placed the British fleet responsible for escorting the convoys in the North Atlantic with their more modern radar and direction finding capabilities. The Canadians had radar and direction finding capabilities as well, but not as many and the ones they did have were a generation behind Britain’s capabilities. The Canadians and Americans, with their slower ships, were left to the Central Atlantic, and took heavy casualties toward the end of 1942. “The British were quick to blame Canadian incompetence, but without good radar and Huff/Duff to provide solid tactical intelligence, the RCN fought blindly.”[15] The result was that the Allies survived 1942, but just barely.

But the dark period for the Allies ended by the spring of 1943. Several key events happened to turned the tide in the Allies favor. “The Allies agreed

to return operational control of the North Atlantic convoys east of 47 degrees to the British, giving a single operational authority effective control over battles in the mid-ocean starting on 20 April. They also agreed to reinforce the North Atlantic with more VLR aircraft and to commit long-awaited escort carriers to eliminate the air gap. Support groups were established to provide powerful and timely reinforcement of the surface escorts, and Allied cryptanalysts once again broke the German operational codes." [16] The critical deciphering of German codes gave the Allies an instant advantage. Combined with air cover, and streamlining of the operational command and control, the Allies now had the upper hand. Their hunter and killer escort system was decimating the U-boat fleet in the ensuing convoy battles of 1943. After this the German's were never able to gain the upper hand again in the Atlantic.

Milner set the stage by stating that "by the end of 1943 U-boats were living a fugitive existence in the Atlantic, operating independently and trying not to reveal their presence by transiting radio signals." [17] The Allies had gained such superiority over intelligence and tactics that the U-boats could not coordinate their efforts into wolf-packs any more as to do so would require significant radio traffic, and to do that at this point was suicide. Additionally, the Allied hunter and killer squadrons were able to go on the offensive. "After the defeat of the wolf-packs of the great convoy battles of 1943, the battle of the Atlantic became in many respects a maritime guerrilla war in which individual U-boats were hunted down by the Allies on the high seas." [18] The hunter had now become the hunted. This was not easy though due to the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean. Tracking down an individual submarine required a significant use of signals intelligence. Syrett continues to explain that the only way that the allies could do it is "to intercept and then analyze the radio communications to and from the vessel." [19] By picking up a radio transmission to or from the U-boat, the Allies could

triangulate its location, or at least its general vicinity. At the same time the intercepted transmission was being decrypted and translated. Although the Allies had been doing this since December of 1942, they only started experiencing real success after mid-1943. This caused the U-boats to operate in radio silence for extended periods. “In 1944, some U-boats went for ‘periods as long as 30 or 40 days without making a single radio transmission.’ Thus, the only way that U.S. Navy intelligence, and for that matter the German Befehlshaber der Unterseeboten (BdU), could determine the position of a U-boat maintaining radio silence for long periods of time was through dead reckoning.”[20] It became critical for a U-boat’s survival to maintain radios silence. Whoever

mastered signals intelligence at this point would have the advantage and the Allies maintained the SIGINT upper hand.

Several factors worked to the German’s advantage at the beginning of their U-boat campaigns in the Atlantic. They were quick to exploit the British intelligence that they had access too by mastering the British codes. They were quick to develop their wolfpack tactics, exploiting success on the confused and unorganized Allied convoys and individual merchant ships wandering the shipping lanes of the Atlantic. They had strategic access to the shipping lanes via the ports in France and Norway. Admiral Dönitz’s lessons learned from World War I and his torpedo boat experiments in the interwar years provided his U-boat fleet with a wealth of talented submariners. Additionally, the Kriegsmarine was much more disciplined than the rest of the Wermacht when it came to practicing good operational security and counterintelligence. More often than not they enjoyed intelligence superiority.

The Allies in the beginning didn’t do much to help themselves to defeat this threat. The British were the first ones to enjoy tactical success against the wolfpack tactics by escorting convoys and consistently

and diligently going after the solution to the German Enigma codes. The Canadians (and the Americans when they eventually joined the war) were behind the power curve initially. The difference between the two was that the Canadians largely accepted British tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as shared intelligence whereas the Americans refused British help initially, and only after suffering severe casualties did they agree that sharing intelligence and tactical information would be a good idea.

Once the Allies all agreed on a unity of purpose on the Atlantic, and started to coordinate their efforts, both tactically and with intelligence sharing, they started experiencing success to the point that they were able to capitalize on German Navy deficiencies found in their U-boat fleet. The Allies were the first to use air assets in the Atlantic, which was a huge advantage. The German Navy never really enjoyed the support of any air assets. “The German Navy had almost won the battle for the North Atlantic (and with it likely the war itself), but failed because Hitler and the German General Staff refused to provide the Navy with naval aviation.”[21] The Allies were finally able to make a significant break in the German Naval codes, which was an even larger advantage.

As much as the Germans practiced good radio discipline while underway, as soon as the fight was raging or they started tracking targets, the Germans were profuse with radio traffic, allowing the Allies to hunt them and kill them. As Admiral Schofield points out, the single thing that was responsible for the demise of the U-boats more than anything was “providing the Allied direction finding stations and ships with information of the enemy’s whereabouts was the number of radio signals and messages which U-boats in contact with a convoy transmitted without restriction, because as Dr Rohwer says, ’their presence was already known to the enemy’. Overattention to the countermeasures against radar led to the neglect of those needed to prevent the successful employment of both decryption and direction finding

equipment.”[22] The Allies combination of surface and air deployed radar, radio transmission triangulation, and dead reckoning were highly effective and the U-boat threat waned as the war came to a conclusion. The lessons learned from this campaign were immense to say the least. From the tactical aspect, sharing of knowledge and capabilities among Allies were instrumental, both in a good way as well as in a bad. The Americans were quick to provide the British and Canadian Navies with enough ships (although antiquated) to at least stay in the fight, but yet the American Navy had no interest in learning from the British experience from the beginning of the war. The cost of that was heavy. The Canadians were trying to make do with what they had with regards to their equipment, even by obtaining an older and less effective radar and direction finding system from the British and fielding it in their fleets. But by the time the Canadians reverse engineered their system and fielded it, the British were already fielding more modern radars.

The Allied employment of aviation for reconnaissance and attack purposes greatly enhanced the Allies anti-submarine capabilities toward the end of the Atlantic campaign. Even the American Civil Air Patrol contributed to finding and sinking U-boats. The Germans never had that luxury with no air cover, nor any aerial reconnaissance assets to coordinate efforts with. The breaking of the German Enigma Codes was critical in that it allowed the Allies a glimpse of the German operational plans. The radar and direction finding allowed Allied formations to track U-boats,

Innovation in the Royal Canadian Navy, 1939-1943. Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Society for Military History, Jan. 1984), pp. 19

5 Schofield, B.B. The Defeat of the U-Boats during World War II. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1, The Second World War: Part 1. (Sage Publications Ltd, Jan 1981) pp. 121

6 Murray & Millett, pp. 239

7 Steury, Donald P. Naval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the Sinking of the Bismarck: A Study in the Integration of Intelligence into the Conduct of Naval Warfare. Journal of

Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War (Sage Publications, Ltd. Apr., 1987), pp. 229
8 Milner, pp. 23
9 Hermann, Arthur. To Rule The Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World. (Harper Collins, New York, 2004) pp. 535
10 Keegan, John. Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. (Knopf, New York, 2003) pp. 232
11 Herman, pp. 536
12 Keegan, pp. 234
13 Murray & Millett, pp. 251
14 Milner, pp. 22
15 Milner, Marc. The Battle That Had to Be Won. Naval History. June 2008. pp. 19
16 Milner, pp. 20
17 Milner, pp. 21
18 Syrett, David. Communications Intelligence and the Sinking of the U-1062: 30 September 1944. The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Society for Military History , Oct., 1994), pp. 685
19 Syrett, pp. 688
20 Syrett, pp. 689
21 Lehman, John. On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy. (Free Press, New York, 2001) pp. 233
22 Schofield, pp. 128
23 Murray & Millett, pp. 259
24 Murray & Millett, pp. 260
25 Keegan, pp. 257

but the Enigma codes revealed important battle plans and strategy as well. Murray and Millett also offer another interesting lesson learned. Asserting that in addition to crypto analysis, “as the campaign against British commerce expanded and became ever more complex, the German staff at U-boat Headquarters remained at the same small staffing levels.” [23] In other words, Dönitz worked his staff, much like his U-boat crews, to exhaustion. Additionally, as Murray and Millett point out, his attempt to seal any leaks in his internal security of his staff restricted them even further.

Earlier, Admiral Schofield mentioned that the single biggest factor of the Allied victory in the Atlantic was the signals intelligence toward the end of the war. The ability to hunt and kill U-boats based upon

intercepting their radio signals was undoubtedly significant. Murray and Millett give the British the lion's share of the credit for the victory. "When its leaders recognized the threat, the Royal Navy developed the tactics, the technology, and the leadership to handle the grim business of anti-submarine warfare. The integration of technology into effective tactical systems was crucial to mastering the U-boats in 1943; similarly, the integration of intelligence into the conduct of anti-submarine and convoy operations substantially boosted the chance of victory."[24] Similarly, Keegan concludes that "the Battle of the Atlantic could have been won without the assistance of codebreakers, greatly though they helped to tip the balance in the favour of the defenders."[25] Although the victory cannot be attributed to any one single factor, cryptanalysis, signals intelligence, and reconnaissance were absolutely instrumental in the allied victory.

Major Brian Guenthenspberger, a former Armor Officer, recently completed the National Defense Intelligence College and is currently stationed in Washington, D.C.

ENDNOTES

1 Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett. A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. (Belknap Press, Cambridge, 2000) pp. 235

2 Information regarding the official campaign streamer was taken from the website of the US Naval Historical Center. http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/stream/faq45-20.htm

3 Murray & Millett, pp. 235

4 Milner, Marc. Convoy Escorts: Tactics, Technology and

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The Combined and Joint Nature of Afghan Intelligence- British Air Force Officer Receives Knowlton Award From U.S. Navy MICA Member

Nothing speaks more to the Combined, Joint nature of intelligence operations in Afghanistan than a Navy Officer presenting the Army Knowlton Award to an Air Force Officer, from the United Kingdom, for Counterinsurgency campaign achievements in the world’s most landlocked country. On 3 July 2010, Group Captain Steven Thornber, Royal Air Force, was presented with the Knowlton Award by MICA member Rear Admiral Paul Becker, USN, the Director of Intelligence for the ISAF Joint Command in Kabul. Group Captain Thornber served with distinction amongst his MI Corps peers for the past year as the Deputy Director of Intelligence for the ISAF Joint Command.

Very Respectfully,
Paul Becker
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
CJ2, ISAF Joint Command (IJC)

Augusta MICA Chapter 10K Provides Support to Fisher House

On 27 March 2010, the Augusta MICA chapter hosted its inaugural 10K trail run on Fort Gordon. The event served as a fundraiser for both the Fort Gordon Fisher House as well as the 2010 Army Birthday Ball which the Augusta Chapter is sponsoring.

The event was the brain child of two MICA members, Capt. Rodney Martin and Sgt. 1st Class Nicole Powell, 707th Military Intelligence Battalion. Both avid runners, they explained that they wanted to do something for the Augusta running community and help raise money for noteworthy causes. Almost 200 people participated in the event.

"The Fisher House is an important organization and we are proud to support it," explained Col. D.J. Reyes, 706th Military Intelligence Brigade Commander and Fort Gordon's senior intelligence officer. "They support military families and events like these are just a small way we can give back to those who serve us."

The event concluded with an award ceremony at which time Lt Col Dave May, Augusta MICA "Masters" Chapter President and 707th MI Bn CDR, along with several of event coordinators presented Francisco Cruz, Fort Gordon's Fisher House director, with a check for $1000, proceeds raised by the race.

"If it wasn't for the support of organizations like this and individuals who participate in these events, we wouldn't be able to accomplish what we do. We are unbelievably grateful," Cruz said.

Cruz called the event a huge success, an opinion the organizers agree with. In fact, The Augusta Chapter already has plans to make this an annual event.

"We are excited to be able to add such a great race to the Augusta running community," Powell said. "Both Augusta and Fort Gordon showed us so much support our first year out of the gate. We are looking

forward to making next year even better."
For more info: http://www.facebook.com/pages/MICA-10k-Trail-Run/218490489541

-30-

TRANSFORMING U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: ADAPTING FOR RELEVANCE

This letter discusses the proposed restructuring of the U.S. Army Military Intelligence (MI) force from the perspective of a tactical user. The Army G2, LTG Zahner, has advocated a major overhaul of the MI force structure. The problem with the current force structure is that it remains aligned for a large-scale conflict instead of the reality of full spectrum operations (FSO) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Since 2001, MI has done what most of the rest of the Army has done: fought a new war with the structure available. However, as much of the rest of the Army has transformed to adjust to the current environment, it is past time for the MI force to follow suit.

Is such a major change truly necessary? The CJ2 for ISAF in Afghanistan, MG Flynn, certainly argues so. In his January 2010 assessment *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, he argues that MI is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy-clearly an overwhelming disappointment requiring action.

So what changes need to be made? While multiple proposals remain up for consideration, they all surround making MI relevant by taking troops from strategic INSCOM or operational roles and placing them 'in the fight' at the tactical level. When the majority of U.S. Army MI Soldiers are outside of the tactical deployment cycle, they cheat the deployed tactical Army out of the intelligence support they deserve. Given the national priority of Iraq and Afghanistan-not to mention the fact that the Army continues to fight these wars every day-why is U.S.

Army MI not more heavily involved in the tactical fight? I see no reasonable answer-therefore requiring changes such as LTG Zahner is proposing. As a BN S2 in Baghdad in OIF-1, I was disappointed with the capabilities that MI brought to the fight. Although thousands of Soldiers exist within the Army MI structure, it seemed to me that very few were focused at the tactical level where the fight in Iraq would actually be won or lost. With limited external intelligence support, our BN S2 shop merely did the best we could at directing our armored task force with our own intellectual capabilities and the ideas we came up with. Although great improvements to the MI structure have been made in the last 7 years, I sympathize greatly with MG Flynn's argument that MI should certainly be more relevant.

After being at the tactical level for 5 years, I spent the next 5 years in INSCOM assignments. I became aware of the vast technologies and resources available within the field of MI, yet was also incredibly disappointed with their limited impact to the tactical user. LTG Zahner's call for MI rebalancing is a simple function of adapting to change. When the environment changes, any successful organization must adapt to meet the new challenges instead of remaining fixed on 'what worked last time.' The U.S. Army MI force now stands at a crossroads, and must rebalance to establish relevance to the current wars.

MAJ David Hazelton

MAJ Hazelton has had experiences at the tactical level as a BN S2 for 1-37 AR BN in OIF-1, and subsequently served five years in INSCOM units. He recently graduated from the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

Editor's Note: Leadership at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) in conjunction with TRADOC Headquarters and the DA G2 are currently staffing MI Redesign/Rebalance initiatives for decision by the Army's leadership. Some force structure changes have already been approved.

MICA is the national professional fraternal association
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Colonel Lew Thompson Remembered

On March 15, 2010, the MI Corps lost a superb intelligence professional. COL Lew Thompson, past Commander of the 902nd MI Group passed away after a seven month battle with cancer. He is pictured above with his personal staff at the 902nd. MAJ George Bratcher, one of those staff officers, currently with the 513 MI Brigade, Fort Gordon, stated, "as many will say in the coming days, we lost a great MI professional. As a young 2LT, he provided me the type of mentorship and leadership expected of senior MI leaders. As an OCS alumni, we were so proud of his induction into the OCS Hall of Fame. You are a true Eagle"!

The text from his obituary read,

Lewis Hiram Thompson, Jr., 59, of Glenwood, MD, passed away Monday March 15, 2010 after a courageous battle with pancreatic cancer. He is survived by his wife, Abigail M. Thompson, and his sons Zachary (20) and Nicholas (17), as well as siblings, Gary Thompson (NC), Roger Thompson (TX), Brenda Hester, Jackie Hannah, and Pattie Davis (all in GA). A retired U.S. Army Colonel, Lew spent 30 years in Military Intelligence, followed by eight years as a defense contractor, recently with QinetiQ North America. A funeral mass was held on Friday, March 19, 2010 at St. Louis Catholic Church, Clarksville MD. Interment was at Arlington National Cemetary. Memorial donations may be made to Lew Thompson's Sons' Education Fund, c/o Raymond James, Attn: William Wagner, 11335 Gold Express, Suite 125, Gold River CA 95670 or John Hopkins Kimmel Cancer Center, Baltimore MD 21201.

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