

2nd Quarter 2008



# *THE VANGUARD*

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**Cover:** Memorial Day, May 26, 2008 at Historic Fort Huachuca Cemetery. Photos by Katherine Smith.

# Memorial Day Service—Fort Huachuca



Major General John Custer delivering the Memorial Day address at the Ft Huachuca cemetery May 26, 2008.

The Army's Intelligence Center Deputy Commandant, Jerry Proctor, and his wife, attending the ceremony at Fort Huachuca's historic cemetery.

1SG Glenn Driver, (A Co, 305th MI Bn, 111th MI Bde) and SFC Eugene Yockey, (HHC, USAIC&FH and Sergeant Audy Murphy Club President) both members of the SAMC providing Memorial Day support to the Fort Huachuca and Sierra Vista community.



# Notes from the Vice President

Dear Colleagues,

Welcome all MICA members to the 2nd Quarter edition of *THE VANGUARD*. In this issue we have a number of outstanding articles provided by our membership. We will be publishing selected articles from our MICA Writer's Program from the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Leaders Course (MIBOLC) and the Military Intelligence Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC). I would like to personally thank Captain Tom Pike and Command Sergeant Major Maurice Mitchell for their continued support to our organization and this publication. I encourage all MICA members and corporate sponsors to submit articles for potential Vanguard publications. The submission deadline for the fall edition is 15 August 2008

As a new feature in this edition we are including an interview or "*SPOTLIGHT ON*" a MICA member from our association. These interviews will provide a snapshot of our membership and will discuss issues they consider to be important to the Military Intelligence Corps. If you or someone you know would be interested in being interviewed for future "*SPOTLIGHT ON*" features please send email to Vanguard@micorps.org.

Of particular importance in this issue you will see we are accepting nominations for our elected MICA National Committee officials. We will be holding elections for the MICA President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer positions. Nominations will be accepted through July 15 2008. Please see the nomination form and options for submittal in this edition of *THE VANGUARD* (page 5). Elections will be held during the month of August, 2008. At that time, members will be requested to log on to our www.micorps.org website, click on the 2008 Elections button and vote.

Thank you for your continued support to the MI Corps. Always Out Front,

—D.C. Schmidt, Vice President, MICA

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Please check your mailing label with every issue of *THE VANGUARD*. Your membership expiration date is shown next to your name. You can easily renew online by logging into the member area at www.micorps.org.

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In honor of June 6, 1944

# OMAHA

By Sean T. Yeterian

What gathers on strips of sand and shells?  
What patrons of frequent occasion?  
With children's laughter and soothing swells,  
Caressing the strands of its' station.

Where elements join in loving embrace,  
Where "carefree" is again redefined,  
Flourishing romance in this utopian place,  
Callers reflect and unwind;

On these breezy shores too oft we've seen,  
A place many thought distant and lost,  
Crimson replaced the blues, whites, and greens,  
Innocence and life were the cost;

In 1944, 6 June our lord,  
On ragged seas afloat,  
Freedoms deliverance huddled aboard,  
On churning warrior boats,

Children themselves, not long men in green,  
Adolescence still coursing their veins,  
Pictures of lovers in pockets unseen,  
And letters were all that remained;

With each slamming passage through seas unforgiving,  
As the waves waft these soldiers near,  
They are defiant! They'll go on living!  
They don't know the meaning of fear!

Artillery explodes! Then gunfire snaps!  
This epic shouldn't last them too long,  
Transports become unwitting death traps!  
The Hun's just can't be this strong!

A new smell emerges among salty sea air,  
Of gunpowder charges and blood,  
Pouring from vessels, men in despair,  
Ever forward through a tumultuous flood,

Flood of the waters, pulling them under,  
With the weight of their craft still attached,  
Flood of their brothers torn apart in the thunder,  
Could it be that they might be outmatched?

Flood of the bullets spraying each swell,  
As if each wave could somehow be killed,,  
Flood of explosions, a deliverance from hell,  
As the Omaha beaches were filled;

Boots finding bottom; the sea is now is fading;  
Crashing waves to their backs, soaking wet,  
Men in their gun sights, the enemy's waiting!  
No time for anger, sadness, regret;

Hiding behind obstacles meant for...  
...The destruction of each craft injected,  
Crawling slow forward, reinforcements are sent for,  
One moves deeper, three others rejected;

Naval gunfire, missing far, missing wide;  
Soldiers are losing their grip;  
The battle is sliding to the enemy's side,  
Warrior footholds are starting to slip;

A voice deep in their hearts, not wanting to die,  
Emerges loudly in each hungry soul,  
"Death if we quit, and death if we try!"  
As they surge toward their ultimate goal;

Moving at sprint, then covering down,  
To the base of the cliffs sure to hide,  
Silhouettes of Huns at the edge of the town,  
Their security of victory denied;

Gauging a pillbox, grenades lofted ahead,  
Gods wrath spilling on this foreign land,  
Now the enemy felt these charging undead,  
Tasting their salt, and rubbed by their sand;

Bullets searing through hedges, while building walls  
tumbled,  
German hands reached for the skies,  
Masters no longer, their might has been humbled,  
Did they still believe Hitlers foul lies?

As the thundering tapered, gunfire crackles still,  
Boys now men did gather their spirit,  
Tending their wounds amongst the dead and the ill,  
A new cry echoed for those who would hear it;

“Hey Jimmy, where are ya? Hey Mike, you seen Jim?  
We was together when we jumped in the sea!  
Stormin’ the beach was the last time I seen him,  
And I told him to stay real close to me!”

A logical man would tell you the ocean,  
Washed the crimson away from the sands,  
But it is equally possible, you must consider the notion,  
Soldiers’ tears cleansed these tormented lands;

As I walk down these beaches and consider their past,  
I think of heroes who fell on these shores,  
The avengers of freedom, who allowed freedom to last,  
By repelling the enemy hoards;

Now at their grave sight overlooking the seas,  
Normandy embraced by the greens, whites, and blues,  
Sailboats are gliding with the north ocean breeze,  
Beach pedestrians now are the views;

What gathers on strips of sand and shells?  
What patrons of frequent occasion?  
With children’s laughter and soothing swells,  
Caressing the strands of its’ station.

Where elements join in loving embrace,  
Where “carefree” is again redefined,  
Flourishing romance in this utopian place,  
Callers reflect and unwind.

It was the late summer of 99, Y2K was looming ominously ahead and a century of technological advances was pushing us ruthlessly forward. The future seemed hopeful and our lessons of the past appeared to have had an effect. But that didn’t change the operational tempo of a Field Artillery unit. We remained ever vigilant and always trained. Grafenwoehr training area knew me well and Camp Aachen seemed like a second home. So when the chance to join a brigade staff ride to Normandy came along I seized the opportunity. Not because of any intense interest in the history of the region, but because I needed the break.

*I stood silently in that cemetery, like in a dream, looking out over the cliffs at a scene not much different than any other coastal scene I had witnessed before. Monterey, Pismo Beach, Avalon, Riccione, Athens, Marathon, Heriklion, and Lloret del Mar, all carried a similar look and feel. But there was an exception. With an brisk breezy chill and gentle ocean spray to my front, I could feel those nine thousand three hundred and eighty seven white crosses on one hundred and seventy two acres to my back. No one was around so I allowed the moment to overwhelm me.*

I kept that moment in my heart and returned to Bamberg, Germany with an urge to write about it. That is when Omaha was written. On my next staff ride to Normandy I was offered the opportunity to read it out loud on the beach. A powerful and memorable moment in my life.

It was in the late summer of 99 that I was transformed. I better understood the meaning of sacrifice.

Enjoy the poem and please remember the sacrifices of our nations past. You see, it would appear that we haven’t learned the lessons of this recent century quite as well as we had hoped. So don’t forget our second “greatest generation” deployed tonight and send along a prayer.

*Sean T. Yeterian is a retired US Army Sergeant Major who served for 28 years.*



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# Lives of Others

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by John Davis

Throughout the Cold War, a relentless barrier separated the Western allies from the Soviet Bloc. This inhuman frontier was made of concrete walls, barbed wire, vicious dogs, machineguns, mines and guard towers and ran the width of Europe. Early in my military career, I spent time at the Berlin Wall and along this inner-German Border, or Iron Curtain. There I only saw my enemy through binoculars, or as a gray presence far away. It was only years and years later, as a middle aged man, that I was given the chance to see them as they saw themselves, in the remarkable German movie, "The Lives of Others." For that revelation, I have to thank the quiet star of that film, Ulrich Muhe.

In a strange way I believe I know Ulrich Muhe. He is the great German actor whose stellar career was capped when he won personal, international honors for his role as the Secret East German State Security, or 'Stasi', officer in "The Lives of Others". This German production won the Oscar for best foreign film in 2007. In this movie he portrayed with uncanny clarity the inner turmoil of a true believing Communist security officer whose society, decayed from within, employs his secret skills to elicit information from an entourage of literary and artistic fellow citizens. When he learns he serves only his masters' personal aims, rather than those of the national security, he gradually rebels at the hypocrisy and corruption. He truly portrayed a conscience in turmoil.

Muhe was born in a little town named Grimma, in what was once the Communist East 'German Democratic Republic' district of Saxony. He was only a few months younger than me. He became a construction worker out of school, then served his national service as a guard at the Berlin Wall, or as the Communists would have called it then, the "anti-fascist protection wall". I believe that it was there, while doing his duty at the wall, he changed. I know it changed me.

In 1977, as a young artillery officer, I saw the Iron Curtain for the first time. It impressed me, raised in St. Louis, Missouri, so much so that upon my return I reflected upon that modern barrier at that time:

"Westminster College, Missouri, is an ocean and a continent away from Hof, West Germany. What they have in common is the Iron Curtain. Winston Churchill coined the phrase at Westminster during a commencement exercise. Graduates of that day over 30 years ago can still see the subject of his address if they were to visit Hof, a post of the US Army in Bavaria.

A tour of the inner-German border, or Iron Curtain, is conducted there by members of an American armored cavalry regiment. The tour is somber, with undertones of a bazaar side show. Held behind a relentless apparatus of steel, concrete, dogs, machine-guns, soldiers, and landmines is the 'new socialist society'. As far as the eye can see, the fence complex reaches across town, fields and hills. But people built the thing.

I imagine macabre East German engineering awards distributed for wall innovations. Here a stipend for self-firing devices activated by a person attempting to scale the wall. There professional recognition for the creator of the iron bar that can stop 32 tons of pressure. Who could this be? Why?

The permanence of the fortified border is more psychological than physical. No construction expense is too great to impede a new escape technique, but in the end, the mind is the greatest deterrent to escape. Each two million Mark kilometer of barrier is supported by a communist miasma of half-truths and lies. Together they serve to keep the people in a constant atmosphere of distrust. Distrust is rewarded in that strange land. The armed apostles of the new socialist faith always travel in pairs, one to prevent the other from escaping. Who will report me? Who will report my plans? These are the questions that stop escapes, more so than barbed wire, dogs and mines.

'Go ahead, Comrade, escape to the West. We still have the wife and kids.' This cynical choice is a fact of East German life. This is what passes for a modern 20th century civilized nation. Hostage taking was outlawed by Pope Innocent III in another age, termed dark.

In a field not far from Hof, a balloon carrying two escaping East German families landed. These families will always hold a special place with me in the years to come when I remember Hof. They are free now, just as we are. They prove that even beyond the wall there will always be places where thoughts remain free."

I had no idea then that perhaps I was describing the turmoil really working upon the soul of the guard, Ulrich Muhe. For all I knew, he was literally one of the guards I saw 'over there', beyond the wall in the east at that very moment. They were forbidden to wave at us, and had to hold the binoculars to their eyes whenever they looked across the border towards us in the West.

A miasma of distrust is what characterized that dictatorship. Muhe left his military service after his time at the wall and became an actor. He became an actor because he believed that at least in that profession, in that country, people spoke the truth to one another. Upon the collapse of the wall and the end of Communist East Germany in 1989, he learned differently. Given access

to his Stasi files, he learned that not only four of his closest colleagues, but his very wife, were compelled to inform on him for years.

Wholly one out of every 14 people in the Stalinist East 'German Democratic Republic' were either willing or co-opted workers for the secret security apparatus. Imagine the anguish of learning that those you trusted, those you loved, had informed against you. Imagine then as they secretly confessed to communist agents about your political loyalties, your beliefs, and your every action. Imagine too that this wasn't enough. The Stasi were masters of the telephone tap, the hidden camera, the surveillance personnel, the faked encounter, the elicitation and the ultimate betrayal. This was life in a police state. This is when Ulrich Muhe finally said 'enough'.

Ulrich Muhe stood before all the cameras of the world in 1989, when it took great courage since the Communists

had not yet given in, and spoke at Alexander Platz, the Times Square of old East Berlin. He denounced the Communist system, and demanded freedom of speech and freedom from police state oppression.

Thus, when in later years he portrayed someone living under that system, he was wholly prepared, indeed by his entire lifetime, to do so. He was quite literally born for that role. His characterization of what it meant to live in that place, in those times, will live forever. When asked about his success, it is said his response was, "I remember." Ulrich Muhe died of stomach cancer at the age of 54 only months after the Lives of Others won the Oscar in 2007. He was born for his star, because he remembered, and told the truth. He helped me understand someone I once thought was my enemy; he made me a better man.



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## MICA National Committee Elections

We are accepting nominations for our elected MICA National Committee officials. We will be holding elections for the MICA President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer positions. Nominations will be accepted through July 15 2008. You can submit nominations two ways: you may use the following nomination form (mail to: MICA Elections, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670); or fill in the online nomination form at [www.micorps.org](http://www.micorps.org). Elections will be held during the month of August 2008. At that time, you will be requested to log on to our [micorps.org](http://micorps.org) website, click on the 2008 Elections button and vote for your candidate.

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Phone: \_\_\_\_\_

Email: \_\_\_\_\_

Brief Biography: \_\_\_\_\_

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# Survival – An Analytical Perspective

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By 2LT Beau Teal

Throughout the history of mankind, situations from simple to complex have challenged the mind. The strength of the mind and its ability to interpret and process data continues to be paramount in the decisions we make when faced with these situations. Richards Heuer, Jr. portrays his viewpoint on thinking in his book *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* that the human mind is flawed and we must apply methodologies in order to remove them. Another viewpoint is that of Malcolm Gladwell, who believes that through time and experience, experts are able to develop their instincts and ‘gut-feelings’ and apply these to complex situations. Each author recognizes that his viewpoint is not an all-encompassing theory and there exceptions. However, each theory is relevant when applied to acts of survival.

In survival situations, complex and unpredictable factors challenge the mind more than in perhaps any other situation. One is suddenly immersed in conditions beyond one’s control - affected by weather, climate, terrain, injury, scarcity of resources – and those in survival situations must make decisions quickly and clearly. In fact, often times one must just know what to do or “think without thinking,”<sup>1</sup> as Gladwell states in his book *Blink*. However, once the instincts and ‘gut-feelings’ have performed their job, one must then apply Heuer’s methodologies in order to maintain his or her survival. One must make a plan as Laurence Gonzales explains in *Deep Survival*, his scientific approach to survival. Applying Gladwell and Heuer’s viewpoints to the following survival examples will allow a greater understanding of the human mind and its flaws when analyzing these complex situations.

On a Saturday in late April, 2003, proven mountain climber Aron Ralston travelled from his home in Aspen, Colorado to Utah’s Moab Desert for a weekend canyoneering trip. Once reaching the Canyonlands National Park, he mountain biked and hiked into Horseshoe Canyon and by early afternoon transitioned to the slot canyoneering portion of his trek. Upon entering the canyon, he faced many chockstone rocks and boulders caught between the one to three-foot walls, which he was forced to traverse, either over or under. Next, Ralston used a technique called chimneying in order to reach the height of one of the boulders in his path. This allowed him to climb over the boulder and descend to the other side. While descending though, he loosened the boulder causing it and another to fall toward his head directly after he landed on the canyon floor. He blocked his face using his left arm as the initial

Figure 1: Day one of Ralston’s entrapment in Horseshoe Canyon.\*



rock smashed it against the wall as the subsequent boulder fell pinning and crushing his right arm to the opposing wall.<sup>2</sup> With only a few bean burritos, a liter of water, the clothes on his back, his climbing equipment, an inexpensive utility tool, and a headlamp, Ralston managed to survive six days before freeing himself and finding aid and exit from the Moab Desert.

Malcolm Gladwell discusses what he calls the adaptive unconsciousness in *Blink*. This is “the part of our brain that leaps to conclusions ... It is thought of as a kind of giant computer that quickly and quietly processes a lot of the data we need in order to keep functioning as human beings.”<sup>3</sup> He then states, “...decisions made very quickly can be every bit as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately.”<sup>4</sup>

Ralston made the decision within the first hour that amputating his own arm would give him his best chance to survive, following a few unrewarding attempts at less drastic measures. He also quickly determined that his water amount was much too low to last any prolonged length of time in that canyon, therefore fighting his initial urge to consume all of it. His instincts were sharp.

Gladwell writes, “Snap judgements and rapid cognition take place behind a locked door ... I don’t think we are very good at dealing with the fact of that locked door. Its one thing to acknowledge the enormous power of snap judgements and thin slicing but quite another to place our trust in something so seemingly mysterious.”<sup>5</sup> He later states, “We need to respect the fact that it is possible to know without knowing why we know and accept that – sometimes – we’re better off that way.”<sup>6</sup>

Next Ralston made a plan, the second reason he survived. He did not wait for rescue (although he hoped for it), but made his own. He regulated his actions and assigned himself tasks. Jack Davis writes in the introduction to *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* that one of Heuer’s three fundamental points about the cognitive challenges that intelligence analysts face is, “Tools and techniques that gear the analyst’s mind to apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analy-

sis on complex issues...”<sup>7</sup> These include “techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions, and exploring alternative interpretations.”<sup>8</sup> Ralston accomplished this in a variety of ways. He rationed his water as much as possible, drinking only a sip every ninety minutes. When out of water, he forced himself to drink his own urine. His food quantity was limited at best. He set up a feeding schedule, eating only enough to sustain, knowing it would not last long. He periodically took pictures and videotaped his situation, benchmarking the times during his imprisonment as well as recording messages for his family and friends to view at a later date. He also used his climbing rope as extra ‘clothing’ wrapping it around his arms and legs to keep warm at night.

Ralston’s instincts and his disciplined methods allowed him to survive and finally climb out of the slot canyon (with one arm), travel on foot several miles until soliciting the aid of a family of day hikers, and reach a nearby hospital via helicopter to be treated.

Another of Heuer’s three fundamental points about the cognitive challenges that intelligence analysts face is “the mind is poorly ‘wired’ to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog fabricated by denial and deception operations),”<sup>9</sup> Davis writes.

In 1971, lightning split a Lockheed Electra airplane forcing it to crash into the triple canopy jungle of Peru. Juliane Koepcke was the lone survivor of that flight; she was seventeen years of age. What’s more amazing is that a dozen other passengers survived the crash, but not the jungle.<sup>10</sup> While all of the passengers’ fate may have been in someone else’s hands during the descent and landing, it was his or hers to control (at least partially) from there.

So then, how did Juliane Koepcke survive? Simply stated, she executed both Gladwell and Heuer’s viewpoints. Koepcke spent little time determining that rescue aircraft would never view her from above and therefore must exit the jungle. She followed rivers travelling downhill and stumbled upon a hut eleven days later where she was found the next day and finally transported to medical personnel for care. Equipped with only the exposure of being in similar jungle with her researcher parents (her mother was killed in the crash) and a few survival facts, she seemed to manage remarkably. She was not well-trained or highly experienced. Nor did inherent or induced uncertainty keep her from making decisions (mostly good) in an extremely complicated situation. She followed her instincts and applied methodologies. The rest of the crash survivors on the other hand remained in their original location, awaiting rescue, and eventually died. They were perhaps not “wired to deal



**Figure 2: Recent film image of Koepcke sitting adjacent to wreckage of the Lockheed Electra in the Peruvian jungle.\***

effectively”<sup>11</sup> with their complex situation.

Both Heuer and Gladwell’s viewpoints are valid. Some humans have inherently flawed minds that only adding a methodology to can fix, while others have accurate intuitions and ‘gut-feelings’ developed through experience and training, both when facing complex situations.

Then how does one explain Koepcke’s lack of training and experience? In *Deep Survival*, Gonzales has a conversation with Kenneth Hill, a Search and Rescue (SAR) manager, who states, “The category that has one of the highest survival rates is children six years of age and under, the very people we are most worried about.”<sup>12</sup> Gonzales offers that the reason for this may simply be that children that young have not developed certain abilities yet. They make decisions to stay comfortable (sleep when tired, warm-up when cold, aren’t in a hurry, etc) which keeps them alive. They follow their instincts.

Conversely, the age group with one of the lowest survival rates is the six to twelve year olds, as they have begun to develop and adopt adult biases, traits, and abilities to think.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps this is the beginning of the man-made fog inducing uncertainty as Heuer explains.

One would find it very hard to argue that Koepcke survived because she was child-like, but maybe her parents engrained in her during her upbringing a certain comfort in the jungle and in solitary situations, not to mention a certain coolness, a collectiveness.

In January 1982, Steven Callahan set out on an estimated one month solo voyage across the Atlantic Ocean in his 21-foot cruiser from Spain to the Caribbean. Days into his journey, a violent storm sank his sailboat forcing him to survive on the open seas for months in a dinghy.<sup>14</sup>

Gonzales writes, “Survival starts before the accident.”<sup>15</sup> He continues later, “A survival situation brings

out the true, underlying personality. Our survival kit is inside us. But unless it is there before the accident, it is not going to appear magically at the moment it's needed."<sup>16</sup> Callahan was an experienced and well-trained sailor. He designed his own vessel to prolong sinking with many watertight compartments. His dinghy was of greater size being a six-person raft. His survival bag was well-stocked for just this kind of scenario. He was also well read on maritime survival situations. "There are few perfect survivors. Steve Callahan may be one,"<sup>17</sup> according to Gonzales.

Callahan's 'gut-feeling' kicked in immediately following his accident. Being asleep when it occurred, he awoke, grabbed his knife, and failed in his attempt to free his survival bag from its lines. He then boarded his life-raft. He knew that his sailboat would not sink immediately and therefore should remain tied to it as long as possible. Next, he decided that he could not survive without his well-equipped survival bag. So he plunged into the ocean, diving back into the sinking boat and retrieved it. His instincts were clear and concise. He followed them.

Callahan critically analyzed his situation and made a plan. He kept a journal tracking his voyage. This helped maintain order and set a routine. He drank only half of a pint of his water per day. His senses were astute enough to keep from crying as he could not afford the fluid loss. Callahan held himself in check, watching closely for signs of self mutiny. He was his own leader. He used a cheap spear gun to shoot fish to include dorados providing sustenance for much of his journey. He patched his raft when it was punctured and created a sextant using a pencil to navigate.

Callahan survived seventy-six days at sea, completing his solo excursion across the Atlantic Ocean, most of it occurring in his raft. He was so calm and collected when he reached the Caribbean, that he refused the assistance of the fishing vessel's captain that spotted him first, saying, "No, I'm O.K. I have plenty of water. I can wait. You fish. Fish!"<sup>18</sup> as he drank four pints in his own glory.

All of the survival situations discussed above required more than tools or know-how. All of them involved solo survivors who relied on a sharp instinct or 'gut-feeling' and a methodology or plan in order to survive. Each of them subscribed to Richards Heuer, Jr.'s viewpoint as well as Malcolm Gladwell's outlook. Studying these survival situations and applying these thinking experts' viewpoints provided a greater understanding of the human mind and its flaws when analyzing complex situations.

**Figure 3: Callahan using self-made sextant while navigating across the Atlantic Ocean.\***



## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Gladwell, Malcolm, *Blink*, (New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), cover.
- <sup>2</sup> Ralston, Aron, *Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, (New York: Atria Books, 2004), 23.
- <sup>3</sup> Gladwell, Malcolm, *Blink*, (New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), 11.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 14.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 51.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, 52.
- <sup>7</sup> Heuer, Jr., Richards J., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, (Langley, Virginia: CIA, 1999), xx.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, xxi.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, xx.
- <sup>10</sup> Gonzales, Laurence, *Deep Survival*, (New York: Norton, 2004), 172-74.
- <sup>11</sup> Heuer, Jr., Richards J., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, (Langley, Virginia: CIA, 1999), xx.
- <sup>12</sup> Gonzales, Laurence, *Deep Survival*, (New York: Norton, 2004), 170.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, 171.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 193.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 195.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 223.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 208.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 226.

\*Figure 1: Ralston, Aron, *Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, (New York: Atria Books, 2004).

\*Figure 2: Herzog, Vernor, *Wings of Hope*, (Germany, 2000).

\*Figure 3: Callahan, Steven, *Adrift*, (New York: Mariner Books, 2002), cover.

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# Clear, Hold, Build: Modern Political Techniques in COIN

by 2LT Ahern

“Clear, Hold, Build”<sup>1</sup> is the stated policy and doctrine for the US military to succeed in the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. This paper discusses the leveraging of domestic political campaigning tools as a way to improve the “Clear, Hold, Build” strategy at the Brigade and Battalion level. This paper highlights the role of the S-2 in leveraging some domestic political tools, how these tools might be used, and the importance of using political tools in a localized, proactive, and comprehensive approach.

The “Clear, Hold, Build” method was doctrinally established in FM 3-24 and endorsed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005:


In short, with the Iraqi Government, our political-military strategy has to be to clear, hold, and build: to clear areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions.<sup>2</sup>

This tactic, as defined by the 3-24 divided into three phases:

- 1) **Clear** the area by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants
- 2) **Hold** the area with security forces (ideally HN forces), in order to effectively reestablish a HN government presence at the local level
- 3) **Build** support for the HN government by protecting the populace and improving economic, social, cultural, and medical needs<sup>3</sup>

FM 3-24 provides the commander on the ground considerable freedom in deciding how to implement “Clear, Hold, Build” in his Area of Operations (AO). Importantly, FM 3-24 cites the needs for a coordinated IO campaign at all stages to support the COIN effort. Also, it notes that “the most important activities during the build stage are conducted by nonmilitary agencies.”<sup>4</sup> This statement highlights the importance of coordinating with groups that are not typically associated with military activity, key to this coordination is leveraging assets that allow commanders to understand the social relationships in their AO.

Understanding the environment, including the social dynamics, is key to undertaking a successful “clear, hold, build” strategy. At the tactical level, there are many assets which should be critical in assisting the commander. These assets range from the Soldier on patrol everyday



to Human Contact Teams to Special Operation units such as Civil Affairs. These elements are ideal sources of information concerning the different personalities and dynamics that work within a given AO. In a “clear, hold, build” strategy the society relationships are a center of gravity for successful operations.

If the relationships can be discerned, then meaningful actions can be undertaken to prevent the insurgents from controlling the AO or intimidating, and resupplying within the AO.

There are political tools and capabilities in the United States that are not traditionally utilized by the military. The importance in a COIN fight of “fighting politically” has been stressed both in the 3-24 and by other commentators, such as John A. Nagel in “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife”. In addition, the United States is one of the most politically active countries in the world, yet military commanders are often left without some of the most basic tools any basic “political campaign” would have. Political expertise, advertising consultants, polling and other metric analysis, and grassroots organizers are part of every successful political campaign, but not currently within the capabilities of the tactical commander. The utilization of domestic political campaign tools could have a dramatic effect on the “clear, hold, build” operations.

Political expertise is most evident in the domestic political area when it is used to formulate and execute a comprehensive plan for a given neighborhood – often called “grassroots organization”. This type of organization combines local organizations and political support, advertising and other aspects of Information Operations (IO) to build and maintain political bases of support. For example, a mayor running for reelection would harness his political support and gain endorsements, advertise across a wide spectrum of media (internet, loudspeakers, leaflets etc), and use other types of political actions to highlight his contribution and usefulness. Modern successful political campaigns combine organization,

unity of message, integrated advertising, and utilization of existing political structures. This expertise should be utilized in “building” popular support and political will in the COIN environment.

The importance of IO is not overlooked in FM 3-24: “Commanders can use IO to increase popular support”<sup>5</sup> FM 3-24 goes on to specify that different groups need different messages. The same was observed in America’s political landscape and is epitomized by former House Speaker Tip O’Neill’s comment “All politics is local.” Therefore, the local commander on the ground must create and implement an IO strategy particular to his AO. For an IO strategy, to be effective, it must be tailored to the target audience, operational tempo, and cultural landscape. In a domestic political campaign the “message”, or central theme of the campaign, is at the center, while all other actions support it. A campaign is said to have “gotten off track” or “failed” when it has gotten “off message”. An action that does not support the message, or theme of the campaign, or one that is not publicized, is not useful. All actions support and are supported by the “IO” (advertising) campaign in order to be effective in building and maintaining supporters. This approach is similar to the one used by the insurgents: their actions are often filmed and put on the internet. Actions that do not support their message – one where US forces succeed – are not publicized or are subject to counter-propaganda.

The US has some of the most sought after media and advertising consultants in the world. If the military were to seek out this expertise and harness it more effectively, at the Brigade and below level, combine it with local expertise and then craft messages – a process well understood in advertising and especially political advertising – their IO campaigns would be more effective.

Leveraging local political knowledge would not take the form of dispatching New York City ad executives to a combat zone. Instead, the process of message development would take place leveraging the Army’s communication technology, combined with on the ground knowledge and native expertise and resources to create effective messages. This can be done by possibly networking Battalions and Brigades with domestic political consultants. Implementation and feedback would then be used to refine the message and make it even more effective. The pairing of civilian expertise to military need has already taken place, with several programs, such as the Human Terrain Team, which places cultural anthropologists and sociologists to offer “cultural intelligence” to the commander, and USAID’s Office of Military Affairs.

The inherently political nature of a COIN fight makes the use of tools usually used by politics particularly ap-

propriate. One of the most visible, and useful tools is the poll. The poll takes many forms in modern politics and serves many purposes. The most well known is the poll that indicates the popularity of one candidate or another. However, in a typical political campaign there are many more “internal” polls that indicate how a target audience feels about the candidate and issues; these polls are used to “leverage” issues into political support for the candidate. Polls are also not only informative; the “push-poll” is a poll designed not to inform, but to sway the audience being polled by posing hypothetical questions about the opposition. For example, a push poll question might be “would you support candidate X if you found out that he was indicted for fraud in the 1980s?”

The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) is a program developed by the USAID Office of Military Affairs (OMA):

The TCAF is a simple and standardized diagnostic tool used to gather information from local inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in a unit’s area of operation.<sup>6</sup>

The framework pairs a short questionnaire (poll) with detailed analysis to determine, along with other sources of intelligence, the causes of instability / insurgency in the area.<sup>7</sup> After analysis, programs are developed that “increase support for the government, decrease support for the insurgents, and increase governmental capability and capacity.”<sup>8</sup>

The TCAF is a good example of how common tools used in other areas of politics can be used in the most “political” fight the military engages in, counterinsurgency. The TCAF pairs the capabilities of the military to physically encounter the population on a regular basis, analyze, collate, exploit data, and synthesize it into a product used for planning. This discipline is at the core of the S2 function in “clear, hold, build”, but with an expanded set of tools and methodologies.

The ground commander has enormous leeway in a COIN fight. “Clear, Hold, Build” is the political/military strategy selected by the civilian political leaders such as Secretary of State Rice, and is a stated doctrine of the US Army in the 3-24. In “Clear, Hold, Build” Information Operations are very important. The ground commander has a wide range of tools at his disposal. Adding tools used by domestic political campaigns – “messaging”, grassroots organizations, and polling, to this set of tools would make units even more effective. The US is one of the world leaders in political campaigning, and the use of America’s political expertise is a logical step in the continued development of COIN doctrine and implementation.

## Endnotes

1. Graphic from the Author
2. Rice, Condoleezza. "Iraq and U.S. Policy."
3. FM 3-24 Para 5-51 – 5-78
4. FM 3-24 Para 5-80
5. FM 3-24 Para 5-76
6. Derleth, James. The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework
7. Ibid
8. Ibid.

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# Countering the Regeneration of the Taliban in Pakistan

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## Strategic Intelligence Paper

by SFC Lee K. Yoneyama

4th Platoon, ANCOG

### Executive Summary

Issue: What is the best move for the U.S. to take with the regeneration of the Taliban in Pakistan?

After more than six years of fighting Operation Enduring Freedom the Taliban, which harbored Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization al-Qaeda, is currently experiencing a rebirth in Pakistan threatening the stability of the region and the success of the Global War on Terrorism.

The solution to this issue is to attack the underlying economic and political reasons for the regeneration of the Taliban while securing the Afghanistan border by pushing Pakistan to fully cooperate in joint operations. Our efforts must continue to focus on providing the basic necessities of housing, drinking water, electricity, medical facilities, education, security, and employment.

If we fail to effectively deal with this growing threat we not only jeopardize our standing within the international community, but the possibility exists that the Taliban could establish a base to support militant Islamic extremists capable of global acts of terror.

### Countering the Regeneration of the Taliban in Pakistan

On October 7, 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom began with an aerial bombing campaign. More than six years later the Taliban are a growing threat in Pakistan. They threaten the stability of the region and the success of the Global War on Terrorism. We must continue to attack high value targets while denying the enemy sanctuary and freedom of movement; however our primary focus must be to pursue diplomatic means to attack the

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underlying causes for their resurgence. The impact of this resurgence in Afghanistan is the creation of an emboldened enemy who will influence the reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan. The second and third order effects will influence international politics and the national security interests of the United States and its allies for decades. This could be especially dangerous if the Taliban in Pakistan create a sanctuary which al-Qaeda can use to prepare for global operations. We will begin by examining the Taliban of today, the reasons why they are regaining power, options which are not viable at this time, and finally how the U.S. should confront this threat.

The term "Taliban" means religious student. Many of the Taliban in Pakistan were not members of Afghanistan's Taliban government which ruled prior to the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. Instead, they are tribesmen in northern Pakistan's North and South Waziristan regions who were inspired to take the name. 1 Many believe the Taliban's sphere of influence has spread into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and to large cities like Quetta. Reportedly they provide refuge to foreign fighters including Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The Taliban's strategy will most likely focus on four points: support of the local populace through fear or preferential treatment, the effective use of propaganda, concerted intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts, and carefully planned and executed attacks. They will continue to be reliant upon the assistance of fellow Islamic nations. We must put aside our assumptions and understand that their movement is not solely religiously based. Their goals are also politically motivated. Not only do they want to expel western forces, but they seek to re-establish themselves within Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Non-Governmental Organization Safety Office (ANSO) tracks conventional and asymmetric conflict across Afghanistan. According to their statistics the pace and volume of attacks in June 2007 showed a 100% increase over the previous year.<sup>2</sup> The United States and its allies are criticizing the Pakistani

government for not doing enough to assist with the War on Terror. Truly, Pakistan is one of the United States' most important allies. They opened their airspace, let U.S. forces use their airfields, and shared intelligence. Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf enacted policies that regulated the administration of madrassas, Islamic schools, restricted anti-western rhetoric in mosques, and arrested hundreds of Islamic militants. They even allowed U.S. Soldiers to conduct joint raids in the tribal border region and gave authorization for missile strikes against specific targets.

Western diplomats and Pakistani opposition figures say that Pakistani intelligence agencies are supporting a Taliban restoration not only to further Islamic fervor, but to exert greater influence along Pakistan's western frontier.<sup>3</sup> Families whose sons die fighting in Afghanistan are afraid to talk because of pressure by Pakistani intelligence personnel. A former Taliban commander said in an interview that Pakistani officials arrested him because he refused to fight in Afghanistan. Government officials misled Coalition Forces by saying this former commander's arrest had been part of the crackdown on Islamic extremists.<sup>4</sup> Critics also cite recent reports that most of the \$11 billion the U.S. provided to Pakistan has been used to buy conventional weapon systems more appropriate for a war against India.<sup>5</sup>

Unilateral military action by the U.S. against the Taliban is unrealistic. We have neither the resources nor the political support to enter Pakistan and confront the growing Taliban threat. Authorizing the United States to conduct large scale operations inside of Pakistan is political suicide for any Pakistani leader. Military action by the United States would trigger severe backlash, especially since three out of four Pakistanis nationwide oppose U.S. intervention.<sup>6</sup> In the wake of the February 18, 2008 elections Pakistan is attempting to reassert its autonomy. While it is still an ally of the United States, members of the Pakistani government are willing to assist the U.S. as long as it serves their interests.

Completely sealing the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan is obviously impossible. The United States cannot even protect our own borders with Canada and Mexico. Therefore, we must focus on attacking areas within Pakistan that give sanctuary to Taliban forces. We must also attack the underlying cause for their regeneration within Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Taliban rose to power in an era of political turmoil. Even though the average Afghani citizen probably does not want the Taliban to resume power the current state of the Afghanistan government creates an ideal environment for the enemy to flourish.

We can provide the stability that the Taliban wants to prevent through carefully planned and coordinated

military and police action. We must systematically rebuild Afghanistan's economic, military, political, and basic infrastructure. A matrix for analysis of competing hypotheses (reference pages 9-11) illustrates the best course of action. When weighed against the presented evidence, the United States must attack the underlying causes for the Taliban resurgence. The matrix also shows that securing the border and pressuring Pakistan to allow multilateral military action in the border region are second and third respectively. It is my opinion that the data does not limit us to only one option. Our primary focus should be social and economic programs aimed at strengthening and stabilizing Afghanistan. We must simultaneously maintain security of the border and continually attack high value targets to disrupt Taliban operations. We must continue to lobby our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies for increased troop support to accomplish this. The United States, Great Britain, and Canada currently shoulder the majority of the burden.

The reign of the Taliban government and subsequent withdrawal left Afghanistan in a state of chaos. They lack the basic infrastructure necessary to rebuild and stabilize their country and government. This will not be an easy task, after the Russians in the 1980's, the civil war which followed, the rise of the Taliban during the mid-1990's and Operation Enduring Freedom the country bears many scars after decades of war.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country highly dependent on foreign aid. The unemployment rate is 40% and 53% of the population is below the poverty line.<sup>7</sup> The United States and its NATO allies must increase economic aid programs. Accountability is integral to ensure that the money is properly distributed in an effort to revitalize the economy. Our efforts must continue to focus on providing the basic necessities of housing, drinking water, electricity, medical facilities, education, employment, etc. As the basic infrastructure begins to develop the local Afghani governments must be able to provide adequate security and policing to promote continued progress. Afghanistan's agriculturally based economy primarily exports opium. Many believe that the Afghani government should allow the production of poppies for medical research, or promote other viable options.

Economic aid to Pakistan will ensure that the Global War on Terrorism on Afghanistan's eastern front has proper funding. Any economic aid given to Pakistan must have strict stipulations attached, for example continued support for joint operations. Given its recent history and growing criticism, accountability of how Pakistan distributes economic aid is essential. If not, it will undermine the confidence the international community has with the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan

should authorize NATO to deploy troops into the border region to assist with counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. This assistance could be limited to an advisory role or expanded as needed depending upon the type and scope of military operations.

Intelligence and information operations must identify and neutralize Pakistani Taliban. Joint military operations between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO will be essential to eliminating the increasing threat. Identification of high value targets through actionable intelligence which results in the capture or elimination of key leaders will build confidence in the Afghani government and undermine the Taliban. The Pakistani intelligence agencies must work with the United States' Central Intelligence Agency to eliminate the growing Pakistani Taliban threat. Pakistan must make an earnest effort to thwart support for the Taliban. Cooperation by Pakistani forces will result in more accurate intelligence information which will give the enemy less material for propaganda campaigns. Our own information operations can serve to whittle away the longstanding stereotypes and misconceptions that exist about the United States and NATO while reas-

suring the population that the systematic use of terror by the Taliban is at an end.

Clearly, the Taliban were not defeated in 2001. Over the past several years they have expanded their footprint in Pakistan and are exerting their influence throughout the border region. The reappearance of the Taliban in Pakistan forces us to reevaluate our Afghanistan strategy. We are facing a dedicated and dangerous enemy who is drawing support from those we hastily labeled as allies. We must proceed with caution and never waiver in our commitment to Operation Enduring Freedom. Holding our allies accountable while giving Afghanistan an honest opportunity to improve its basic infrastructure will ensure our future success. The solution lies in attacking the underlying economic and political reasons for the regeneration of the Taliban while securing the Afghanistan border by pushing Pakistan to fully cooperate in joint operations. If we fail to effectively deal with this growing threat we not only jeopardize our standing within the international community, but the possibility exists that the Taliban could establish a base to support militant Islamic extremist capable of global acts of terror.

### ACH Matrix

Question: What is the best move for the U.S. to take with the regeneration of the Taliban in Pakistan?

Evidence	H 1 - No Action	H 2 - Unilateral Military Action	H 3 - Border Security	H4-Attack Underlying Causes	H 5 - Multilateral Military Action
E1-Expanding Power	I	C	C	C	C
E2-Border is Porous	I	C	C	C	C
E3-No Entry into Pakistan	NA	I	C	C	I
E4-Pakistan's Campaign Against Terror	C	I	I	I	I
E5-Pakistan Secretly Supporting Taliban	I	C	C	C	C
E6-Taliban Controls Border Region	I	C	I	C	C
E7-Need to Increase Troop Level	C	I	I	C	I
E8-Taliban Favor Political Instability	I	NA	C	C	C

Legend:

- H# = Hypothesis
- E# = Evidence
- C = Evidence is CONSISTENT with hypothesis
- I = Evidence is INCONSISTENT with hypothesis
- NA = Evidence is NOT APPLICABLE to hypothesis
- \*see notes for explanation of hypotheses and evidence



Map of Afghanistan



Map of Pakistan

**ACH Matrix Notes**

•Hypothesis 1 (H1): The U.S. should take no action and continue to work with Pakistan and NATO.

•Hypothesis 2 (H2): The U.S. should take unilateral military action and enter Pakistan.

•Hypothesis 3 (H3): The U.S. should secure and seal the Afghanistan side of the border with Pakistan.

•Hypothesis 4 (H4): The U.S. should attack the underlying causes for the Taliban resurgence.

In Pakistan and Afghanistan the economic, political, and infrastructure problems should be addressed.

•Hypothesis 5 (H5): The U.S. should pressure Pakistan to allow multilateral military action in the tribal border regions.

•Evidence 1 (E1): The Taliban are expanding their power along the Pakistan border with Afghanistan.

•Evidence 2 (E2): The border is porous and gives the Taliban freedom of movement.

•Evidence 3 (E3): The U.S. and NATO cannot enter Pakistan for military action.

•Evidence 4 (E4): Pakistan has devoted its own Soldiers and resources to defend the border

region and destroy the Taliban.

•Evidence 5 (E5): Assumption: Many people believe that the Pakistani Intelligence Service is supporting the Taliban to further Pakistan’s political goals and interests.

•Evidence 6 (E6): The Taliban utilizes terror tactics and intimidates border region inhabitants.

•Evidence 7 (E7): Assumption: Increased military action requires that U.S. and NATO

drastically augment troop levels to effectively neutralize the Taliban threat.

•Evidence 8 (E8): The Taliban will continue to exploit Afghanistan’s agrarian based

economy which suffers from a lack of housing, drinking water, electricity, medical facilities, and employment. They will create and capitalize on political instability.

**Endnotes**

- 1.Eben Kaplan, "The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," 30 May 2006. Retrieved 29 March 2008 from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/>
- 2.Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, ANSO Quarterly Data Report (Q.2-07), 22 December 2006-30 June 2007 (Kabul, Afghanistan: ANSO Quarterly Data Report, 2007), 3.
- 3.Carolotta Gall, "At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge," The New York Times, 21 January 2007, para. 3. Retrieved 29 March 2008 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/world/asia/>



Map of North and South Waziristan

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 5. Jason Motlagh and Jim Lobe, "The War on Terror Moves East," *Asia Times*, 17 January 2008, para. 30. Retrieved 6 April 2008 from [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/JA17Df02.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA17Df02.html)  
 6. Jason Motlagh and Jim Lobe, "The War on Terror Moves East," *Asia Times*, 17 January 2008, para. 35. Retrieved 6 April 2008 from [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/JA17Df02.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA17Df02.html)  
 7. "Afghanistan," 20 March 2008. Retrieved 7 April 2008 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html#Intro>



## Extract from the 2008 Army Posture Statement

### A STATEMENT ON THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2008

submitted by THE HONORABLE PETE GEREN and GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY JR. to the Committees and Subcommittees of the UNITED STATES SENATE and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d SESSION, 110th CONGRESS 26 FEBRUARY 2008

STRATEGIC CONTEXT – Extract from the 2008 Army Posture Statement

#### An Era of Persistent Conflict

Persistent conflict and change characterize the strategic environment. We have looked at the future and expect a future of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use violence to achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends. We will confront highly adaptive and intelligent adversaries who will exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S.

**Interests.** Operations in the future will be executed in complex environments and will range from peace engagement, to counterinsurgency, to major combat

**Operations.** This era of persistent conflict will result in high demand for Army forces and capabilities.

#### Trends Creating the Conditions for Persistent Conflict

The potential for cascading effects from combinations of events or crises arising from the trends described below compounds the risk and implications for the United States.

#### Globalization and Technology

Increased global connectivity and technological advances will continue to drive global prosperity—yet they





also will underscore disparities, such as in standards of living, and provide the means to export terror and extremism around the world. Globalization accelerates the redistribution of wealth, prosperity, and power, expanding the “have” and “have not” conditions that can foster conflict. The scale of this problem is evident in the projection that 2.8 billion people are expected to be living below the poverty line by 2025.

While advances in technology are benefiting people all over the world, extremists are exploiting that same technology to manipulate perceptions, export terror, and recruit the people who feel disenfranchised or threatened by its effects.

### **Radicalism**

Extremist ideologies and separatist movements will continue to have an anti-western and anti-U.S. orientation. Radical and religious extremist groups, separatists, and organizations that support them are attractive to those who feel victimized or threatened by the cultural and economic impacts of globalization. The threats posed by Sunni Salafist extremists, like Al-Qaeda, as well as Shia extremists with Iranian backing, represent a major strategic challenge.

### **Population Growth**

The likelihood of instability will increase as populations of several less-developed countries will almost double in size by 2020—most notably in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. The “youth bulge” created by this growth will be vulnerable to antigovernment and radical ideologies and will threaten government stability. This situation will be especially true in urban areas in which populations have more than doubled over the last 50 years. By 2025, urban areas with concentrations of poverty will contain almost 60 percent of the world’s population.

### **Resource Competition**

Competition for water, energy, goods, services, and food to meet the needs of growing populations will

increase the potential for conflict. Demand for water is projected to double every 20 years. By 2015, 40 percent of the world’s population will live in “waterstressed” countries. By 2025, global energy demands are expected to increase by 40 percent, threatening supplies to poor and developing nations.

### **Climate Change and Natural Disasters**

Climate change and other projected trends will compound already difficult conditions in many developing countries. These trends will increase the likelihood of humanitarian crises, the potential for epidemic diseases, and regionally destabilizing population migrations. Desertification is occurring at nearly 50-70 thousand square miles per year. Today more than 15 million people are dying annually from communicable diseases. The number of people dying each year could grow exponentially with increases in Population density and natural disasters.

### **Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The diffusion and increasing availability of technology increases the potential of catastrophic nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. Many of the more than 1,100 terrorist groups and organizations are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction.

### **Safe Havens**

States that are unable or unwilling to exercise control within their borders create the potential for global and regional groups to organize and export terror. Territories under the control of renegade elements or separatist factions will challenge central government authority, potentially creating a base from which to launch broader security threats. The trends that fuel persistent conflict characterize the strategic environment now and into the future and will require integration of all elements of our national power (diplomatic, informational, economic, and military) to achieve our national objectives. The implication for the Army is the need to be modernized, expeditionary and campaign capable, and prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.

### **Challenges of Providing Forces with the Right Capabilities**

The Army recruits, organizes, trains, and equips Soldiers who operate as members of Joint, interagency, and multinational teams. The Army also provides logistics and other support to enable our Joint and interagency partners to accomplish their missions, as well as support civil authorities in times of national emergencies. Responding to the strategic environment and the national security strategy that flows from it, we are building an



expeditionary and campaign quality Army. Our expeditionary Army is capable of deploying rapidly into any

operational environment, conducting operations with modular forces anywhere in the world, and sustaining operations as long as necessary to accomplish the mission. To fulfill the requirements of today's missions, including the defense of the homeland and support to civil authorities, approximately 591,000 Soldiers are on active duty (currently 518,000 Active Component, 52,000 Army National Guard, and 21,000 Army Reserve). Forty-two percent (251,000) of our Soldiers are deployed or forward-stationed in 80 countries around the world. Additionally, more than 237,000 Army Civilians are performing a variety of missions vital to America's national defense. Of these, more than 4,500 are forward deployed in support of our Soldiers.



## SPOTLIGHT ON

**Spotlight on** is a new feature in *THE VANGUARD* that includes a series of questions and answers that encompass both personal and professional areas. We would like to thank LTC Bostwick for agreeing to be our first interview subject. Who would you like to see interviewed next? Send an email and let us know.



**Who:** LTC Randall Bostwick, Foreign Area Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa. LTC Bostwick is assigned to the Joint Information Operation Warfare Command in San Antonio, TX.

**Birthplace:** Middletown, Ohio

**What did you like about Ohio?** "Summers in Ohio—freedom from school and playing in the woods."

**Most Interesting Assignment:** Embassy duty, Office of Defense Cooperation, in Tunis, Tunisia from 1994-96. I was there in 1994 after the Gulf War. Tunisia supported Iraq during the war and the embassy was at a moderate threat level. It was an interesting time because the PLO had set-up headquarters there. My family was with me and I remember I had to drive to and from the embassy in an armored car for awhile. Tunis was fairly modern, but not so much outside the capital. It is a very beautiful country, especially the beaches on the east coast.

**Most Valuable Military lesson:** As Officer of the Guard (470th MI BDE), prior to the invasion in Panama, there was a major snafu due to lack of communication and coordination. We received new M-16s and they were distributed to different units without fully

communicating that the new M-16s required the A2 ammo and the A1 ammo could not be used. Fortunately, the information was disseminated before any damage occurred.

**Favorite Geographical Assignment:** Tunisia, Botswana.

**If I was not in the military, I would be:** In real estate, managing property.

**Hero:** Theodore Roosevelt, he was an intelligent and natural leader who lead us into a prosperous time. He was a very successful naturalist. Also, Andrew Carnegie—he was a poor immigrant who successfully built US Steel. He said (paraphrase) he would spend the first half of his life making as much money as he could and the second half of his life giving it away.

**Most recent book:** "Age of Turbulence," by Alan Greenspan. He discusses the inside story of the US economy and monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Board.

**Music:** Rock N Roll

**I want to travel to:** Tanzania, Namibia, Fiji, New Zealand

**Importance of Military Intelligence:** "MI has got to be as accurate as possible...it's not perfect due to the enormous amount of information and mis-information. In today's modern warfare, intelligence will play the key role in any commander's operational decisions."

**Major MI Challenge:** HUMINT, especially in the Middle East

**Future "hotspots" are:** The Sahara Desert, Horn of Africa, Syria, Iran, leftist organizations in South America

**Anything else you want to add:** "I love what I'm doing; especially traveling and working with the embassies."

**Whose interview would you like to read:** J2 AFRICOM



LTC Thomas Knowlton, MI Hero

## ***THE VANGUARD***

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