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Purpose: *THE VANGUARD* is the official journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) for its members and sponsors. The quarterly journal serves as a professional forum for sharing knowledge, preserving history, and honoring civilian and military members of the Corps.

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Cover: Sgt. Todd Burnap, the 2008 Doug Russell Award Recipient congratulated by CSM (R) Douglass S. Russell during the 4 March Sergeants Major Conference, held at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Notes from the Vice President

Dear Colleagues,

I would like to welcome all of our current and new MICA members to the spring edition of our quarterly publication, the Vanguard. In this issue we will examine a number of relevant and critical issues that influence our Military Intelligence Corps today. Additionally, we are proud to showcase the selected articles of our MICA Writer's Program from the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Leaders Course (MIBOLC) and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC). These selected papers typify the quality submissions that we receive each quarter and also exemplify the high caliber of soldiers that are currently serving in our Military Intelligence Corps.

I would like to thank Mr. Les Siemens for his outstanding support to MICA. Since his appointment as our MICA Executive Director, we have seen a vast improvement in our customer service response time and modernization of our website at MICORPS.ORG. I would encourage all MICA members to login, update their personal profile, check membership renewal dates, participate in our "open forum," and explore online MICA benefits. Members can now submit a Knowlton or Golden Rose nomination form online. Just login, click on the awards tab, complete the nomination form and insert the email address of the approving O-5 or above. This streamlined process has reduced the processing, approval and shipping time from two weeks to just over three days.

As a new feature in our upcoming summer Vanguard edition, we are accepting "Letters to the Editor." These letters or editorials invite you share thoughts, ideas, critiques, or article ideas to members on subjects related to the Military Intelligence Corps.

Additionally, I would encourage all of you to contact the MICA Chapter in you local area. These chapters actively support their local communities through Military Intelligence sponsored events and activities. Your support to these local chapters is invaluable and also offers a forum to promote the MI Corps.

Of particular importance in this issue is an extract from the new Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations which was published last month. Within this document, the Army describes the current operational environment and outlines how Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) drive operations. FM 3-0 highlights the value and use of ISR in the contemporary operating environment and how it enables the Warfighter to find, fix, and finish decisive operations against the enemy.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) spotlights the importance of intelligence and the need to synchronize and integrate our ISR capabilities to counter the many asymmetrical threats we face today. The intelligence professional is now looked upon in a different light. The Cold War templates and strategies of yesterday, to determine location and size of probable enemy formations, are not valid. Successful operations now require us to consider and understand the enemy's culture, organizations, networks, and associations. Critical thinking is no longer the sole responsibility of senior Commissioned and Noncommissioned Officers; it is required from all intelligence professionals. Much is expected from today's MI Corps to remain viable and successful. We must demonstrate our effectiveness, flexibility, and critical thinking skills in support of operations. We can no longer produce intelligence that is not "actionable" but must seek to provide value "added" to the Warfighter.

Thank you for your continued support to the MI Corps. Always Out Front,

D.C. Schmidt
MICA, Vice President

2008 CSM (R) Doug Russell Award to SGT Todd Burnap

On 4 March, 2008, SGT Todd Burnap received the MI Corps Association Doug Russel Award. Presenting the award was CSM (R) Douglass S. Russell, CSM Gerardus Wykoff, CSM (R) Scott Chun, CSM Franklin A. Saunders, and CSM Joseph J. Paul.



Now 24, SGT Burnap made his decision to join the U.S. Army following the events of September 11th. He enlisted as a 98X, Cryptologic Linguist – Analyst, and upon completion of basic training attended the Defense Language Institute. SGT Burnap graduated from the Basic Korean Course in 2005 and attended the 35M, HUMINT Analyst Course, after which he was assigned to the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Lewis, Washington.

SGT Burnap has deployed to Iraq on two occasions where he has worked various missions in the CI/HUMINT arena.

In recommending SGT Burnap, MAJ Zoltan Krompecher, Group S2 for the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, states: “In my 21 years of service as both a Green Beret and Military Intelligence Officer, I have rarely come across a junior NCO as enthusiastic and devoted as SGT Todd Burnap. . . (his) devotion to supporting Special Forces Soldiers with precise and actionable intelligence is immeasurable.

SGT Burnap joins the ranks of seven previous CSM (R) Doug Russel Award Recipients: SGT Deborah Sills, Specialist Ario Sanchez, Corporal Andrew Rapp, Specialist Daniel Sheldon, SGT Amber Bennett, SGT Sarah Patterson, and SGT Steven Heigh. In addition to these recipients since 2001, the award honors CSM (R) Douglass Russell for his 32 years of service.

CSM (R) Douglass S. Russell, upon retiring from the U.S. Army, served 14 years as director of Non Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Affairs, and as director of Retiree Activities in the Association of the U.S. Army in Washington D.C., before assuming his current position as President of the American Military Society.

At the 4 March ceremony, held during the annual military intelligence sergeants major conference, SGT Burnap also presented with a Knowton award by MICA national vice president, 1SG (R) Dennis Schmidt.

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FM 3-0 Operations

Excerpts. February 2008; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Headquarters; Department of the Army Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

From the Foreword

William S. Wallace, General, U.S. Army, Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command America is at war, and we live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies are realities. The Army has analytically looked at the future, and we believe our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of “persistent conflict”—a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.

The operational environment in which this persistent conflict will be waged will be complex, multidimensional, and increasingly fought “among the people.” Previously, we sought to separate people from the battlefield so that we could engage and destroy enemies and seize terrain. While we recognize our enduring requirement to fight and win, we also recognize that people are frequently part of the terrain and their support is a principal determinant of success in future conflicts.

This edition of FM 3-0, the first update since September 11, 2001, is a revolutionary departure from past doctrine. It describes an operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. Just as the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 began to take the Army from the rice paddies of Vietnam to the battlefield of Western Europe, this edition will take us into the 21st century urban battlefields among the people without losing our capabilities to dominate the higher conventional end of the spectrum of conflict.

Ours is a doctrinally-based Army. FM 3-0 provides the intellectual underpinnings that lie at the core of how our Army will organize, train, equip, and conduct operations in this new environment. It recognizes that we will achieve victory in this changed environment of persistent conflict only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace.

Although the strategic environment and operational concepts have changed, Soldiers remain the centerpiece and foundation of the Army—as they have been since 1775. These Soldiers are led by leaders proficient in their core competencies, sufficiently broad to adapt to conditions across the spectrum of conflict, and courageous enough to see enemy vulnerabilities and exploit opportunities in the challenges and complexities of our operating environments. As leaders, it is our obligation to understand and be proficient at employing Soldiers in full spectrum operations. We must read, study, understand, and implement the doctrine in FM 3-0.

Excerpts from 7-38 through 7-51

7-38. Knowledge of the operational environment is the precursor to all effective action, whether in the information or physical domain. Knowledge about the operational environment requires aggressive and continuous surveillance and reconnaissance to acquire information. Information collected from multiple sources and analyzed becomes intelligence that provides answers to commanders’ information requirements concerning the enemy and other adversaries, climate, weather, terrain, and population. Developing this is the function of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR). Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. For Army forces, this activity is a combined arms operation that focuses on priority intelligence requirements while answering the commander’s critical information requirements. (JP 2-01 contains ISR doctrine.) Through ISR, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces. These collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate information, combat information, and intelligence to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and other intelligence requirements. When necessary, ISR assets may focus on special requirements, such as information required for personnel recovery operations. It supports full spectrum operations through four tasks:

- ISR synchronization.
- ISR integration.
- Surveillance.
- Reconnaissance.

7-39. ISR synchronization considers all assets—both internal and external to the organization. It identifies information gaps and the most appropriate assets for collecting information to fill them. It also assigns the most efficient means to process the information into in-

telligence and disseminate it. ISR integration tasks assets to collect on requirements that intelligence reach or requests for information cannot answer or that commanders consider critical. Commanders integrate assets into a single ISR plan that capitalizes on each asset's capabilities. Commanders also synchronize and coordinate surveillance and reconnaissance missions and employ other units for ISR within the scheme of maneuver. Effectively synchronizing ISR with the overall plan positions ISR assets to continue to collect information, reconstitute for branches or sequels, or shift priorities throughout the operation.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION

7-40. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization is the task that accomplishes the following: analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets internal and external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets controlled by the organization to collect on the commander's critical information requirements; and submits requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support. This task ensures that ISR, intelligence reach, and requests for information result in successful reporting, production, and dissemination of information, combat information, and intelligence to support decisionmaking.

7-41. The intelligence officer, with the operations officer and other staff elements, synchronizes the entire collection effort. This effort includes recommending tasking for assets the commander controls and submitting requests for information to adjacent and higher echelon units and organizations. When these sources do not answer the CCIR and other requirements, ISR synchronization uses intelligence reach to obtain the information.

7-42. ISR synchronization includes screening subordinate and adjacent unit requests for information concerning the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. When intelligence reach and requests for information do not satisfy a requirement, ISR synchronization develops specific information requirements to facilitate ISR integration. (FM 2-0 discusses intelligence reach.)

7-43. ISR synchronization is continuous. Commanders use it to assess ISR asset reporting. ISR synchronization includes continually identifying new and partially filled intelligence gaps. It also provides recommendations to the operations officer for tasking ISR assets.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE INTEGRATION

7-44. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration is the task of assigning and controlling a unit's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (in terms of space, time, and purpose) to collect and report information as a concerted and integrated portion of operation plans and orders.

This task ensures assignment of the best ISR assets through a deliberate and coordinated effort of the entire staff across all warfighting functions by integrating ISR into the operation.

7-45. The operations officer, with input from the intelligence officer, develops tasks based on specific information requirements (developed as part of ISR synchronization). Specific information requirements facilitate tasking by matching requirements to assets. The operations officer assigns tasks based on latest time that information is of value and the capabilities and limitations of available ISR assets. Intelligence requirements are identified, prioritized, and validated. An ISR plan is developed and synchronized with the overall operation. During ISR integration, the entire staff participates as responsibility for the ISR plan transitions from the intelligence officer to the operations officer. ISR integration is vital in controlling limited

ISR assets. During ISR integration, the staff recommends redundancy and mix as appropriate. ISR synchronization and integration results in an effort focused on answering the commander's requirements through ISR tasks translated into orders.

SURVEILLANCE

7-46. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 1-02). Surveillance involves observing an area to collect information.

7-47. Wide-area and focused surveillance missions provide valuable information. National and joint surveillance systems focus on information requirements for combatant commanders. They also provide information to all Services for operations across the area of responsibility. The systematic observation of geographic locations, persons, networks, or equipment is assigned to Army intelligence, reconnaissance, and maneuver assets. Changes or anomalies detected during surveillance missions can generate a reconnaissance mission to confirm or deny the change.

RECONNAISSANCE

7-48. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the me-

teological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0).

7-49. Units performing reconnaissance collect information to confirm or deny current intelligence or predictions. This information may concern the terrain, weather, and population characteristics of a particular area as well the enemy. Reconnaissance normally precedes execution of the overall operation and extends throughout the area of operations. It begins as early as the situation, political direction, and rules of engagement permit. Reconnaissance can locate mobile enemy command and control assets—such as command posts, communications nodes, and satellite terminals—for neutralization, attack, or destruction. Reconnaissance can detect patterns of behavior exhibited by people in the objective area. Commanders at all echelons incorporate reconnaissance into their operations.

SOLDIER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

7-50. Surveillance is distinct from reconnaissance. Often surveillance is passive and may be continuous; reconnaissance missions are typically shorter and use active means (such as maneuver). Additionally, reconnais-

sance may involve fighting for information. Sometimes these operations are deliberate, as in a reconnaissance in force; however, the purpose of reconnaissance is to collect information, not initiate combat.

Reconnaissance involves many tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout the course of a mission. An extended period of surveillance may be one of these. Commanders complement surveillance with frequent reconnaissance. Surveillance, in turn, increases the efficiency of reconnaissance by focusing those missions while reducing the risk to Soldiers.

7-51. The Soldier is an indispensable source for much of what the intelligence commanders need. Every Soldier is a sensor. Observations and experiences of Soldiers—who often work with the local populace—provide depth and context to information gathered through surveillance and reconnaissance. Commanders should train all Soldiers to report their observations, even when not assigned a surveillance or reconnaissance mission. Commanders and staffs emphasize integrating information gathered from Soldiers into intelligence production.



Shared Situational Understanding: A Summary of Fundamental Principles and Iconoclastic Observations

by Richard Maltz

Introduction

There has been a great deal of discussion within the defense community in the past several years on the subject of Situational and Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding. Much of that is tied up in discussions concerning, and programs purporting to offer, “Common Operational Pictures”, “Common Relevant Operational Pictures”, “Common Relevant Actionable Pictures,” and the grandest of all, the “Operational Net Assessment”.

Each of these is supposed to eliminate fog and friction in war and stimulate “Self-Synchronization” between friendly units by providing uniform and comprehensive information to all cognizant parties concerning everything of interest in the battlespace. Needless to say, there are problems. As with most such projects, the problems start with a poor (generally no) philosophical foundation. In each instance, it is assumed that human decisionmakers are essentially interchangeable and need only access to a common set of data to achieve “Shared Situational

Awareness.” This is generally presumed to automatically result in “Shared Situational Understanding”; which in turn, is generally presumed to automatically yield the ultimate (if sometimes obscured) goal of Self-Synchronization (disparate units automatically acting in concert, even with limited communications). Aside from the fact that, in general, this chain of causality presumes a great deal too much, and therefore cannot be relied upon; other fundamental philosophical errors and important unaddressed questions revolve around issues that are explored below. I highlight these because I have observed that even in very sophisticated environments, populated with first-rate minds, such concerns are generally overlooked in favor of those to which our cultures of productivity and warfighting reflexively drive us.

“Situational Understanding” (of a single decisionmaker, however august) and Shared Situational Understanding (of multiple decisionmakers who must act in concert to achieve shared goals and desired outcomes) are two related but very distinct sets of challenges. Similarly, “Awareness” (shared or otherwise) is not the same thing as “Understanding” (which, unlike awareness, requires some useful grasp of the information at hand). One could reasonably argue further that “Understanding” is different from, and inferior to, “Insight” or “Wisdom”; and that either of these should be a recognized goal on the path toward Self-Synchronization (which does not automatically result, even from shared situational insight or wisdom).

Shared Situational Understanding (the most commonly used of the myriad related terms) is not a desired end in itself. It is valuable only as a means of enabling desired emergent behaviors, notably those of: synergy, adaptability, and opportunism. These, in turn, facilitate Self-Synchronization (and vice-versa). All of this promotes the ultimate values of any military (or other) enterprise, enhanced: effectiveness, efficiency, and economy. It is in order to achieve these, and only in order to achieve these, that Shared Situational Understanding is needed. If we keep this hierarchy of needs and purposes in mind, it will help us in solving the related challenges without sub-optimizing the greater solution in favor of lesser ones.

Shaping Frames of Reference

Emergent (indeed, all) behaviors are most directly determined by culture (personal and shared beliefs and values). The culture of warfighting (which is a type of culture of productivity) determines if and how a warfighter decides to lift his weapon and place himself in harm's way. It also determines (through "Frames of Reference") what a warfighter sees, hears, tastes, smells, feels, emotes, and thinks in response to any given stimulus, individually and in groups (in multiple layers of group identity). It does this to a greater degree than does intelligence, aptitude, or any training, instruction, orders, material, technology, or any other aspect of "DOTMLPF" (Doctrine, Operations, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities¹). We ignore this fact at our peril. Any stimulus that we may try to convey in order to foster Shared Situational Understanding will have meaning to the recipients only in the context of the disparate frames of reference through which the stimulus must pass within the minds of those recipients. The same image, viewed by 100 people, may very well mean 100 very different sets of things to them, unless we focus on how to shape their frames of reference to increase their predisposition to attain Shared Understanding. Shared "Warfighting Culture" must therefore be the ultimate key to Shared Situational Understanding in the battlespace. It is on this then that we must focus.

In trying to shape and promulgate "Shared Frames of Reference", it is important to guard against any tendency toward tunnel vision or "Group Think". One should differentiate between Cognitive Preferences (such as linear, reductive, analytic and non-linear, constructive, intuitive problem-solving), where there is a critical need to diversify our ranks further (by expanding the numbers of those who favor the latter approach); and the issue of group culture, per se. Cultures—warfighting and otherwise, exist on several levels simultaneously, from that of the individual to that of the nation, or religion, or other over-arching focus of self-identification and socializa-

tion. These levels share a fractal relationship reflected in the organizational structure, and beyond. At each level, disparate lower-level cultures must be reconciled so that a common vision can be pursued at that level, in support of the vision at a higher level. The common culture formed at each level can be viewed as an overlay in relationship to the subordinate cultures. These overlays can form haphazardly or by design, or by some combination of the two. We need to leverage the tendency of such overlays to occur spontaneously while consciously seeking to incorporate elements that we deem desirable or essential. With an adequate cultural overlay, each decision-maker will intuitively understand what their colleagues are likely to infer from the same information; and they will similarly intuit their colleagues' likely responses thereto, permitting "instinctive" "self-synchronization". The establishment of shared frames of reference can be accomplished without destroying existing frames of reference shared with other groups.

Shared Situational Understanding and "Shared Situational Understanding on the Move" (another related term of art) differ in their treatment of time and space. The former suggests the luxury of establishing such understanding in fixed locations over protracted periods, while continuously, fully, and uninterruptedly connected to external sources of support. The latter implies a need to adapt one's thinking rapidly and iteratively while physically in motion, likely unconnected, or only partially connected to external sources of support, many of which will be of dubious value (because they themselves will generally lack the ability to adapt their thinking rapidly and iteratively, especially with necessarily incomplete intelligence and feedback from the front).

The practice of attempting to control or substitute the Situational Understanding of rear command elements by or for those of forward commanders dates back many years. During the First World War, it was called "Chateau Generalship". Now, it is called "Network Centric Warfare". It has never worked as expected because it is based on several technocentric fallacies that do not adequately take into account immutable aspects of warfighting and warfighters, and the primacy of warfighting culture, not machines, in ultimately determining actions in battle. In this, it strongly resembles other age-old technocentric delusions that continually disappoint, such as the notions that airpower alone can reliably win wars; that precision-engagement will destroy all threats; or that elaborate Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) will eliminate ambiguity, uncertainty, and deception from the battlespace. Our enduring infatuation with such shibboleths illustrates the philosophical and theoretical poverty of our efforts in general; and deprives our otherwise generally expert planning and execution of

context and a sound “trajectory” along which to plan and execute, leading to random outcomes, and the systemic predisposition to expend infinite resources without any assurance of achieving desired outcomes.

The Human-Centric Paradigm

While technological and material solutions are critically important, they cannot be relied upon to carry the day in warfighting. They have inherent limitations to which our culture is generally blind; and they are ultimately inferior in importance to the human-centric solutions from which we reflexively recoil because: they are too difficult to quantify, they require more abstract thinking than we care to muster, and they offend our cultural imperative for “radical egalitarianism” (everyone is equal as far as machines are concerned; but human differences come to the fore in a human-centric paradigm). It is worth remembering that historically, while technological and material solutions have helped to build great empires; these same empires ultimately foundered on human-centric problems. Athens fell to Sparta; Carthage and Greece fell to Rome; Rome fell to the Goths; Persia fell to the Arabs; Byzantium fell to the Normans, and then (finally) to the Turks; China fell to the Mongols, and then to the Manchus. Wealthy, sophisticated, technologically advanced civilizations being crushed by more primitive but vigorous competitors is an historical commonplace. It will happen to us too, if we continue to fail to learn from history.

Shared Situational Understanding consists of multiple subordinate elements. Many observers reduce these to the single issue of “Connectivity”. This is partially true; but connectivity manifests itself in two distinct ways: “Technical Connectivity” and “Perceptual Connectivity”². Technical Connectivity is the material network of sensor and communications grids that link a network of users through mechanical and electronic interfaces in order to acquire and share information. Perceptual Connectivity is a network of shared frames of reference within the users themselves that enables them to make sense of the information transmitted via the technical connections, and to intuitively understand what other, similar users will infer from that information. In the absence of reliable technical connections, it can help bridge inevitable gaps in communications through logical assumptions based on shared perspectives. Of the two types of connectivity, the latter is superior. In its absence, the former conveys only empty symbols, not meaning; but in the absence of the former, the latter can go a long way toward facilitating shared understanding and self-synchronization, even with very little data. Our culture embraces and invests heavily in Technical Connectivity; but cannot generally be bothered with the imponderables associated with Perceptual Connectivity.

This too is a model for investing vast treasures in projects that, incomplete, can never deliver promised outcomes.

“Shared Situational Understanding on the Move” adds additional, special requirements that are primarily cultural in nature. These requirements result from both the aforementioned challenges of less support, less time, and the need to think, understand, design, plan, etc., while physically moving; and the additional challenges associated with the greater dynamism and complexity of the environment through which you (and your adversary(ies)) are moving. This greater dynamism and complexity require a greater emphasis on emergent behaviors, to include the need to continuously adapt mentally while the objective circumstances around you are in constant flux; the need for disparate elements to arrive at complementary conclusions based on limited communications; and the need to generate self-synchronizing actions thereby. This, in itself, requires a very different philosophy of conflict and command than we are normally accustomed to. It renders most of our traditional assumptions on these subjects dangerous anachronisms. Principal among these changes is the fact that (in a complex and dynamic environment, with “Post-Industrial Age”, “Third-Generation” forces) what we traditionally hold to constitute “control” of one’s own forces in battle is generally only an “illusion of control” when applied to actual outcomes in the battlespace. True control of outcomes can usually only be obtained by abandoning direct, prescriptive control of one’s own forces (giving them the latitude to adapt freely to circumstances in pursuit of shared goals as defined by the vision embodied in the Commander’s Intent).

Conclusion

Building shared frames of reference is a daunting challenge; but success in doing so is not unprecedented. It generally requires a high level of socialization on the part of the persons and forces involved. (W. Edwards) Deming theory³ does a great deal to illuminate the challenges here. The best example of successfully implementing this in a warfighting organization can be drawn from studying the Prussian “Scharnhorst Reforms” of 1808⁴. There, Gerhard Von Scharnhorst, applying lessons that he and his coterie (the “Militarische Gesellschaft”) had learned before and during the Napoleonic Wars, set in motion a process that was to culminate in 1917 under Erich Von Ludendorff as “Stormtroop Tactics”, later evolving into “Blitzkrieg”⁵. This process was later emulated with great success by the Israel Defense Force; and our own Marine Corps has been trying to assimilate it since the 1980’s under the name “Maneuver Warfare Doctrine”⁶. At their core, all of these approaches are Post-Industrial-Age⁷, Third-Generation⁸ techniques of warfighting that, by

their nature, focus on strong shared cultural overlays as a means of consciously and systemically enabling desired emergent behaviors, with a view toward the routine facilitation of self-synchronization, even in the absence of direct guidance and assured communication.

Endnotes

1. The acronym DOTMLPF, having evolved and expanded over recent years from a smaller acronym, is now widely accepted as describing the entire universe of those sets of things that must be taken into account when implementing and accommodating military concepts. This is another fundamental error; as this acronym omits the two most important things that determine the success or failure of any military (or other) enterprise: "Policy" and "Culture". Thus, if correctly conceived, the acronym would be PCDOTMLPF. Such an unwieldy acronym might be better expressed (in the Chinese style) as "the nine critical determinants of success or failure"; but then some perverse bureaucrat will inevitably come to refer to them as the NCDSE.

2. Together, they can be described as "Comprehensive Connectivity". Others have recently discussed this; but to my knowledge, I coined these terms in U.S. Joint Forces Command's "Joint Operational Warfighting" (JOW) concept in 2001.

3. W. Edwards Deming was a statistician and organizational productivity theorist and lecturer. He is credited by the Japanese with reviving their economy after World War Two. The once popular "Total Quality Management" (TQM) and "Total Quality Leadership" (TQL) movements claimed to be based on his work; although he rejected them as perversions of his theories. His work spans three generations of thought. The first was based on "Statistical Process Control". The second was based on organizational practices ("14 Points and 7 Diseases"). The last was explicitly philosophical in nature, and revolved around what he called "Profound Knowledge" (that he defined as the union of Systems Theory, Variation Theory, Psychology, and Epistemology ("Theory of Knowledge")). Deming Theory properly applies to a Post-Industrial-Age milieu, superseding the "Scientific Management" of the Industrial-Age. Among the many luminaries and theories in this field, Deming and his work were, and remain, preeminent.

4. Between 1801 and 1805, Gerhard von Scharnhorst organized and presided in Berlin over the "Militarische Gesellschaft" (Military Society), the world's first voluntary membership organization dedicated to the advancement of military art. In 1806, Napoleon destroyed the Prussian Army in a single day in the battle of Jena-Auerstadt. In 1808, the King of Prussia invited Scharnhorst to rebuild the institution of the Prussian Army and transform it from a feudal possession of the King to the military instrument of a modern state (the "Scharnhorst Reforms"). In so doing, Scharnhorst used people and ideas culled from the "Militarische Gesellschaft". The process that he initiated crystallized 109 years later as "Stormtroop Tactics". It not only succeeded in bridging the previously irreconcilable

cultures and interests of the disparate classes in Prussia and ranks in the Prussian Army; but it went on to do the same for the myriad German kingdoms, principalities, and city-states over which Prussia assumed control in 1871. The successes of this approach are illustrated in the German "Defense in Depth" and "Stormtroop Tactics" of late WWI, and their "Blitzkrieg" operations of WWII. Their ultimate failure at the strategic level, due to having bad senior leadership and being massively out-resourced, does not detract from the spectacular successes demonstrated at the tactical and operational levels.

5. "Blitzkrieg" or "Lightning War" was an operational military technique perfected by Germany in the 1930's. It was based substantially on British and Russian theories of armored and combined arms warfare, built on a foundation of the German World War I doctrine (and culture) of "Stormtroop Tactics" (with the addition of 1930s' technology in the form of tanks, aircraft, and radios). It entailed the synchronization of artillery and air support assets to support the deep maneuver of concentrated armored and mechanized units spearheading the attack of larger infantry armies. Blitzkrieg is a "Post-Industrial-Age", "Third-Generation" warfighting approach (called "Maneuver Warfare Doctrine" by the U.S. Marine Corps). It is dependent upon both technology and "Maneuver Culture" to achieve its maximum effect. By 1945, in the absence of maneuver culture, none of the Allies were able to reliably employ the same techniques with more than 80 percent of the combat effectiveness enjoyed by the Germans. They were able to mimic its form (technology, synchronization, concentration, etc.), but not its substance.

6. "Maneuver Warfare Doctrine" is the term used by the Marine Corps to describe their distillation of the German and Israeli military experience, as interpreted through the insights of Colonel John Boyd. It is historical, theoretical, philosophical, and cultural and views leadership as an art. It is a way of thinking about problems; eschewing rigid dogma and maximizes combat effectiveness by more synergistically using human resources and focuses the mind and will. It is based on decentralization of decision-making to remove systemic barriers to initiative, creativity, and maximum performance, and to thereby unleash the full potential of every individual. It emphasizes speed and tempo of operations and continuous (cyclical) improvement and innovation. Its focus is on the enemy, not terrain. It is "Post-Industrial-Age" and "Third-Generation"; and stands in contrast to the "Methodical", "Industrial-Age", "Second-Generation", control-focused approach that reached its apogee under the French Army of 1917. It is not, properly speaking, a doctrine; and it is completely unrelated to what the Army means when it uses that term.

7. "Post-Industrial-Age" is a term used to describe a paradigm of productivity and social interaction. It is characterized by a high level of socialization and mass group self-identification (as a nation, rather than as an individual, family, clan, tribe, or other "special interest group"). This promotes trust, which promotes synergy (and other desirable emergent behaviors (adaptability, opportunism)), that promote productivity and

affluence, that in turn reinforce higher levels of socialization, trust, etc. The bulk of the working population of this age is intrinsically motivated to be industrious and creative in support of community goals (shared vision); and requires only the removal of systemic barriers to excellence. This age stands in contrast to the "Industrial Age", wherein the principles of Frederick Taylor's "Scientific Management" were the most effective way to synchronize the labors of peoples with low levels of socialization, and whose work is motivated primarily by extrinsic factors (direct rewards and punishments); and where maintaining "control" is of paramount importance. In an Industrial-Age environment, emergent behaviors would be deemed beyond direct centralized control, and therefore disruptive and intolerable. Because of the increased synergies, etc. of the former, Post-Industrial-Age work-forces generally achieve at least 20 percent greater productivity than do Industrial-Age workforces.

8. "Third-Generation" is a term used to describe a paradigm of warfighting. It is a direct analogue and reflection of the "Post-Industrial-Age". Like that age, it is characterized by a high level of socialization and mass group self-identification. It is described by many contemporary military theorists as "Maneuver Warfare Doctrine". It came into being in 1917 as the German response to the trench warfare of the Western Front. Its defining characteristic is the systemic stimulation

of desired emergent behaviors (notably synergy, adaptability, and opportunism). It stands in contrast to "Second Generation" warfighting, which is the "Industrial-Age" approach to warfare perfected by the French at the same time in response to the same situation ("First-Generation" warfighting is "Pre-Industrial-Age"; "Fourth-Generation" warfighting is "Extra-National" (waged by other than nation-states); and "Fifth-Generation" warfighting transcends the physical battlespace to directly target an adversary's polity (traditionally known as "Political Warfare"). The research of Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, Martin Van Creveld, Martin Samuels, and others, has demonstrated that, when the force employed is properly organized and conditioned, Third Generation warfighting is reliably at least 20% more combat effective than the "Methodical", Second-Generation, Industrial-Age approaches with which we are more familiar.

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The Van Deman Program at the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leaders Course (MIBOLC)

Training Second Lieutenant to be Analysts By CPT Tom Pike

Richards J. Heuer, a premier analyst from the CIA wrote, "Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a mental process, but understanding this process is hindered by the lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our mind." The human mind's strengths and weaknesses have created an irresolvable dispute in the conduct of analysis. On one side are the scientists, the analysts who have seen the weaknesses of the human mind, its oversimplification of complex situations and its natural biases and misperceptions. This side favors various analytical methodologies in order to overcome our mental weaknesses. On the other side are the adaptors. This side favors experience and understanding over analytical methods. They will use analytical methods but only to the extent they remain useful for a given situation, always reverting to their experience. This side appreciates the weaknesses of analytical methods and the ability to understand the impact of the improbable. Neither side is dominant in this struggle. However, both bring critical

elements to the continuous efforts to improve intelligence analysis.

The United States Army has favored the method-based approach focusing on quantifying battlefield effects in order to predict enemy actions. MIBOLC has historically trained IPB as an equation where values are plugged into the appropriate place and an answer is revealed. However, the current threat and the unpredictable future require that MIBOLC trains Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) to a higher level of understanding that has been historically reserved for Captains and Majors. To train IPB to a higher level, sooner, students must learn the assumptions underlying IPB, know natural human biases, and be critical thinkers. The mission of MIBOLC is to create this foundation of analysis in 13 weeks. This is an incredibly daunting mission. In order to reach our objective, MIBOLC is taking a two-prong approach. The first prong is making our instruction more effective. The use of experiential learning models through multi-day scenarios and detailed practical exercises is essential to achieving our objective. In addition, the instructors are always refining their instruction, the tests, and homework to increase our training effectiveness. The second prong is creating an analytical culture with a high esprit de corps. Creating this analytical culture is partially achieved through more rigorous and effective training. The other portion is showing that anal-

ysis is a truly developed and complex profession that requires rigorous study and contemplation. To achieve this effect, MIBOLC created an enhanced analytical training program called The Van Deman Program (VDP).

The mission of the Van Deman Program is to expand the understanding and practice of analysis within the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. Due to the already intense academic schedule and critical tasks that the MIBOLC must train, the Van Deman Program is designed for only those who have the extreme desire, mental acuity, and intestinal fortitude to further their analytical understanding. The ideas and concepts are indicative of analytical conflicts at the highest levels of analytical circles across the intelligence community and civilian world. The Van Deman Program draws on ideas and discussion from the business world, sociology, the CIA, recent operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, the Global War on Terror and from any other source that will increase our analytical ability and ultimately, our lethality on the battlefield. The Van Deman Program is a demanding intellectual program designed to create premier analysts within the Military Intelligence Corps.

Students participating in the Van Deman Program complete several additional assignments in addition to the MIBOLC coursework. The students read an additional 8 books and selected readings. The students complete four additional professionally written papers based on the readings and their own research. They participate in six discussion seminars and they complete two briefs. The final brief is to a Colonel or higher with a recommendation on solving select analytical problems that they will take to their gaining unit based on that unit's real world mission. In an average MIBOLC class of 45 students, an average of 20-25 students volunteer to participate and an average of three actually complete the course. The high attrition rate presents a paradoxical problem. On the one hand, students who complete the program have a strong sense of accomplishment and are motivated to go forth and show their worth. On the other hand, there is only a small minority who receive the training. To overcome this deficit, MIBOLC created an "audit" option that allows motivated students to participate and gain the analytical skill-set that the Van Deman Program seeks to instill.

The Van Deman program is designed to enhance the analytical culture of the MI Corps and train new and motivated officers on the complexities of intelligence analysis. MIBOLC and MICA are working together to link these students with experienced members of the MI community in order to assist them with their professional development. We are looking at two major initiatives to accomplish this goal. The first is to provide additional

incentives to officers for their successful completion of the program, such as publication of their writings, recognition of their achievement and a free one year MICA membership. The second is to utilize the large number of MI professionals at Fort Huachuca and throughout the Intelligence Community by inviting them to be mentors for the Van Deman program. Each Van Deman class completes five discussion seminars. Interested mentors can participate, in some or all of the discussion seminars during the 13 week training period.

Upcoming Van Deman Program schedules will be available on the MICA website at MICORPS.ORG. Interested parties can contact the Van Deman Program Course manager, Mark Domenic at 520-533-9327 or email mark.domenic@us.army.mil.

CPT Tom Pike is the course manager for MIBOLC. He has served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Rifle Executive Officer, Bradley Platoon Leader, Scout Platoon, Intelligence Officer, Company Commander and MIBOLC Instructor. He served in Ar-Ramadi, Iraq with 1-16 IN as the Scout Platoon Leader and Intelligence Officer.



IPB for Counterinsurgency

By 2LT Kimberly Groves January 2008

Throughout the course of military history, intelligence has had to adapt to changes in the methodology of warfare. The intelligence cycle, with all of its analytical tools, informs the friendly commander of the course of a battle and potentially, the outcome of a war. With changes in tactics and settings, intelligence tools should be updated and revised in order to produce maximum effects during different kinds of conflict. The Army adopted the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in order to organize intelligence tools and ensure that all aspects of warfare are analyzed and contingencies examined. FM 34-130 provides tools to be used by analysts that prepare intelligence for aspects of the battlefield to include terrain, weather, enemy capabilities and order of battle. These are basic tools that are crucial to warfare of any type. However, with different kinds of warfare, there are other intelligence requirements that can change the outcome of battle that are not always included in traditional IPB. Jamison Medby and Russell Glenn produced Street Smart: An Urban Approach to IPB, outlining updates and improvements to the IPB process that compensate for the aspects of urban combat that complicate the battlefield beyond the reaches of traditional IPB¹. This developed into FM 3-06, which now covers these changes, to include analysis of a city's layout, streets, building structures, and demo-

graphics. However, the warfare that the US is involved in today is more complicated than urban combat. It is urban combat with counterinsurgency (COIN). The characteristics of COIN are unique; IPB should again be revised in order to adapt to these elements.

COIN's Attributes

Counterinsurgency is arguably the most complicated form of warfare for a military like that of the US: one that dominates the conventional battlefield with its weapons and technology. Historically, large conventional militaries have had this problem; the French and Americans both in Vietnam, Israel with the Palestinians, and the British in Malaya all struggled through prolonged insurgencies. In Iraq, the US is facing a complicated insurgency comprised of multiple groups, each with very different characteristics. Counterinsurgency must be fought in a different way than conventional warfare because it has different objectives and parameters. IPB for COIN must be different than traditional IPB or Urban IPB because COIN can be in either setting; it is the nature of insurgency, not the location, that dictates a need for different analytical tools. COIN is different because it is inherently political and intertwined with a population's attitudes and beliefs. These elements at the forefront of combat change the way that a military operates: "[a]t the foundation of counterinsurgency is the salience of the political dimension—in doctrine, planning, implementation, and, most importantly, operational coordination." In order to achieve success in counterinsurgency, a military must adapt its tactics to the insurgency it is fighting. Ignorance of the insurgency's goals, advantages, and the impact of the local population on the outcome of war will only contribute to the failures and stagnation of the COIN forces. While politics is always related to war, in counterinsurgency they are intertwined to such an extent that some of the most critical victories and failures in counterinsurgency are not military ones, they are political. David Galula, author of *Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice* expands on this element of counterinsurgency and goes far enough to say that unlike other kinds of warfare, counterinsurgency is 20% military and 80% political². If the human dimension—the wants and needs, opinions, and perceptions of a population are so critical to operations in counterinsurgency, the intelligence community must adapt and integrate this dimension into the analytical process. IPB must be revised once again, this time to include the political and social elements of COIN.

Revising IPB

IPB at a battalion level is the core of intelligence used on the battlefield. Integrating intelligence and operations pushes a battalion forward and sets the momentum for the rest of the conflict. Looking at IPB at this

level, how it works in a battalion setting, gives the best picture of how it should be revised. A Battalion sized Area of Operations (AO) in Iraq, for example, can be comprised of Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd, all with different tribal backgrounds and political opinions that facilitate continued violence: "the primary factor for the persistence of tension and violence [is] the brittleness of Iraqi national identity." (Dawisha, 553). This complicated setting has been challenging the US military for years; it is necessary to take the lessons we have learned so far and integrate them into visible tools that will make it easier for our conventional military to fight a political war. No progress can be made against an insurgency if the mass base that it lives in does not support the counterinsurgent. Therefore, there must be tools that give a BN Commander a deep understanding of the local population and how it factors into the fight. The questions that will contribute to this understanding are already being asked by the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) community, they just are not integrated into the intelligence understanding of an AO. PSYOP is conducted based on tools that lead to an understanding of the attitudes and beliefs of a population, as well as their vulnerabilities and perceptions, all gathered in order to exploit and manipulate a target audience to the benefit of the mission. If the same information was collected and used by a BN's S2 in order to understand the workings of an AO, recommend operations that could give the US a political advantage over the insurgency, and prevent the mistakes that push a population to support the insurgency, then the US would have gained significant ground in Iraq. FM 3-05.30, the field manual for psychological operations, outlines the important characteristics of a population that we now see are critical to intelligence in counterinsurgency. The ideal solution to the intelligence problem would be to integrate PSYOP into every S2 shop and have a trained asset who understands the population

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Context Assessment

- 1979: Shiite revolution in Iran influences Iraqis; *Saddam Hussein becomes president*, purges party, and arms his guard; *Saddam emphasizes tribal identity*
- 1980: Iraqi forces invade Iran; *Saddam emphasizes Arab identity*
- 1982: Baath party affirms Saddam's absolute control of country
- 1984: Diplomatic relations with US

- 1987: Genocide in Kurdistan; *Saddam emphasizes Iraqi identity*
- 1988: War ends with Iran; *Saddam emphasizes Arab identity and plays religious sects against each other*
- 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait; UN embargo and sanctions
- 1991: Desert Storm; followed by UNSCOM; *Saddam emphasizes Islamic identity*
- 1998: Desert Fox air bombardment
- 2002: President G.W. Bush defines Iraq as part of "Axis of Evil"

be part of the intelligence and operations planning. However, the PSYOP community is very small and does not have the resources or numbers to accomplish this. Instead, I have adapted the tools from PSYOP's format into analytical tools that could easily be added to IPB's toolset. By asking the questions PSYOP developed, but with a goal of understanding and not exploiting, IPB can be more effective in COIN.

The Tools

The first and possibly the most critical aspect of understanding a population is gaining a knowledge of their history and the events that have shaped their lives. Therefore, it seems impossible that IPB could be effective if it has no tool that provides this knowledge. There must be a Context Assessment, a tool that outlines the events and themes that influenced a population in the last few generations. The example below shows a Context Assessment for Iraq, though it will be more effective when used at a more local level. For example, New Orleans's context assessment and its experiences with Hurricane Katrina is vastly different from Detroit and its loss of manufacturing jobs or California with its success in the information technology field. Understanding an AO's demographics is not sufficient unless the commander also has an understanding of what this local population has experienced.

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Vulnerabilities

Category	Vulnerability	BLUF
Motives	Water Electricity Employment	
Psychographics	Fear: Corrupt Police Shame: Welfare Love: Family Structure Frustration: Lack of strong leadership	
Demographics	80% Unemployed Many were victims of Secret Police raids 85% Shiite	

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The next tool that will enhance the effectiveness of IPB is an assessment of the value sets of a local population. Just as terrain and weather are critical to understanding the battlefield, it is necessary to be familiar with local values. For example, some cultures value family over status, others are the opposite; some cultures value possessions as a status symbol while others value the local community. For the purposes of an analyst using IPB tools, a matrix that facilitates this understanding will be most useful. The analyst will have the ability to list which values are apparent in an AO, explain how it factors in, provide examples of how this value manifests itself, and

consider external influences that may effect how the target population responds to these values.

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Value Set Matrix

Values	Described	Justif. 1	Justif. 2	Outside Influence Variable
Family				
Security				
Justice				
Prosperity				

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Perceptions

Entity	Perception
Political Leadership	Strong but corrupt
Foreign Influence	Not trustworthy
Military/Police	Violent and corrupt

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Another characteristic of an AO that is a key asset in COIN is knowledge of a population's vulnerabilities. PSYOP lists these vulnerabilities under three categories: motives, psychographics, and demographics. Motives include those things that will get people to act, like a need for water, electricity, or employment. Psychographics are more emotion-based, to include the things people fear, hate, love or are frustrated with in their community. Demographics are details about a population like average age, religion, literacy rate, etc. Although demographics are already part of IPB, including this more flexible and applicable category in a format that draws connections about themes in a population is more effective for an analyst than the traditional pie charts and overlays of Urban IPB.

Finally, it is critical that we include a tool in COIN IPB that addresses the perceptions of the target population.

Improving Intelligence Efforts in COIN: Seizing the Cultural Initiative

by 2LT Danny Zhu, MI

If COIN is a political fight, we can not win the “hearts and minds” without attempting to understand how the local population as well as the insurgents perceive us, our actions, and each other. A perceptions matrix will allow an analyst to conceptualize the important parts of what they might already know; as a BN remains in an AO, over time they will become more familiar with these perceptions but it may never be clearly outlined so that they respond or act upon them. Adding this tool to IPB will facilitate this process.

Conclusions

King Faisal said of his country in its earliest days that in Iraq, despite his efforts, there were “no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever.”³ If the US is to overcome the insurgency in Iraq, we must be equipped with the tools that will help us to understand how, why and which characteristics of the population and the insurgency are a challenge or a benefit to us. As we fight a major counterinsurgency battle, our analytical tools must be updated in order to reconcile the aspects of the battlefield that are human or political in nature with the rest of the IPB process.

Endnotes

1 Medby, Jamison Jo and Rusell W. Glenn. 2002. Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation

2 Galula, David. 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International

3 Dawisha, Adeed. Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RANDOP127.pdf.

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The United States Army is a formidable conventional fighting force second to none. The most significant threat posed to us by today’s enemy comes in the form of asymmetric warfare. The purpose of this article is to establish the following points:

- modern asymmetric warfare (in the form of fourth generation warfare or 4GW) is characterized by globalization
- globalization is conducive to insurgencies, and
- culture is the center of gravity in counter insurgency (COIN) operations

Additionally, this article will examine current cultural endeavors pursued by the Army and discuss why further cultural immersion is necessary and vital to success. The thesis of this essay will promote the discussion of a supplemental Iraqi or Afghani cultural immersion or reverse-embedding program.

History of generational warfare. While the first three generations of warfare are generally accepted in the community of military strategy and theory, the concept of 4GW is neither well defined, nor universally accepted. The first three generations of warfare span from as early as the 16th century to the mid 20th century and are characterized by mass, firepower and maneuver respectively. For an in depth review of the first three generations, readers are referred to an article published in the October-December 2004 issue of MIPB by Chief Warrant Officer Three (R) Del Stewart and the original article found on pages 22-26 of the October 1989 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. Despite the misnomer of “generational” warfare, which suggests a linearity of sorts, it is important to realize that generations of warfare are not mutually exclusive, and subsequent generations never completely replace previous ones. However, the commonality linking each generation of warfare arose from the introduction of a new technology, and subsequently, new tactics to implement them on the battlefield. In this sense, 4GW is no different; however unlike its predecessors, the technology introduced in 4GW is not something maneuver elements have traditionally used to physically destroy the enemy. Instead, it comes in the form of information technology and mass media used to subvert, undermine and defeat the enemy. For this reason, intelligence has become the main effort in today’s fight, as seen in today’s reliance on human intel-

ligence (HUMINT), and the Army-wide introduction to Every Soldier a Sensor (ES2) training.

4GW, Globalization and Culture. In a recent publication by the Strategic Studies Institute, titled *Rethinking Insurgency*, Dr. Steven Metz, Chairman of Regional Strategy and Planning, provides further insight into how the globalization caused by the development of information technology defines 4GW and makes it conducive to insurgencies:

“Many [national borders] do not reflect political, economic, or social distinctions on the ground. Artificial and increasingly fragile states are pummeled by globalization, interconnectedness, and the profusion of information. Globalization and information profusion make it difficult for states to manage the distribution of goods and power within their borders and expectations.”¹

The effects described here empower non-superpower nations by allowing them to better exploit existing asymmetries between themselves and superpowers. For example, wealthy nations with well-funded research and development programs may retain a technological advantage by developing the latest cutting edge technologies, however, this advantage is frequently marginalized by the world-wide accessibility to similar technologies available on the black market. Yet, technology and information are not the only aspects of civilization that have been impacted by this globalization—and they are certainly not the only asymmetries the enemy leverages against us. Anthropologist and UCLA Professor Nicholas Gessler writes:

“...members of a culture share common mindsets based upon living in common social, behavioral and physical environments...[They] regard themselves as the standard for what it means to be a “person”... In the past, when cultures were isolated from one another...one rarely dealt with persons of a different culture. In today's society...cross-cultural encounters are increasingly frequent, [and] we can no longer afford the luxury of this economy of thought.”²

While culture is a less tangible asymmetry than technology, it is no less exploitable on the battlefield today. In fact, military strategist David Kilcullen, in his presentation, titled “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice,” described two marked advantages of the enemy in today's environment to be: “cultural understanding of the target population, and longevity.”³ To date, it has been well established that COIN is a population-centric mission, with a solution that is “20 per cent military and 80 per cent political.”⁴ However, to best understand the people, it is necessary to first understand the very thing that defines who they are, how they think and how they act: their culture. Failure to do so has strategic implications that later turns into les-

sons learned—consider, for example, the use of female coalition soldiers in mosques, and the management of detainees. For these reasons, culture should be regarded as the center of gravity in COIN operations. Although a culture gap will always exist between Americans and Iraqis, this is one asymmetry the Army cannot afford to be deficient in during a COIN campaign. Just as the enemy minimizes the disparity between U.S. technological advantages through the global black market, the Army should continue to minimize the disparity between the enemy's cultural advantages by augmenting a more comprehensive cultural immersion program.

Culture in Military Operations. Both historical and contemporary military campaigns have shown the strategic implications of cultural awareness in foreign affairs and military operations. In 1941, to stop an expanding Japanese military power, the U.S., along with the British and the Dutch, imposed an embargo on exports of oil and steel, with the expectation that doing so would force them to negotiate. But as author Colonel John Hughes-Wilson describes it, “any knowledgeable adviser on Japanese culture and thought at the time could have explained, the American diplomatic pressure left only one real choice...to fight, and to seize what Japan needed, despite efforts to deny access by the Americans and their friends.”⁵ Decades later, similar cultural biasing and mirror-imaging led to poor preparation for the infamous Tet Offensive in 1968, during which American forces, based on their own experience in 1944 with the Germans in the Ardennes, were largely convinced that the decisive push would occur at Khe Sanh, a firebase 12 miles from the border of North Vietnam—instead, it took place all throughout South Vietnam. In the 21st century, the significance of culture has not changed; today, more than ever, culture has become increasingly vital in our success. The aggressive use of force in the historical city of Fallujah in 2004 only brought greater scrutiny on American cultural indifference. Shortly thereafter, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment's campaign in Tal Afar resulted in perhaps one of the most acclaimed success stories in the contemporary operating environment. Yet, in both cases, the outcomes were largely dictated by the actions of US soldiers and their respective level of cultural understanding. It comes as no surprise then, that British Brigadier General Nigel Aylwin-Foster wrote in his criticism of Army operations, “a COIN force...must be able to see issues and actions from the perspective of the domestic population.”⁶ The preceding examples show that this is true across the operational spectrum: it applies to soldiers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and in all roles, whether maneuver, fires and effects, operational support or force sustainment. With the increased reliance on HUMINT today, cultural

understanding affects intelligence professionals just as much—if not more—than it does the soldier patrolling the streets.

Cultural Intelligence. Intelligence professionals worldwide may be familiar with the phrase, “intelligence drives operations.” Whether as a staff officer that plays the role of a threat commander, or an analyst that develops threat courses of action, it is imperative that assessments made are as culturally accurate and unbiased as possible. Otherwise, the advice and recommendations developed may reflect “an adversary whose behavior and decision-making resembles those of educated, white, middle class Americans,”⁷ as was the case in one anecdote written by Dr. Rob Johnston, a Director at the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence. Indeed, playing the role of the enemy commander is ineffective at best if unable to replicate their cultural understanding of the population, because in the end, “specific cultural knowledge is a skill and the foundation for forecasting the behavior and decision-making of foreign actors.”⁸ Yet, contrary to the Soldier patrolling the streets, the intelligence professional gains little of his or her cultural knowledge through civilian interaction (due to limited opportunities), and the majority of it through reading. Ideally, the adaptable Soldier at all levels should understand the enemy through interaction with the civilian populace, classroom training, and self-motivated reading. Much like the Army’s Training and Leader Development Model, cultural awareness should be achieved through Institutional Training, Operational Assignments and Self Development, each of which is interconnected with the others. Self Development is a leader-guided individual responsibility, but will always vary Soldier to Soldier, Supervisor to Supervisor. In the Institutional Training domain, the Army has already developed an 80-hour modular cultural awareness program for deploying Soldiers, as well as made improvements to cultural realism seen at Combat Training Centers (CTC). Where the Army falls short in this model is the Operational Assignments domain. While there is certainly no shortage of operational assignments today, an inconsistent level of cultural experience is achieved across military specialties throughout these assignments.

Culture in the Operational Environment. At the ground level, Soldiers patrolling the streets, manning checkpoints and executing non-kinetic operations have the opportunity of gradually becoming familiar with community leaders and learning firsthand the customs, traditions and cultural nuances of the people. Moreover, with the Army becoming increasingly involved in training and advisory roles in foreign operations, Soldiers now also have opportunities to serve in Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and Embedded Training Teams (ETT), as well, where the level of inter-

action between American Soldiers and foreign Soldiers becomes much more personal. Additionally, the Army’s latest cultural endeavor known as the Human Terrain System, is made up of a small team of Soldiers and Anthropologists. The team’s sole purpose is to provide cultural insight on the area of operations, advising the brigade commander and staff on potential second and third order effects of military operations. Though it is still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the Human Terrain System, assignments to MiTT and ETT naturally require Soldiers to become more culturally attuned to their foreign counterparts. Despite these opportunities, only a fraction of the force is exposed to the depth of cultural experience provided by them—more can be done to mitigate the enemy’s cultural advantage. But because no Operational Assignment yields the same cultural experience, and no amount of Institutional Training or Self Development will provide Soldiers with greater cultural insight than a foreign citizen, the Army should integrate foreign cultural advisors into its units, just as it integrates military advisors into foreign armies. Surprisingly, such a reverse-embed program would not be the first adopted by the Army. Though not originally intended to be a cultural exchange program, the Korean Augmentation Troops to the United States Army (KATUSA) program of the 1950s has provided tactical and cultural advantages to the Eighth U.S. Army at all levels of operation.

The KATUSA Program. Originating during the dire need for troops in the Korean War, the KATUSA program was an initiative taken by General MacArthur to augment Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, which still exists today. As with most new programs, for various reasons, when it first started, it was very unsuccessful. Amidst shoddy recruiting and little or no training, Korean soldiers would frequently be used as ammo bearers and often became deserters.⁹ However, according to the Eighth Army today, “the KATUSA soldier is fully integrated into a U.S. unit; he lives, works and trains with his American comrades. Not only does he learn through this association, he raises the operational capability of the unit to which he is assigned and imparts to his American counterparts a better understanding of Korea and its people.” KATUSA fill a wide range of MOS’s in the Eighth Army and works in all types of units from Infantry to Signal and Intelligence, and provides several advantages, tactically and culturally. Not only do they increase the manning strength of a unit, but the cooperation between U.S. troops and KATUSA also promotes mutual trust and support, and improves the local perception of the Army. Moreover, on top of being proficient in the language and having a deep knowledge of local cultures and traditions, they are familiar with the terrain and the threat, and can blend into the populace, providing an indispensable perspective U.S. Soldiers often cannot.

Fall-out of Cultural Immersion. Nonetheless, such a program is likely to face much resistance and criticism on many levels. The most significant concern is likely to be focused on operational security (OPSEC) and subversion and espionage directed against the U.S. Army (SAEDA). While this is a realistic threat, it will only serve to reinforce security, heighten alertness and increase scrutiny. The key is that as the host of the program, the Army maintains control over who is augmented where, and how they are utilized. Additionally, individual vulnerability assessments can be handled on a case by case basis by the Special Security Officer, but must not be pursued so aggressively as to break mutual trust between augmentees and American Soldiers. It is also possible that the likelihood of espionage be reduced due to a mentality similar to that adopted by the Chinese Nationalist Revolutionary Army, who would often have their own soldiers be recruited by the Communist Army when captured, during the Chinese Civil War.¹⁰ In other words, insurgents may not trust augmentees for fear of maintaining their own operational security. This also opens up many opportunities for Counter Intelligence (CI) and HUMINT campaigns. Other arguments the program faces may include the fact that South Korea is an environment that does not face an active insurgent threat and the program's success there is not indicative of success in a COIN environment. Antagonists would follow with the argument that if it is to succeed in a COIN environment, it may require half a century, just as it did in South Korea. However, because this is not an entirely new program, and conditions during the middle of the 20th century were much different than they are today, the Army can learn from many of the mistakes it faced during the initial push for the KATUSA program, thoroughly detailed in a 1957 Military Review article by the late Lieutenant Colonel Martin Blumenson, appropriately titled, "KATUSA." Finally, others may argue whether the KATUSA program provides any intimate knowledge about the North Korean threat whatsoever, suggesting that South Koreans are very different from North Koreans. While there may be some truth to this, even KATUSA Soldiers are far different from Republic of Korea (ROK) Soldiers, in that the majority of the former are college students that come from wealthy, upper-class families. But no matter how different they may be, South Koreans can still provide more cultural insight about North Koreans than the average American Soldier can, because certain aspects of culture simply can not be replicated.

In summary, cultural knowledge is a distinct enemy advantage, and because the objective of COIN (people) is culture-centric, we must first achieve a deep understanding of the culture in order to understand the people. However, intimate cultural knowledge cannot

be developed through just Institutional Training and Self Development; it requires regular interaction with foreign nationals abroad. Current Operational Assignments do not always provide this level of interaction and consequently, different levels of cultural experience are achieved by Soldiers in different specialties. Because of this, the Army should seek a more uniform cultural immersion program that integrates foreign citizens into its ranks and provides deep cultural understanding at all levels of operation. To this end, several cultural and tactical advantages, as well as operational risks of a similar reverse-embed program in South Korea today have been presented in this article to encourage discussion. The final outcome should be a program that mitigates the enemy's cultural advantage that preventing insurgents from leveraging the asymmetry of culture against coalition forces every day.

Endnotes

- 1 Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2007), 12.
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- 3 David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice* (2007), 55.
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- 6 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 6 (2005): 4.
- 7 Rob Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), 82-4.
- 8 *Ibid*, 84.
- 9 Martin Blumenson, "KATUSA," *Military Review* 37, no. 5 (1957): 51-6.
- 10 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 35.

2LT Danny Zhu was born in Abidjan, Ivory Coast and received his commission through the Army ROTC program at the Rochester Institute of Technology, where he was recognized as a Distinguished Military Graduate and received both his Bachelors and Masters of Science degrees in Electrical Engineering. He is a recent graduate of the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leadership Course and is currently assigned as the Electronic Warfare Maintenance Platoon Leader in B Company, 224th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) at Hunter Army Airfield. Lieutenant Zhu's previous publications include "Source Localization within a Uniform Circular Sensor Array" in 2007 through the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and his research thesis of the same title.



“The Army’s First Warrior Transition Brigade”

By Sgt. 1st Class Jeffrey Uth

Platoon Sergeant, Chosen Battery,
Warrior Transition Brigade,
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

After a series of articles about the conditions of some of the facilities at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Department of the Army quickly stepped in and implemented the Army Medical Action Plan to address issues not only at Walter Reed but all Army military treatment facilities. Six days later, I found out that I was going to be part of the solution.

On Thursday, Feb. 22, 2007, I was a military intelligence Soldier serving in Company A, 742nd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort George A. Meade, Md. About five weeks later on March 30, I became a platoon sergeant in the Warrior Transition Brigade at Walter Reed.

When I arrived, the WTB leadership to include the commander, command sergeant major, company commander and first sergeant were already at Walter Reed. I in-processed with 17 other sergeant’s first class from other Career Management Field’s (CMF), including infantry, signal, air defense, aviation, medical, armor, military police and field artillery. I was the only Military Intelligence Soldier.

Many of the platoon sergeant’s wore Drill Sergeant, Recruiter, or Old Guard identification badges and had previously been platoon sergeants in other units throughout the Army. I too was a former drill sergeant and had served as a platoon sergeant. It makes sense that the Army sent representatives from all different CMFs, especially those that had combat experience. This enables all of the NCOs to pool their knowledge and experience to make the Army’s first ever Warrior Transition Brigade a success – taking care of the Nation’s defenders.

The Warrior Transition Brigade was activated Apr. 25, 2007, and would soon be followed by the activation of its three companies – Able Troop, Battle Company, and Chosen Battery. The weeks between my arrival in March and the brigade’s activation were filled with numerous classes on medical injuries and conditions, special pay and allowances, family counseling, and compassionate leadership.

Those classes formed the foundation of a different style of leadership. No longer did we have one or two Soldiers that went to sick call because they had an ingrown toenail or had the sniffles, but we now had Soldiers who were seriously injured in battle, some missing limbs while others were diagnosed with Traumatic Brain Injury.

Instead of lighting up a Soldier for missing an appointment or for having a bad attitude, I now have the responsibility of ensuring my Soldiers and their families are being taken care of during their road to recovery. I have to first take a deep breathe and think, just for a second, what if I was in that Soldiers boots? Our most valuable asset also arrived during this time – our squad leaders.

Most the squad leaders also had combat experience, which would prove to be a vital asset in dealing with Wounded Warriors who had been injured in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. This battlefield experience gives the squad leaders and platoon sergeants something in common with their fellow platoon members. They had pounded the same sand and faced the enemy.

When we were not in class, we were doing left seat/right seat rides with previous leadership to insure we understood our new duties. This training added to the foundation we had already gained from the classes. Instead of managing an electronics repair shop or developing training standards for equipment, I now had to escort Soldiers to appointments and transition then to either return to duty or medically retire to a productive civilian life. I learned very quickly that getting daily accountability for my former Soldiers in my previous duty was easy compared to trying to get accountability of Soldiers located on three different military installations.

Since my arrival at Walter Reed almost a year ago, things are going great. With the full complement of platoons, there is now a 1 to 12 ratio of squad leader to Wounded Warrior. After implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan, Warrior Transition Units have stood up across the Army. Missed appointments have fallen below the Army standard of 5%. Warriors and their family members now have more people and resources to address their concerns about adjusting to their new life here at Walter Reed. Living conditions in the barracks and on-post facilities have been refurbished and include plasma televisions and computers with free internet access in all rooms. Morale for the Wounded Warriors is much higher than when I arrived a year ago. The Warrior Transition Brigade is a success story, and I’m proud to have been apart of that success and to take care of my own. We never leave a fallen comrade behind.



CORRECTION

In the Volume 12, Number 3, issue of *THE VANGUARD*, the author’s name was misspelled for the article on page 19. Apologies and thanks to **Victor Tindall** for your fine description of your construction of the *ENIGMA (E) Cipher Machine*.

A Study on Stabilization Forces in the Balkans

by SFC Mark E. Wood

SFC Wood is the MICA Writer of the Cycle for the Advanced NCO Course Class 08-001.

Executive Summary

As Balkan states continue their quest for independence, stability in the region continues to wane. The Balkans has a long history of violence, which has affected both its political and economic stability. The presence of stabilization forces (SFOR) from January 1996 through December 2005 fostered progress within the Balkans. The majority of the people no longer lived in fear, state institutions were established, and there was respect for human rights.¹ However, with the conclusion of SFOR and the introduction of the European Union forces (EUFOR), there has been an increase in demands for independence as well as increased tensions, which once again threaten the frail stability of the region. This paper will analyze three separate hypotheses on how premature removal of stabilization forces from the Balkans might affect the region. It needs mentioning, before continuing, that prematurely removing stabilization forces from the region does not imply within the next few years. Considering their long history of violence and ethnic hostilities, as well as current demands for emancipation from controlling states, it is conceivable that removal of stabilization forces from the Balkans with the next 50 years constitutes premature. Evidence collected and analyzed indicates that prematurely depositing forces from the region will result in an outbreak of war. A stronger, radical Serbia threatens the weaker, conservative states within the Balkans. Other hypotheses considered in this paper examine the possibilities of peace and stability without the assistance of stabilization forces, as well as the possibility that outside interests may attempt to gain a foothold within the afflicted region. Due to lack of confidence in NATO's ability to fulfill its mission, the United States will assume a role as a key player in resolving the issue of increased instability in the region, either by forcing NATO to fulfill its mission, or by creating a long-term resolution for peace and stability of its own.

It is the international community's assessment that NATO's stabilization forces (SFOR) from January 1996 through December 2005 were successful at bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. It is difficult to argue against this assessment when we look at the fact that within one year after the arrival of the United States' (U.S.) forces into Bosnia, they "were able to separate

warring factions, they divided disputed territory, and they sent warring troops and heavy equipment to cantonment areas."² Additionally, when one considers that there was nearly nine years of this type of progress throughout the Balkans, resulting in the conclusion of SFOR and the introduction of the European Union forces (EUFOR), it is easy to assume that the Balkans is stable. Regrettably, this is not the case. In fact, there is every indication that stability in the Balkans is a superficial reality. With the world's primary focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems likely that the international community could be lulled into a false sense of security when it comes to the Balkans. False senses of security result in the assumption that forces are not needed, which results in premature withdrawals. The issue that needs addressing is how the Balkans would react to a premature withdrawal of security forces from the region. After careful analysis of three separate hypotheses, evidence overwhelmingly indicates the likelihood of renewed conflicts. War is a harsh actuality of life within the Balkans, and, unless the current rise in tensions between the Balkan states abates, it will again become reality. In order to preserve the peace and maintain stability within the region, stabilization forces need to remain in place for no less than the next 50 years. The U.S. can expect the responsibility of ensuring that EUFOR fulfills its commitment, or it will be required to intervene and take the lead.

Historically, the Balkans is a region that has constantly sought independence from one occupying force or another. War is not a new concept; in fact, it seems to be a part of who they are. However, the Balkans has come a long way since the early 1900's, when the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks successfully drove the Turks out of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. The Ottoman Empire's control of these Balkan states ended in 1913. The Serbians, subsequently, drove the Bulgarians out of Kosovo and Macedonia, asserting them as a legitimate force in the Balkans. Not surprisingly, "it was a Serb nationalist that triggered events, which led to the start of World War I."³ At the end of World War II, by the decree of Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia became a socialist country. Subsequently, this led to the formation of Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. For a period, until ethnic tensions increased due to unequal development and a growing burden of debt, relations with the West were good. In fact, when Tito died in 1980, many expected the precarious situation in Yugoslavia to cause an immediate break-up of the federation. It was not until 1992 when Bosnia made a claim for independence that the region succumbed to war.

Serbia, which has historically been the most radically minded of all of the Balkan states, represented a problem for Bosnians who were seeking independence.

ACH Matrix

How might the Balkans be affected by prematurely removing stabilization forces from the region?

Evidence	Competing Hypotheses		
	Outbreak of War Between Balkan States	Stability and Continued Peace	Outside Interests Attempt to Gain Foothold Within Balkan States
Serbia's isolation from the remaining Balkan states	C	I	I
Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia	C	I	I
Reduction of violence within the Balkans	I	C	I
U.N.'s failure to meet resolution deadlines	C	I	C
Russia's increased interest in Serbian affairs	C	I	C

At the time that Bosnia made a plea for independence, Serbs living within Bosnia were resolute on remaining with Yugoslavia. With the backing of Belgrade, Serbians within Bosnia went on a mission to ethnically cleanse Bosnian Muslims, and by 1993, Bosnian Serb forces controlled over 70% of the capital city of Sarajevo. Complicating matters further, Bosnian Muslims were also engaged in a separate war that had erupted with Bosnian Croats, who incidentally wished to be part of a greater Croatia. By this time, the United Nations (UN) dispatched peacekeepers to the region in order to contain the situation, but they proved ineffective. The U.S., as well as all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, sent forces into the Balkans in 1995. Presently, U.S. troops remain in the Balkans, but the number of troops is significantly less. It is crucial, however, that the EU does not underestimate the issues with instability and ethnic tensions it currently faces, which will likely worsen in the very near future.

The situation within Bosnia, since 1992, has improved dramatically. Underscoring this point, more than anything else, was the withdrawal of American forces from Tuzla in 2007. What many fail to realize, however, is that "Bosnia is not a fully sovereign state - it is supervised by the Office of High Representative and its peace is maintained by an international European force."⁴ This does not bode well with present-day Bosnians. Bosnians harbor a lot of resentment towards Serbia. They feel that Serbia, as a country, needs to be abolished because it was, in their opinion, built on genocide and aggres-

sion. Political leaders within Bosnia are inflaming ethnic tensions, whether advertent or not, because they are failing to embrace tolerance as an option. Instead, they are holding tightly to their sense of nationalism, while blaming Serbia for their poor state of economy and their high unemployment rate. These factors contribute to Bosnia's instability.

Another factor flaring tensions within Bosnia is Kosovo's push for independence. Everyone expects Kosovo, formerly a Serbian province, to gain its independence, and Bosnians are fearful of Serbia's reaction. They are afraid that Serbia will make a push for Bosnian Serbs to join with Serbia, and, with memories of 1992, they are concerned. These are the issues concerning Bosnia and Serbia. EUFOR must be prepared to not only face them, but also deal with them. Removing stabilization forces from Bosnia would create more anxiety in the region. Peace is inherently fragile. Each time it has to be re-pieced together, it is not as strong as it was previously. If there is any realistic expectation that Bosnia's peace will not crumble, the international community (EUFOR) needs to consider leaving stabilization forces in place for an indefinite amount of time.

Increased sentiment of deteriorating stability within the Balkans during 2008 has many concerned. Recent polls indicate that the majority of Balkanians feel that stability and peace in their region is declining.⁵ A large part of their consternation revolves around the UN's failures at reaching negotiations by prescribed deadlines. A recent example of this is the "UN's failure of recent

ACH Matrix (cont)

How might the Balkans be affected by prematurely removing stabilization forces from the region?

Evidence	Competing Hypotheses		
	Outbreak of War Between Balkan States	Stability and Continued Peace	Outside Interests Attempt to Gain Foothold Within Balkan States
Serbia's history of ignoring international pressure	C	I	I
Bosnian political leaders inflaming ethnic tensions	C	I	I
Macedonia continuing on path towards Euro-Atlantic integration	I	C	C
Increasing sentiment of deteriorating stability with Balkan region during 2008	C	I	I
Internal political pressure for Serbian President's abandonment of pro-EU position to move EU mission into Kosovo	C	I	C

negotiations to resolve the issue of Kosovo's status by the 10 December 2007 deadline."⁶ Many feel that the best-case scenario, coming to a decision acceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade, is now virtually non-existent. Though Kosovo's independence is inevitable, a bigger issue remains; can Kosovo gain its independence in conjunction with the risk of long-term violence being minimized or averted? The stabilization of the region depends on the ability to achieve both. Until such time the threat of violence dissipates and Serbia has grown used to the idea of having lost Kosovo, stabilization forces will be needed for a very long time. Perhaps establishing a long-term base, versus a short-term camp, will aid in stabilizing the region. I think that so long as the region continues to view stabilization forces as a temporary entity, they will feel as though their stability is temporary as well. We need to be prepared to commit troops throughout the next couple of generations if we are to expect peace to prevail. Just as American children are born today without an understanding of the concept of racial segregation, we need to be able to maintain our presence in the Balkans until generations of children can be born without the concept of war as the solution to their problems.

Kosovo's quest for independence is fueling Macedonia's desire for independence, which will affect both the Albanians and the Serbians. Macedonia's pop-

ulation contains a substantial number of citizens with Albanian ethnicity. Ironically, the Albanians historically maintained a closer relationship with the Serbians than anyone else did, but "the majority of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia support the move for independence."⁷ Startlingly, the majority of ethnic Albanians supports Kosovo's bid for independence. This will almost certainly result in further isolation of Serbia from the rest of the Balkans. However, with Serbia's history of ignoring international pressure, they will ultimately isolate themselves from the rest of the Balkan states, if they have not completely done so already.

Serbia's President, Boris Tadic, is under extreme pressure from his Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, to drop his pro-EU stance on deploying an EU mission into Kosovo. President Tadic represents Serbia's last hope at being able to maintain a relationship with the rest of the EU, but with increasing internal political pressure, it is likely that Serbia's nationalists will prevail. In fact, Tadic received a threat that, "if he expected support in the upcoming election run-off, he would abandon the stance."⁸ Though Boris Tadic is Serbia's President, many believe that Kostunica and his nationalist supporters hold the power.

In recent news, it was announced that "Serbia signed a new energy bill with Russia."⁹ This further underscores

Serbia's tendency to ignore international pressure as well as find ways to isolate themselves even further from the rest of the Balkan states. It is not surprising, however, that Russia is eager to strengthen its foothold in the region. If stabilization forces redeploy from the Balkans prematurely, Russia would most certainly assert itself on a larger scale. This, as well as the outbreak of war, is one of the hypotheses supported by the removal of stabilization forces from the region. It represents another issue the EU must consider when carrying out its duties. If Russian and Serbia continue to make deals and form alliances, there will be no choice but to emplace stabilization forces in strategic locations throughout the Balkans. Russia's relationship with Serbia is inevitable and unavoidable, but it will be much easier to accept if we allow the Balkans the time necessary to solidify and grow in confidence. Security of the remaining Balkan states needs accomplishing before we can look at removing the rest of our forces from the region.

In conclusion, collected and analyzed evidence overwhelmingly points to the fact that we need to avoid prematurely removing stabilization forces from the Balkans. It is my strong opinion, which is supported by the preceding evidence that premature removal of stabilization forces from the Balkans would inevitably result in war. At present, ethnic and political tensions are threatening peace and stability within the Balkans. Stabilization forces will provide states such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia the time they need to realize their dreams of independence and realize their full potential. Without them, states like Serbia, with the backing of Russia, will continue to remain a threat. EUFOR, with assistance from the United States, needs to be committed to maintaining a stabilization force for at least the next 50 years.

Endnotes

1. NATO Ends SFOR Mission: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-december/e1202a.htm>. NATO website providing news, background, and international opinion on SFOR's previous, and EUFOR's current, peacekeeping mission in the Balkans.
2. Bosnia Update: What a Difference a Year Makes: <http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=40635>. American Forces Press Service website dedicated to providing new articles on any/all updates within Bosnia.
3. BBC News: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/map/yugoslavia>. Provides daily world news information, with this particular article focused on the history of Yugoslavia.
4. Time: Is the Fragile Peace in Bosnia Crumbling? <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1449151,00.html>. An independent website providing a history of significant events that shaped present day Bosnia.
5. Southeast European Times: <http://www.balkantimes.com>

Website that provides electronic version of the Balkan Times, which is dedicated to providing information and the latest news within the Balkans.

6. Inside Track: Calamity in Kosovo? <http://serbianna.com/blogs/michaletos/?cat=4>.

Website capturing issues of national interest as well as military developments in the Balkans.

7. Macedonia in 2008: Challenges and Opportunities: <http://www.balkantimes.com>.

8. Kostunica asks Serbia's Tadic to Abandon Pro-EU Stand: <http://www.settimes.com>.

Website dedicated to providing new briefs on issues pertaining to the Balkans.

9. Kostunica: Serbia to Sign Energy Deal with Russia: http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/print/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/01/22/feature-01.

Website that provides electronic version of the Balkan Times, which is dedicated to providing information and the latest news within the Balkans.

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Adding Economic Analysis to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

by Clay D. Murray, Jr.

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Today, more than ever, economic analysis must be accounted for in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Army intelligence analysts already account for terrain and weather effects on the battlefield, but analysts do not account for what is truly the linchpin in all of our fights around the world; economics. Throughout history, economic factors have been the tinder that feeds the flames of war.

Economics is the social science that studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. The term economics comes from the Greek word for oikos (house) and nomos (custom or law), hence "rules of the house(hold)."¹ Another definition is the study of trying to meet unlimited needs with limited resources.

Currently, the Army is teaching soldiers and officers cultural awareness. I have attended several of these types of classes, but none have adequately discussed the economics of the culture in question. Yet the etymology

of the term “economics,” indicates that by knowing the economics of a place it will show what the “rules of the household” are; thereby deepening the understanding of that specific culture. When analysts can understand our adversary’s holistic situation, more importantly, understand neutral civilian population’s holistic situation, our power to win will dramatically increase both on the ground and in the minds of our adversary. Simply stated, adding an economic analysis tool to the current IPB process will not only deepen our cultural understanding and sensitivity to the area of operation, but enhance our nation’s ability to predict enemy actions.

On several occasions, Army doctrine states that economics is a very significant part of warfare, specifically, counterinsurgency operations (COIN). With regard to COIN the leading doctrine on economics is found in the Logical Lines of Communication (LLO) model, found in Field Manual 3-24, Chapter 5, Executing COIN Operations. There are five elements to the key aspect of the LLO model, the last element being economic development. Under economic development there are five recommended actions to take.

- Mobilize / Develop Local Economic Activity
- Initiate Contracts Locally to Stimulate Trade
- Rebuild Commercial Infrastructure
- Support Broad Based Economic Opportunity
- Support a Free Market Economy

Chapter three of FM-3-24, Intelligence in COIN, provides a definition and statement on the significance of economics in COIN. Chapter eight, Sustainment, talks about support to economic development. Chapter two offers one bullet on economics, and chapter four gives a few words on how engineers should focus construction efforts with regard to economics.

What analysts are missing is the analysis and assessment of the economic situation in military area of operations, at the tactical level: battalion, brigade, division. Without analysis and assessment we cannot fully, nor effectively, gauge enemy forces, civilians on the battlefield, or the success or failures of US military actions; whether those actions are lethal or non-lethal.

The recommendation is to insert this economic analysis tool in step two of IPB, Describe the Battlefield’s Effects (see IPB insert below). Economic analysis should be briefed after Terrain and Weather Analysis. Intelligence analysts should use map overlays supported with trend-lines shown on charts, graphs or scatter plots to visually prove the analysis and assessments, which is the driving point. Intelligence analysts must produce an overall assessment of economics’ effects on the battlefield and a recommended operations list, mostly likely a non-lethal one.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

1. Define the Battlefield Environment
2. Describe the Battlefield’s Effects
 - a. Analyze the Battlefield Environment
 - i. Terrain Analysis
 - ii. Weather Analysis
 - iii. Economic Analysis
 - b. Analysis of Other Characteristics of the Battlefield
3. Describe the Battlefield’s Effects on Threat and Friendly Capabilities and Broad COAs
4. Evaluate the Threat
5. Determine Threat Courses of Action

Economic analysis will be a very powerful tool for commanders and military operations. Understanding the economic situation will:

- Improve battlefield understanding / increase operational efficiency.
- Deny insurgents easy access to the people’s hearts and minds.
- Maximize the people’s support for their government / our mission.
- Maximize the effectiveness / focus of military operations.
- Minimize negative impacts of military operations on the people.
- Round-out predictive analysis, more inclusive.
- Create a priority list of social needs (non-lethal operations list), guides stability and support operations.
- Evaluate the likelihood of an insurgency taking root in an area.
- Indicate positive / negative economic effects on insurgents.
- Indicate positive / negative insurgent effects on economy.
- Indicate positive / negative military effects on economy.

The application of an economic analysis should follow a defined process. The process should be flexible to the given conflict or other unforeseen reasons. Overall though, the economic analysis should generally follow a phase or step sequence. For example:

Step 1, establish economic indicators. These indicators are essentially variables that should be tailored to the area of operation. The indicators need to reflect the

preponderance of the economy, rural or urban; agricultural, industrial, or service oriented for example.

Step 2, analysts need to collect historical values for each of the selected indicators. For example purposes think of a mostly rural-agricultural economy. Select indicators, such as the number of farms, the size of farms and the number of cattle in the area, to name a few. In step two analysts' reference economic reports from the host country, international organizations and US economic research organizations and find that a year earlier there were 104 farms, the average farm size was 30 acres and there were 5,852 head of cattle.

Step 3, analysts determine the current values for the same indicators and find only 49 farms with an average size of 24 acres and 2,428 head of cattle.

Step 4, calculate the difference in the values for each indicator. This step can be made as broad or as detailed as need or deemed appropriate by commanders on the ground. However, the intent for step four is to identify trends. According to the example situation, there was a loss of 55 farms, the average acreage decrease by four acres and the number of head of cattle fell by approximately half.

Step 5, make an assessment of the economic effects on the battlefield. Again this step can be very broad or very detailed. Analysts may want to categorize the economic situation or potential impact on the battlefield via a three tier system. Looking at the example situation, a simple assessment may reveal that farmers are selling small segments of their farmland to maintain their income level or farmers are losing their labor force and are not able to farm as much land as usual. Also, a decrease in the number of farms may be indicative of where US and Allied forces emplaced bases of operation or storage, or an indication of insurgent forces buying out farms for the use of the land in training or preparation operations. The significant decrease in the number of head of cattle may be because of decreased amounts of dry food stocks or due to the decreased amount of farm land.

Tier 1, weak / failing; Tier 2, static / unchanging; Tier 3, strong / growing. Analysts can even use a color-code system as the situation changes during the period of operations. Tier one, may be coded as red due to the failing nature of the economic situation; yellow or amber for the tier two and green for tier three where the economic situation is strong and growing.

An army "fights on its stomach," and throughout the ages, removing the capability of the land and population to sustain a war effort is part of the strategy for victory. Yet as Jefferson wrote in his "Declaration of Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms" on the 6th of July in 1775, "We have counted the cost of this contest ...the arms we

have been compelled by our enemies to assume we will, in defiance of every hazard, with unabating firmness and perseverance, employ for the preservation of our liberties; being with one mind resolved to die freemen rather than to live slaves." If we are viewed as enemies of a people rather than liberators, might they too fight to the death?

Extrapolating for a world wide application that our War for Independence strategy of General Washington involved "skirmishing" - attack and retreat, attack the enemy's supply lines both on land and at sea with his "Washington Cruisers", and lay in wait for the time when forces can be massed to defeat the superior forces of the enemy.

Let us recall further American History and Economics, both for the causes in the initiation of the War Between the States and in the military prosecution of it. That war has been described as the first in the modern era of warfare. Tariff issues and methods of production (slavery on the farms vs. child labor in northern factories) were subordinate issues to the economic competition or "economic warfare" between two regions, one agricultural and one industrial.

The War came and the initial strategy included the "Anaconda Plan" of constricting the South and its economy with a blockade of its ports. That had limited effectiveness, so later the commander in chief directed the "scorched earth" policy of war with Sheridan in the Shenandoah, and Sherman with his "March to the Sea" in Georgia. While effective in achieving victory, animosities were created that have spanned decades over a century.

Then the Reconstruction Period was basically an economic recovery program in a conquered territory, creating other successes and failures for future leaders to resolve.

Then look at World War I that left the German economy prostrate which served as a tinder box for the animosity that grew into the Third Reich and the flames of World War II. Learning from our post-WWI economic failure, the Marshall Plan in Europe, and McArthur's work in Japan were very successful Reconstruction periods that have reshaped the modern world for the betterment of all mankind.

The lesson for America to be gained today in our efforts to expand Liberty around the world is that destruction of an adversary's ability to wage war must then in our victory be reconstructed in a manner that will reshape the world for the future betterment of man.

Our reconstruction efforts must be based on Liberty and Free Market Economics so the will and energies of the people are unleashed and encouraged to rebuild

their nation into a new form that fosters Freedom and Liberty for all of its citizens.

When that is the result, America and the entire world win.

Biography:

2LT Clay D. Murray Jr was born in Louisville, Kentucky, and graduated from Fairdale High School in 2002 as Valedictorian and Class President. He then received an Army ROTC Scholarship from the Cardinal Battalion, University of Louisville (U of L) where earned his Army Reserve Commission and Bachelor of Science Degree in Political Science. His studies concentrated on U.S. Constitutional Law, Public Policy and Military Science. 2LT Murray was a Distinguished Military Graduate and received the George C. Marshall Award for scholarship, leadership and service. Since August 2006 he has worked towards his Graduate Degree in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

Acknowledgments:

Special recognition for this article goes to my wife, Laura. She has supported my effort with many great

and provocative ideas. James Renwick Manship, Sr. a Major in the Civil Air Patrol, Mount Vernon Composite Squadron Drug Demand Reduction Officer generously lent his support. Mr. Manship applied his background in economics and history as well as his experience as an officer in the US Navy to this paper. Additionally, each member of the US Army Military Intelligence Center (USAIC), Cadre has guided and mentored me in this endeavor; namely, Captain Tyler Hernandez, Captain Thomas Pike, Mr. David McElroy, Mr. William Buppert and Mr. Mark Domenic. Lastly, but certainly not least, I want to acknowledge the ideas and interest given by my counterparts from the USAIC Basic Officer Leaders Course; specifically, Second Lieutenants Ronald VanValkenburg, David Kay and Brandon Eliason. We talked often and in great detail about this idea and each one of them have greatly contributed to the development of this economic analysis idea. To each one of them, I am very grateful and in their debt.



Footnotes

1 Harper, Douglas (November 2001). Online Etymology Dictionary - Economy (HTML). Retrieved on October 27, 2007.

Awakening Councils in Iraq

by 2LT Brandon Eliason

The Anbar Awakening Council was the first of a growing number Awakening Councils (AC) to form throughout Iraq. Sunnis formed AC in response to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Working with coalition forces in Iraq, these AC have helped to greatly reduce the ability of AQI. The great power of the AC comes from the grassroots nature of the councils. The AC are seen as an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem. Maintaining its distance from outside influences is an important part of ensuring that the councils remain effective. In the efforts to support the councils, the U.S. is currently on the verge of providing too much support. In order to maintain the effectiveness of the AC, there are changes that the U.S. can implement to provide support and prevent the destabilization of the councils.

By forming neighborhood councils that protect citizens, AQI has lost the popular support it once had. Sunnis have now turned against AQI. However, the progress made with the AC has come at a price. There are now several challenges facing the future of the AC. There are threats from without and within the AC. The threats from without include AQI and the Iraqi government. Threats from within come from power struggles as the AC seek to gain power over each other.

As AC were formed, they began a shift in momentum for the Sunni population. AQI is formed primarily of Sunnis, and as AC gained in strength and popularity there was a shift of support away from AQI. Insurgents stopped working for AQI and began to support the AC and Coalition Forces (CF). The efforts of the AC have led to the near demise of AQI. In response to the Awakening Council's pressure on AQI, AQI has begun to target members of the AC. Since December of last year, there have been over 100 members of the AC killed, as well as 6 of their leaders.

There is growing contention and power seeking taking place among the various AC. These councils know that they will not last forever; therefore some councils are seeking to gain power to have a base from which to compete. However, the largest obstacle facing the Awakening Council is the Iraqi government's refusal to add them to the existing security forces. This means that when the AC are eventually disbanded there will be thousands of individuals without jobs. In order to ensure a smooth transition, there must be a method to place more people in jobs as they leave the AC. One method would be to encourage the government to do a phased drawdown of the AC to prevent a sudden influx of jobless individuals. Additionally, as part of being employed by AC, Iraqi and non-governmental organizations could provide job training. Encouraging the Iraqi government to create a job training program for AC is a way that

the government can show appreciation for the councils, without adding them to the security forces. Ultimately one of the most important elements of security is to increase the job availability to Iraqis.

One potential solution to the problem is to increase cooperation between the AC and Iraqi Security Forces. If CF can find a way to turn the AC into a neighborhood watch program, where people observe situations but allow the police to respond, it could go a long way to preventing the AC from turning on CF. The AC have the potential to become a long term partner in the stabilization of Iraq; however, it will take work to keep them on track.

AC helped to solve a major problem for CF in Iraq. The influence of the AC has led to a drop in the level of violence within Iraq, and, just as important, people feel that their neighborhoods are becoming less violent. However if CF are not careful, this short term solution will have long term implications and may precipitate a rise in violence in Iraq. CF have the ability to prevent or limit any potential problems that may arise as a result of the use of AC. Continued cooperation and support for the AC can help prevent any problems with the AC. To maintain the effectiveness of the Councils, coalition involvement needs to maintain a low profile to prevent the Councils from being viewed as an American run organization.

The best way for the CF to maintain influence with the Councils while minimizing perceived U.S. involvement is to assign liaisons to the councils. These liaisons would be responsible for cooperation between CF and the Councils. In order to minimize perceived CF involvement, the liaisons would meet with Council leaders no more than once or twice a week.

There are three types of liaisons that would be very valuable in gaining the assistance of the AC. These are a chaplain, an intelligence liaison, and a military liaison. These liaisons will be the primary method of support to the councils coming from CF. It is important that the liaisons do not become an overbearing force on the councils, in order to prevent the appearance that the CF are running or manipulating the Councils.

The chaplain is perhaps the most important of these three individuals. The AC are largely religious in nature. Being a religious scholar, the Iraqi religious leaders view the chaplain as a peer. As a result of the inherent trust that the Iraqis place in the chaplain, the chaplain is in a perfect position to understand and influence important members of the AC. The freedoms with which the Iraqis may communicate with the chaplain allow him to spot future concerns or issues. This will allow CF to head off or divert any problems before they arise.¹

The intelligence liaison would be responsible for correlating information that CF need to combat the insurgency. Additionally, the intelligence liaison would pass information to the AC that they could use. Finally, the most important information the intelligence liaison can collect is intelligence about the structure and organization of the AC. This is useful in the event that a Council becomes corrupted and it would give CF a big head start to already have information collected.

Adding a military liaison to the AC would provide the Councils with an individual that could help them operate in a more efficient and safe manner. The liaison would also inform the Councils of some military operations of which they may need to be aware. The key to these liaisons is the two way flow of information. If the CF are not willing to share information with the AC, then they will be less willing to share information with CF.

The CF have several means of ensuring that the AC are willing to cooperate. The U.S. is currently paying 65,000 Council members. Making funds dependent upon cooperation will place great pressure on leaders to ensure that they are fulfilling their portion of the requirement.

AC have served a great purpose in assisting to eliminate AQI. They have the potential to continue to assist CF in Iraq as the U.S. seeks stabilization it. In order to maintain the effectiveness of the AC, the U.S. needs to assist them in maintaining their focus. Additionally, the U.S. has to be aware that the Councils will eventually be disbanded and prepare to mitigate any negative effects disbanding may have. Finally, the U.S. must continue to communicate with them, and learn if and where problems may be arising in order to head off undesirable situations.

Biography

2LT Brandon Eliason grew up in Eugene, Oregon. Shortly after graduation from high school he spent two years in Taiwan. Upon returning from Taiwan, he began school at Oregon State University in Corvallis Oregon. Brandon then decided to transfer to the University of Wyoming, where he joined the National Guard and ROTC. Upon graduation from the University of Wyoming, he was commissioned into the United States Army in the Military Intelligence Corps. He is currently serving as the Assistant S2 for the 54th Engineer BN.

Footnotes

1 CH (COL) Michael Hoyt, Command Chaplain for the MNF-I, Interview with Defense Bloggers Roundtable. 21 June 2007. <www.defenselink.mil/home/blog/docs/Hoyt_Transcript.pdf>



2008 MICA Scholarships

The Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) Scholarship Program provides scholarships for individuals pursuing undergraduate degrees or technical certifications. Scholarships may be used for attendance at regionally accredited colleges, universities, or state approved vocational schools/technical institutions.

Who is Eligible?

Applicants must be a current individual member of MICA or a family member of such. Family members are considered a spouse, children, or immediate relative living with or supported by the qualifying MICA member.

Applicants must be pursuing their first undergraduate (Associates or Bachelors) degree or a technical certification. Applicants already possessing an undergraduate degree or seeking a graduate degree are not eligible.

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Complete instructions and application forms are located on the MICA webpage at www.micorps.org. Information on MICA membership is also available on this webpage.

Applications must be mailed and postmarked no later than 15 May 2008. Late or incomplete applications will be returned to the applicant without consideration.

Send completed application to:

Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI)
Attn: MICA Scholarship Chairman
110 Rhea Street
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7080

For more information call: SGM Kent Wheelock at (520) 533-1174, DSN 821-1174

Gift Shop News

New Spooks — We have a brand new version of the male spook statute. It has been redesigned, and it is now available in three color choices: Black, White and Antiqued Platinum. These new statutes are now hand-cast from solid color resin, and are therefore considerably less fragile than before.

The new spook statues make great presentations. The MICA Gift Shop provides a collection of MI branded items. You can access the gift shop from the MICA home page or enter MICAGIFTSHOP in the eBay *Items By Seller* option under in the Advanced Search page. Contact the Gift Shop manager at gifts@micorps.org with questions.



Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Four Man Scramble

Thursday, 26 June 2008, 0730 Shotgun Start
Mountain View Golf Course, FT Huachuca, AZ

More details on page 28

Chapter News

Shown in photo from left to right is John Donaldson, Baroness Ann Taylor, William Bennett, Dr. R. Don Green

DELMARPA Chapter News (September 2007 – March 2008)

Delaware–Maryland–Pennsylvania
Headquarters: Carlisle, PA
Founded: 1 October 2003
Chairman Pro Temp: Dr. R. Don Green
Presidents Pro Temp –
Delaware: Ms. Diana Russo
Maryland: Mr. William Bennett
PA-East: Mr. John Donaldson, Jr.
PA-West: Accepting Nominations
Secretary/Treasurer: Accepting
Nominations
Point of Contact: Dr. R. Don Green,
drdg@prodigy.net



- Military Intelligence Scholar John F. Murphy, Jr. of American Military University enjoyed lunch with DELMARPA Chapter members in March 2008. See “Suggested Reading” below.

- Annapolis, MD: National Defense Intelligence College and Alumni Association invited DELMARPA chapter members to attend their 6th Annual Homecoming brunch at the US Naval Academy Officers’ and Faculty Club on 30 September 2007. The event’s keynote speaker, Baroness Taylor, discussed UK’s counter-terrorism activities prior to, and after events of 7 July 2005 when coordinated Islamist terrorist bomb blasts hit London’s public transport system. See photo of DELMARPA Chapter leaders with Keynote Speaker Ann Taylor, Baroness Taylor of Bolton, former Chairman Intelligence and Security Committee, United Kingdom.

- Washington, DC – Select DELMARPA Chapter members attended the conference at National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC, formerly JMIC – Joint Military Intelligence College), “Intelligence Strategy New Challenges and Opportunities” at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling AFB, on 26-27 September 2007. This conference convened Senior leadership from the Intelligence Community, e.g., Director of National Intelligence, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and others. For details see <http://www.fbcinc.com/ndic-odni/> and <http://www.fbcinc.com/ndic-odni/agenda.pdf>. Attendees were welcomed by LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence discussed Intelligence Community 100 day and 500 day plans. MajGen Michael E. Ennis, USMC, Deputy Director for Community HUMINT, National Clandestine Service, among others participated in panel discussions on

these topics: 1. What Has the Intelligence Community Accomplished Under Intelligence Reform?; 2. Global Events that Have Changed in the World: Implications for Intelligence; 3. Collaboration: Are we there yet?; 4. Transformation: Pushing through the Barriers.

Suggested Reading (UNCLASSIFIED):

- “United States Intelligence Community (IC) 100 Day Plan for INTEGRATION and COLLABORATION.” OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: <http://www.dni.gov/100-day-plan/100-day-plan.pdf>.

- “United States Intelligence Community (IC) 500 Day Plan for INTEGRATION and COLLABORATION.” OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: <http://www.dni.gov/500-day-plan/500-day-plan.pdf>.

- “Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest’s to the Attack on America” by John F. Murphy, Jr.

Bavarian Chapter News

MICA is pleased to announce that through the diligent effort of Mr. Ken Taylor, a new chapter has been formed in Vilseck, Germany, known as the Bavarian Chapter. Formation documents submitted 31 Jan 08 and approved by the MICA national board 11 Mar 08.

President: Kenneth D. Taylor

Vice President: Stephen Skells

Secretary: Jennifer Lagow

Treasurer: Adam Cundieff

Charter members: Vincent Vezzetti, Levi Tarr, Maria

Lanfor, Shawn Lonergan, Jason Gee, Pedro Flores
Congratulations to what looks to be a great new asset for MICA. We look forward to news of their progress.

BOOKS

Can't We All Just Get Along?: Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship

(Paperback)

by National Defense Intelligence College (U.S.) (Compiler),
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (Compiler), Timothy
Christenson (Editor)

This collection of essays addresses the challenges presented to both the law enforcement and intelligence community by an enemy who plans operations strategically and exploits our weaknesses relentlessly. In the years since the attacks of 9/11, law enforcement has been re-inventing itself and intelligence agencies have been making changes that set aside years of established policy and procedure. *Can't We All Just Get Along?* provides a foundation for understanding the strengths that each community brings to their shared environment. It is a must-read for all intelligence professionals.

The first section of articles addresses "Best Practices in Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community," and lays out some of the techniques that have proven effective in either community that would be useful to exchange and apply. This includes issues of law enforcement intelligence analysis, drug enforcement administrative tradecraft for the intelligence community, anti-gang techniques, and the "home-grown" Islamic extremists recruiting in U.S. prisons.

Can't We All Just Get Along? provides ideas that will help law enforcement and the IC realize some strategic advantage from greater mutual awareness. This compilation is an ideal vehicle for an ongoing dialogue between intelligence and law enforcement.

Mike Bayer, Branch Chief
Transnational Criminal Investigations
Diplomatic Security Service
U.S. Department of State

The second section points out some of the difficulties inherent in integrating the two communities. It begins with a historical analysis of British Military Intelligence and law enforcement integration during the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921, by Devlin Kostal. Devin Rollis describes "the wall between national security and law enforcement," and Robert B. Murphy explores the problems and progress in information sharing.

The volume concludes with a brief section, "Addressing the Difficulties." These abstracts of graduate studies by law enforcement and intelligence professionals suggest ways of facilitating the rapid passage of information and intelligence between the two communities to the point of need.

Paperback: 210 pages Publisher:
United States Dept. of Defense
(February 14, 2008) Language:
English ISBN-10: 1932946187
ISBN-13: 978-1932946185
Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.2
inches

Other recent unclassified NDIC
Press publications:

A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia, by
Dr. Max L. Gross, former Dean of the School of Intelligence
Studies and senior Research Fellow with the Center for
Strategic Intelligence Research at NDIC.

*The Coast Guard Intelligence Program Enters the Intelligence
Community*, Occasional Paper #16, by LCDR Kevin E. Wirth,
NDIC student.

*Mongolia's Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment,
and Evolution of Field Information Capabilities*, Discussion
Paper #15, by COL Jargalsaikhan Mendee, Mongolian Army.

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Dabbs

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Hall of Fame 2008 Inductees

On Friday, 27 June, the following individuals will be inducted into the Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame. The ceremony will take place at the Hall of Fame ceremonies to be held at Fort Huachuca, AZ.

LTG William Campbell (US Army, Retired): Served 38 years, 13 as a flag officer. One of the early experts who contributed greatly to signals intelligence and electronic communications technologies. Was the TRADOC Systems Manager for the All Source Analysis System; Program Executive Officer for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, C2 Systems, C3 Systems; the Systems Architect for Army Digitization and Task Force XXI, and later the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications and Computers (G-6). Continues to serve on Army Science Board and the Future Combat Systems Senior Advisory Council.

CSM John Gregorcyk (US Army, Retired): 30 years service in MI and Special Operations units, including tours in Vietnam, Iraq (Operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort) and Bosnia. His leadership inspired Soldiers to exceed standards and his mentorship guided many to become CSMs, SGMs and field grade officers. He turned down Brigade CSM three times in order to continue developing leaders at battalion level.

Colonel Jerry Jones (US Army, Retired): Served 30 years active duty and continues to serve as civilian director of INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support

Detachment (ITRADS). For 18 years, he was involved in directing and leading some of the most sensitive missions directly supporting national security goals. Most of the programs are still classified. He also served as a staff officer in Vietnam, a Battalion commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina and as a CENTCOM augmentee during Desert Storm.

CW4 Alan Lindley (US Army, Retired): 51 years of service, including 24 in the Army, 21 as an Army civilian, and the last six as a contractor. During that time he was involved in some phase of development, fielding, maintenance, and logistics support of nearly every ground and airborne MI system, including SIGINT, Electronic Warfare, ASAS, CI HUMINT, IMETS, DCGS-A, and Guardrail Ground Baseline projects.

Honorable Thomas O'Connell (Colonel, US Army, Retired): Completed over 27 years of service to the Army and MI Corps, commanded from company to brigade level, served in the CIA, Joint, FORSCOM, Special Operations, INSCOM, and TRADOC organizations, and served in Vietnam, Grenada, and the Middle East. In 2003, he became the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

COL Walter Walsh (US Army, Retired): 27 years service, he was directly responsible for testing and developing of intelligence initiatives used in Army today, including establishing special-compartmented intelligence support to Brigade Combat Teams and establishment of an S2X at BCT level. Served as director of J2 Plans during Operation Desert Fox.

Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Four Man Scramble

Thursday, 26 June 2008, 0730 Shotgun Start

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When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the *MICA* membership. The goal is to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

When writing for *THE VANGUARD*, please consider the following:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not counting graphics without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.

- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.

- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take more than a year to publish some articles.

- Be aware that submissions become property of *THE VANGUARD* and may be released to other government agencies or non-profit organizations for republication upon request.

What we need from you:

- Cover Letter – A cover letter with your work and home email addresses, work telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published. We accept electronic or hardcopy cover letters.

- Security Release – A security release signed by your local security officer stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, non-sensitive, and releasable in the public domain.

- Publication Release - A publication release if your organization requires it. Please include that release with your submission.

- Graphics – Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (who, what, where, when, why and how), the photographer's credits, and the author's name on the photos. Please note where they should appear in the text.

- Biography – The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address and phone numbers with the biography.

In what format:

- Text - Your article in Microsoft Word. Do not use special document templates.

- Graphics - Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in .tif or .jpg formats.



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The objectives of *MICA* are to:

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- Educate leaders
- Honor professionals
- Share knowledge
- Provide support programs

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MICA provides scholarships for members and their families

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Submit articles and graphics to vanguard@micorps.org or mail (on disk or CD) to:

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If you have any questions, please email us at vanguard@micorps.org.



LTC Thomas Knowlton, MI Hero

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