



1st Quarter 2007

THE VANGUARD

Journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association



THE VANGUARD

Volume 12, Number 1

Publisher

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Purpose: *THE VANGUARD* is the official journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) for its members and sponsors. The quarterly journal serves as a professional forum for sharing knowledge, preserving history, and honoring civilian and military members of the Military Intelligence Corps.

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News Items

Military Intelligence Corps

Hall of Fame Four Man Scramble

Thursday 21 JUNE 2007, 0730 Shotgun Start

Mountain View Golf Course, FT Huachuca, AZ

\$50.00 Entry Fee Per Person

\$25 for Mt View Member w/owncart//\$34 for Mt View Member

Carts will be available for the first 60 pairs

Hat and hat clip w/ball marker will be given at registration

Lunch included with entry (additional lunches \$5.00 /order in advance)

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Additional information at: www.huachuca.org

DCGS-A Users' Web Forum and TRADOC Capability Manages Sensor Processing Home Page

The TRADOC Capability Manager Sensor Processing has initiated the process of developing a web forum for Distributed Common Ground System-Army users. The intent is to provide a single web point where DCGS-A users can solicit help and support, and exchange ideas with other users, trainers, material developers, combat developers, hardware and software developers, and others in the Intelligence Community. To access these pages you must be a member of Army Knowledge Online and login using your AKO information. The primary entry point to this capability will be from the ICON Portal. Eventually this will be available directly from a DCGS-A workstation. This page will provide a place for posting thread discussions, limited chat capability, and other tools for information exchange. It will also feature a "shout box" for users to post comments outside the forum topics. The forum moderator will link the posting to the appropriate SME for resolution and ensure the individual who posted the issue gets a response within 24 hours. Presently, the forum page provides the ability to post discussion threads across four areas (hardware, software, training, and TTPs), with additional areas being added as needed. There will also be a "blog" for the TCM Sensor Processing, COL Levin to post his thoughts for the user community. This DCGS-A Forum page is now operational, but is in its infancy. Once things are operating satisfactorily on NIPR, the site will be mirrored and updated to SIPRNET PM DCGS-A, CECOM, INSCOM, JFCOM and others will eventually become part of this effort as it matures. Future capabilities will include links to DCGS-A NET materials and trainers, lessons learned archives, the DCGS-A mini brain, SEC FSRs, and other agencies.

POC for this effort is Steve Ponder 520-533-5301

steve.ponder@us.army.mil

TCM Sensor Processing

President's Message

You will notice that the Vanguard has a new editor, Sterilla Smith. She has unique talents that will ensure that we continue to improve the Vanguard as the voice our professional Corps association.

We have included in this issue our revised Bylaws. The Executive Committee spent much of last Fall refining the Bylaws to reflect the changing environment in which our association must support its membership and chapters. I would call your attention to the section on revenue sharing. Dennis Schmidt, our Vice President, spent a good deal of time considering, coordinating, and revising this section to ensure a viable revenue sharing component was added to the Bylaws. I would encourage Chapters to leverage this change to grow and invigorate MICA at the local level.

You will also find in this issue the Hall of Fame inductees for 2007. MICA extends its congratulations to the inductees and expresses its gratitude for and admiration of their numerous contributions to our profession. The Hall of Fame week is an excellent time to visit the home of Military Intelligence (MI); renew and catch up on friendships, and experience all that this event means to our MI Corps. I hope that many of you will be able to attend.

It is time for elections to the Executive Board. Nominations are open for President and Treasurer. Tim Carroll, our outstanding Treasurer, has decided to focus on the MI Gift Shop and is stepping down. No one has stepped forward for this position. I request that any member wishing to run for this position contact me, Dennis Schmidt, or Chris Friend. I have decided to run for reelection as President, but we encourage all who are interested to step forward.

I have used this forum to repeatedly encourage the membership to support the MI Museum. The current museum is not sufficient to house and display the numerous items that are being offered. My primary concern is that we are not able to adequately capture the contribution of MI professionals to our Nation and our Army. Giving to the museum ensures that the history being made by MI professionals can be displayed for all to see and understand. Please donate to the Museum to ensure we capture and preserve our history.

— Larry Bruns

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What Will Be The Repercussions If Iraqi Kurdistan Seeks Independence?

By SFC Thomas J. Sullivan



SFC Thomas J. Sullivan

Executive Summary

The Kurdish region in Northern Iraq is experiencing an economic and social boom, which until now hasn't been seen throughout the history of the Kurdish people. The people enjoy an unprecedented level of security. The violence that racks the rest of Iraq is largely unheard of in the Kurdish north. The Iraqi Kurds are realizing they have a real future but not if that future is adjoined to the rest of the country. The Kurdish people are anxiously waiting for their chance to formally declare their independence. If Iraq falls into a civil war, it has already been stated by Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Regional Government, the Kurds would immediately call for independence, which would have serious domestic and international repercussions. Domestically the Kurds would need to take Kirkuk and its oil reserves, whereas the large Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Syria and Iran would be bolstered to seek their own independence causing further instability in the region.

The Kurdish north is at a pivotal point in its history. For the first time the Iraqi Kurds are close to achieving what no other Kurds have accomplished before them, a formal independent state. This would be a historic achievement with monumental consequences for the Kurds and the surrounding nations of Iran, Syria and most importantly Turkey. There are many factors to investigate when deciding if and how the Kurds can achieve this without destabilizing the region into another round of bloodshed. The Kurds understand that to achieve formalized independence they will have to address two main issues.

First if the Kurds were to seek independence they would most likely have to take control of the city of Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves. Secondly if the Kurds do openly state they are no longer going to be a part of the Iraqi government this could potentially spark independence moves from the Kurdish minorities in Iran, Syria and Turkey.

The Kurdish ethnic group is estimated at approximately 30 million people¹. This would make the Kurds the largest ethnic group in the world without a country. The Kurdish lands stretch from eastern Turkey down into Syria, across northern Iraq and finally into northern Iran. Their respective countries throughout time have repressed the people. The Kurds in Iraq are in a unique position. They have been mostly autonomous since the end of the first Gulf War when United Nations (U.N.) no-fly zones were implemented. This kept Saddam Hussein at bay and allowed the Kurds to begin reconstruction efforts. The Iraqi Kurds became an example to the other ethnic Kurds in the surrounding countries of how to take advantage of their newfound freedom. The Kurds immediately set out to repair the devastation wrought on them by Saddam's regime. The infrastructure was revamped. The roads were rebuilt. Hospitals, schools and domestic housing began to blossom. With the new infrastructure came an improvement to the economic situation. With all the improvements the Kurds implemented during the no-fly zones, no one could have predicted the amazing "rebirth" of the Kurdish north after the eventual fall of Saddam.

Since the fall of Saddam the Iraqi Kurds have expounded on their initial improvements to such an extent, the world views the Kurdish north as a shining example of what can happen when people are allowed to work and worship how they please without external agitators trying to stoke sectarian violence. The roads are excellent even by western standards. The electricity is generally on all hours of the day. The education system is outstanding. The people live a life of religious tolerance not found anywhere else in the Middle East. The Kurds are generally ecstatic about their newfound successes but with these successes comes a yearning for a future they rightly believe involves an internationally recognized state.

The Kurdish north is already an autonomous region of Iraq. It has its own government, which takes scant advice from the government in the south. The soldiers may wear the standard Iraqi uniform but the flags are Kurdistan's not Iraq's. When visiting the north you will not see the Iraqi government flag flying from any of the municipal buildings. You will not see the Iraqi flag flying over any of the Iraqi Army installations. Instead the homes and buildings all fly the Kurdish flag. It is known as the Kurdish Sunburst. It is green, white and red with

a yellow sun in the middle. Even the Kurdish Regional Government's President Massoud Barzani refuses to fly the Iraqi flag that was flown under Saddam's time. This isn't meant to be a snub to the rest of Iraq as much as it is meant to promote the nationalist pride of the people enjoying their newfound freedoms².

The Iraqi Kurdish region is called Southern Kurdistan and it stretches from Sulaymaniah, near the Iranian border down to Kirkuk north of the Sunni triangle, to just north of Mosul in the north east of the country. The current capital of this area is a large city in the middle of the region called Erbil. It is here that the Kurdish calls for independence are being heard the loudest. It is also here that the Kurdish Regional Government has its headquarters. The leader is a charismatic and intelligent man by the name of Massoud Barzani. He is the leader of one of two main political parties that dominate all aspects of Kurdish life. His organization is called the Kurdish Democratic Party and was previously run by Massoud's father, Mustafa. The party has been fighting for independence since the Ba'athists took control of the country. Massoud is a prior member of the Pesh Merga (those who face death). The Pesh Merga have historically been the Kurdish resistance fighters during Saddam's time. Massoud has refused to be dragged into a partnership with Baghdad instead insisting on leading Kurdistan from Kurdistan. The other main political party is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which is led by Jalal Talabani. Talabani is the current president of Iraq. Both of these men wield considerable influence over which direction the north will go.

No one can deny the inevitable declaring of independence. The signs are all pointing to this eventuality sooner rather than later. But how will this affect the United States efforts to rebuild Iraq as a single unified country. The most glaring problem would be the question of how the Kurds will look to support an economy that until now has depended on oil revenues and a cross border trade. Kurdistan is surrounded on all sides by unsympathetic countries that do not view a Kurdish state as being a viable option. For the Kurds to be independent they will need to produce their own revenues, which will have to come from the oil rich areas surrounding Kirkuk. Kirkuk has historically been a Kurdish city. Saddam tried to counter the Kurdish control over the city by moving thousands of Arab families to the region during the 1980's. Since the invasion these families are being pushed out of the region through intimidation and ha-

arrassment. The Arabs understand they are not welcome in this important Kurdish hub of economic sustenance. If the Kurds were to gain control over Kirkuk it would allow Kurdistan to become wholly self-sufficient. While Kurdistan eyes the Kirkuk oil, Turkey is anxiously waiting to see how the situation plays out. The Kurds, Arabs and finally the Turkomen are the three main ethnic groups that inhabit the city. The Arabs are being driven to move to areas where there can be safety in numbers. For example Sunni Arabs in the north are moving back to the Sunni triangle for safety from the ethnic strife and sectarian violence that has become so prevalent in the recent months. The Turkomen do not have that luxury. They are essentially stuck in this area without anywhere to go. The Turkish government claims if the Kurds attempt to take Kirkuk they would be forced to intervene in order to stave off any ethnic cleansing of the Turkomen people. This is merely Turkey's way of ensuring continued access to the cheap fuel Turkey so desperately needs. Turkey fears if the Kurds are in control of the oil then the Kurds will be able to put pressure on the Turkish government by holding back on oil sales. Turkey would find itself in a situation where they would be forced to legitimize a Kurdish state by conducting state affairs with a people they themselves are repressing in the eastern part of their own country. It is estimated there are approximately 15 million Kurds living in Turkey. The Turkish Kurd minority has been in a struggle for independence for hundreds of years. The Turkish government has been waging its own war against a Kurdish terrorist group call the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The Turkish government has gone so far as to establish a Turkish military base inside of Kurdistan in the eventuality the Iraqi Kurds seek independence. The most likely hypothesis to occur would be Turkey's military involvement in stopping the Kurds from taking control of Kirkuk. It appears the Turkish gov-

ACH MATRIX			
EVIDENCE	Hypothesis / Courses of Action		
	US will suport a independent Kurdistan	Kurdistan will be sanctioned by the US for not remaining a part of a unified Iraq	Turkish military attempts to stop the Kurdish government from taking control of Kirkuk
Kurdish leaders calling for independence	NA	I	I
US protection to autonomous Kurd region since first Gulf War	C	NA	I
Kurdish desires to retake Kirkuk for oil revenues	I	I	C
TOTAL NUMBERS OF CONSISTENT VERSUS INCONSISTENT	C=0/ I=3	C=3 / I=0	C=2 / I=1
Legend: C = Evidence is Consistent with this hypothesis I = Evidence is Inconsistent with this hypothesis NA = This evidence is Not Applicable to this hypothesis			

ernment views it as being unacceptable for the Kurds to have their own state. The Turks know that without the oil revenues Kirkuk would provide, Kurdistan would not be able to support itself. If Kurdistan were to become a reality, Turkey would then have a huge problem in that Turkey's indigenous population would attempt to gain its own independence.

The second most likely hypothesis would be America supporting a Kurdish state. This appears likely for several reasons. Whereas the Turks could be cut out of the fuel equation, we would stand to benefit from the increased access to a secure fuel source from a pro-United States source. The Kurdish north also presents the United States with an area in which we could house a military installation from which future Middle East operations could be executed. The Kurdish north offers us a safe and secure environment in which we could operate without the fears of constant attacks on our installations. The bases would generate revenue for the Kurds through local contracts and working with the local communities. The security in our presence would give the Kurds something they need to ward off invasion by either Turkey or Iran. Our presence would lend a sense of both permanency and legitimacy to the new Kurdish state.

The least likely hypothesis would be for the United States to sanction the new Kurdish state. This would not be beneficial to either side. Alienating a pro-democratic, secular Middle Eastern ally would only be detrimental to our efforts in fighting the Global War on Terrorism. The United States understands we have an opportunity to cultivate a relationship that could eventually help stabilize the region. Other countries and peoples would see what can happen if there is sincere cooperation with the United States.

In conclusion it appears the Iraqi Kurds will be seeking formalized independence. They are a de facto country today but to ensure their future generations' freedom, the birth of an internationally recognized Kurdistan needs to occur. It will happen but not without consequences and growing pains. Based on previous formal statements Turkey will be the major hurdle to Kurdish independence and without explicit, determined support from the United States; the Kurds may be forced to wait for many years before realizing their dreams. The coming months will be key as to whether the Kurds seize this opportunity. Massoud Barzani has claimed if Iraq falls into a civil war he will be forced to immediately call for Kurdish independence³. The civil war appears to have begun; we are now awaiting the inevitable.

SFC Sullivan enlisted in the US Army in June 1996 and attended Basic Training and 11B AIT at Fort Benning, Georgia. Upon completion of Basic Training and Airborne School, SFC Sullivan was assigned to the 3rd US INFANTRY Regiment (The Old Guard). SFC Sullivan served as a Full Honor Casket Team member until November 1998. SFC Sullivan reenlisted for the 97E MOS and attended AIT at Fort Huachuca. Upon completion of AIT SFC Sullivan was assigned to A CO 519th MI BN (TE). While assigned to the 519th, SFC Sullivan deployed with the 202nd MI BN to Afghanistan in December 2001. Upon returning from Afghanistan SFC Sullivan was assigned to 10th Special Forces Group. SFC Sullivan has deployed with 10th SFG (A) on every OIF rotation. SFC Sullivan is currently the 10th SFG (A) Senior Interrogator. SFC Sullivan is married with 3 daughters and resides in Fountain, Colorado.

Endnotes

1. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kurdistan>,
2. <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/31/AR2005073101055>



FEATURE

Company Level Intelligence

By LTC Mike Sterrett

“Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force.”

- FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

It is generally accepted that while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations killing the enemy is relatively easy; however, finding him is much more difficult. In fact, finding the enemy is rapidly becoming a process of think-to-contact versus actual movement-to-contact to develop the timely (actionable) intelligence traditionally lacking at the lowest tactical levels. Successful COIN operations rely on accurate, timely information derived from the bottom up through patrol debriefings, site exploitation, tactical questioning, tips, etc. analyzed and exploited at the lowest level. Since COIN operations are fought primarily at the company level, with the actual combat operations executed by platoons and squads, it is important for each company to create an organic intelligence capability. While operations are intelligence driven, the intelligence comes mostly from company level operations, not as products produced higher and pushed down to the company. In fact, in a COIN environment 70-80% of intelligence is “bottom-fed”. The company

intelligence cell collects raw data from a variety of sources then filters, organizes, and analyzes the data in order to make recommendations to the company commander and disseminate information and intelligence to the battalion S2.

The purpose of this article is to assist units in standing up their own company level intelligence capability. Company-level intelligence is not a novel concept. Units have recognized the need and developed their own capability throughout OIF/OEF; however, in most cases this was not done until they arrived in theater and was developed through discovery learning. Additionally, the USMC has stood up company cells and published the Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations manual. The information used to produce this paper was primarily gleaned from observations of units taking the initiative to create their own company level intelligence capability and the USMC Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations manual.

Purpose of Company Level Intelligence. Company level intelligence assists the commander in developing and maintaining situational awareness of his area of operations (AOR), develop kinetic and non-kinetic courses of action based on the commander's desired effect, ISR synchronization and management, development of Specific Information Requirement (SIR) and Specific Order or Request (SOR), conduct patrol pre-briefs and debriefs, and identify second and third order effects of company operations. Additionally, the company cell works closely with the battalion S2 in order to facilitate the flow of information, from lower to higher and vice versa.

The company intelligence cell complements, not competes with, the battalion S2 shop. Working closely with the battalion S2, the company cell is the first filter of the vast amount of information a battalion S2 is inundated with in a COIN environment.

Company Level Intelligence Tasks.

The company cell performs the following tasks:

- SIR/SOR development.
- Patrol pre-brief/debrief.
- Basic nodal and pattern analysis.
- Assist in handling, processing, and tracking EPWs.
- Assist in site exploitation.
- Conduct and advise patrols on tactical questioning.
- Document and materials handling and processing for exploitation.
- Company level ISR synchronization and management of collection effort.
- Process, analyze, and organize information.

- Continually update a company-level Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).
- Identify:
 - Patterns and trends.
 - Threat TTPs.
 - Threat organizational relationships.
 - Battlefield effects.
 - Civilian population.
 - Infrastructure.
- Supervise the production of company level products; e.g.,
 - Intelligence summaries.
 - Enemy activity overlays.
 - Situational maps.
 - Pattern and nodal analysis diagrams.
- Disseminate intelligence to the company commander and the battalion S2.
- Advise the commander on use of intelligence in operations.
- Coordinate and contribute to the targeting process.
- Describe potential environmental advantages and limitations.
- Ascertain enemy strengths to be avoided.
- Uncover enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

Operationalizing "Every Soldier a Sensor" (ES2). By developing SIR and SOR from higher PIR and conducting detailed patrol pre-briefs and debriefs the company cell exploits the ES2 concept. Currently, the Army has formalized ES2 training starting at initial entry training and continues throughout NCO and Officer Education Systems. However, the Army has not formalized the process to focus, collect, and disseminate observations. The company cell formalizes the process in a manner that is manageable by focusing the observations on requirements during the patrol pre-brief, collecting the observations during the patrol debriefs, filtering/analyzing the information, and disseminating relevant information/intelligence to the company and the battalion S2. Without the focusing and filtering at the company level, the battalion S2 is overwhelmed by information overload.

Resourcing the Company Intelligence Cell. Perhaps the most critical aspect in the development of the company intelligence cell is the amount of resources the commander is willing to allocate to the cell. Ideally, intelligence personnel would be assigned down to the company to perform company level intelligence tasks; however, that is not realistic as we struggle to fill our

S2 shops. Company cells are typically manned by non-intel soldiers. When the requirement for basic medical capabilities at the squad level was recognized, the Medical Service Corps developed Combat Lifesaver training for non-medical soldiers. Likewise, USAIC is currently developing an intelligence training support package for non-intel soldiers to perform basic intel tasks at the Company-level.

The level of dedicated resources (mainly personnel) will have a direct correlation to the effectiveness of the fusion between operations and locally developed intelligence. However, the effectiveness of the cell's organizational skills and ability to focus the overall company effort on what to look for and how to return that information to the cell will dictate its accuracy, regardless of how many people are dedicated to the effort. Too few resources result in an extrication of raw information effort, vice an analytical and understanding effort.


The objective is to make intelligence, not information. To do this you have to invest, resources, and focus on preparation. The diagram below depicts the movement from merely gathering information to incorporating intelligence into operations thru investment of assets at the commander's discretion. The more investment, the greater the return if organized properly.

The most successful cell observed during a recent rotation in Iraq was manned with an experienced SSG from each platoon and the FSO. The SSG served as the platoon representative and devoted approximately 60% of his time to the company cell and 40% to his platoon. Regardless how the commander chooses to resource the cell, the principles outlined in the paper remain the same.

Steps to establishing a Company Intelligence Cell

1. Identify resources.

- a. Personnel
 - Dedicated
 - Supporting
- b. Automation
 - Tools (software programs)
 - Connectivity
 - Compatibility
- c. Other materials
 - Working space
 - Pre-prepared analysis "tools"
 - Display, integration, access



2. Identify Information Requirements.

- a. Bn Information Requirements
- b. Company Information Requirements
- c. Bn Specific Intelligence Requirements needed to answer BN PIR
- d. Area and Topic checklists

3. Identify methods for pulling information from the unit.

- a. Debriefings
- b. Checklists
- c. Tasking (friendly forces)
- d. SIGINT / IMINT - unit dependent

4. Identify methods for performing analysis.

- a. Diagrams
- b. Charts
- c. Matrices
- d. Overlays

5. Database information.

- a. Infrastructure
- b. Personnel
- c. Activities
- d. Significant Events

6. Manage collection efforts.

- a. Develop the intelligence picture - have a plan and update it
- b. Identify gaps in information
- c. Identify collection requirements
- d. Focus effort to fill known information gaps (Know what you don't know)

- e. Manage redundancy (both intentional and unintentional)
- f. Evaluate reporting
- 7. Display AO and AOI information graphically - Situational Awareness.
 - a. 3-D Models
 - b. Imagery
 - c. SIGACTS
 - d. Significant Reporting
 - e. Threat Organization, demographics, disposition, composition
- 8. Report information higher.
 - a. Standardized formats
 - b. Methods of reporting
- 9. Train the force.
 - a. Tactical Questioning
 - b. Mission pre-briefings
 - c. Patrol Debriefings
 - d. SSE Support
 - e. BATS
 - f. Falcon View
 - g. Automation tools
- 10. Maintain Friendly Force Profile.
 - a. Route Verification
 - b. Pattern Analysis
 - c. OPSEC

Tasks

1. Patrol Debriefs. Done at company level at the end of the patrol with every soldier in the patrol participating. Using the chronological method the debriefer “rewinds” the patrol and does a “playback” using maps and route overlays to key soldier’s memories. During a long patrol filled with multiple events, a soldier may forget what he saw during the first hour until it plays back in his head. Checklists of the material to be covered in a debrief are important. But it is almost as important that you set the conditions for a meaningful and detailed debrief.

This includes the following considerations:

- Establish a debriefing format in your SOP and update as needed to use as a checklist or guide during debriefing.
- Pick a comfortable location where the group can be debriefed without interruption or congestion.
- Establish and maintain a rapport with the individual or group.

- Establish a “no rank” debrief.
- Even the most junior man is expected to speak up freely.
- Ensure that all relevant billet holders are present i.e. PL, APL, element leaders, recorder, etc.
- Ensure all products, tools, or items of interest collected by patrol are present and displayed.
- Includes pictures, recordings, sketches, map improvements, things picked up.
- Maintain the focus on drawing information from the individual or group being debriefed.
- Avoid trying to confirm pre-patrol assumptions or suspicions of any debriefer.
- Do not ask leading questions.
- Ask one simple question at a time that requires a detailed response.
- Do not accept simple “yes” or “no” answers.
- Follow your established routine (SOP) for debriefs; e.g.,
- PL gives start-to-finish narrative.
- Note key events in sequence.
- Each event debriefed before moving to the next.
- Every key leader or individual provides input.
- Go through each event with every individual and have them describe what they saw.
- Debiefer pulls additional detail.
- Debiefer walks patrol through collection requirements in order to match collection requirements against what was actually collected.
- Additional wrap up questioning from checklist/format.
- Maintain focus during questioning, but do not discourage patrol members from giving input.
- Find a balance between objective and subjective observations.
- Limit debriefing time only when it is absolutely necessary.
- NOT A CRITIQUE.
- NOT AN AAR.

Output of the Debrief:

- Patrol Report. Catalogued and filed for ready reference.
- Updated matrices, databases and assessments.
- Distribution to appropriate users; including higher and adjacent units as applicable.

2. **Route Verification.** Coincides with the patrol debrief. Debriefers should track the actual route taken by the patrol as compared to the planned route. This enables the cell to keep track of routes, times, and places every patrol in the company takes. By comparing them, the cell can determine not only whether each platoon is inadvertently setting patterns with their patrols, but also whether the company as a whole is setting patterns. Route verification can be done manually with overlays or utilizing GPS tracks downloaded into Falcon View.

3. **Graphic portrayal of local IPB.** Overlays with the MCOO, depicting trafficability of local roads, bridges, and canals, choke points, location of local government facilities, key infrastructure, mosques/religious sites, key leaders homes, suspected insurgent homes, tribal areas, sectarian areas, and key terrain.

4. **Target Folders.** Develop target folders on suspected and confirmed insurgents operating in the Company Battle Space and proposed targets for raids or other actions. Target folder should consist of photos of target, target house, HUMINT reports, and any other information that will assist the Platoons in conducting both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.

5. **Company SIGACTS.** Company SIGACTS should be tracked at company level by the cell on butcher block or some other physical means and be placed where members of the company have access in order to maintain situational awareness. Maintain staff journals (DA1594), reports, manage information.

6. **Company AO Picture.** Also on butcher block, a track of all the "atmospheric" changes and subtle indicators observed in the AO, i.e. new construction, new signs, things that are no longer present, population traffic pattern changes, etc. Taken from the debriefs and posted, it gives each patrol preparing to go out an easily available updated look at the AO they are about to go out in.

7. **Local National Database/ Link Diagram.** The cell should track all potentially significant local nationals encountered during patrols (to include pictures, names, locations, business, etc.), and compare with the other companies.

8. **Tracking Enemy Activity.** Establishing a system to track and analyze enemy activities and significant events will help identify patterns and predict future actions. Within the system, it is very important to organize each matrix, overlay, and database in such a way that can quickly reference information from one tool, and check it against another.

9. **Detainee Packets.** Assist the Platoons in the completion of the detainee packets to ensure they are filled

out properly, all detainee items are documented, and photos and capture tags match prior to detainee sent to detention facility.

10. **Event Wheel and Attack Tables.** Both products are effective for tracking number and types of events over a given period in order to observe any discernable or potential patterns of activity. Weekly wheels are displayed until the end of the month when a compilation wheel of the month's events, including the last week, is displayed. Excel spreadsheet charts are used to show the number and type of attacks per area for a seven day period. If space is available, posting all the wheels for the month, not just the current one, will provide a side-by-side comparison of each week's events. The cell is more likely to identify patterns of concern through visual comparison of the past few weeks' wheels than through a monthly roll-up on one wheel, which can become too cluttered.

11. **CMO Flowers.** These diagrams track the current status of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in specific areas within the Company AO. The center of the flower indicates the overall feelings of the population in that area. The flower petals represent the status (percent of population supported) in green (100%), yellow (80-99%), orange (40-79%), red (0-39%), and clear (status unknown) for: water, sewer, electricity, health, agriculture, roads/bridges, education, irrigation, and communications. This tool has significant potential for maintaining awareness of the "pulse" of the population at any given time in a specified area. A quick review of the diagram for an upcoming mission would provide potential indicators as to the population's likely attitude toward the Company's presence in their area. Additionally, it would provide an indication of likely topics the Mukhtar or others would be most interested in addressing, or complaining about. Ultimately, patrol leaders could go out prepared to answer those questions/complaints with the right (approved) answers. Keeping ISF counterparts apprised of the situations as well gives the appearance of a solid unity of effort.

12. **IO Matrix.** The IO matrix tracks Information Operations (IO) messages employed. Specifically, it tracks which Company element is tasked as the delivery agent, the message conveyed, the target, the objective of the IO material, and the associated information requirement it supported.

13. **Contact (Business) Cards.** These contact cards are for Company personnel to hand out to habitual contacts and influential personnel in the community (such as Mukhtars). The cards should contain Company cell phone number and name in Arabic and are intended to facilitate timely two-way communication. In the past, Companies have received calls from local nationals with

information of activity in a specific area. Likewise, the Company Commander is able to contact local leaders to verify reported activity as part of his decision making process before dispatching reaction forces. This has been a successful tool that has fostered constant two-way communication while also adding a level of safety for the individual by not being “seen” talking to the Americans.

14. Information Requirements. The Company should take the Battalion and Brigade PIR and create Company Specific Information Requirements (SIR) that when answered act as indicators pointing to the larger, more nebulous PIR. SIR are more understandable and realistic for the average soldier to look for and report. The cell takes the SIR answers and compiles the information together to determine if an answer exists to the higher headquarters PIR. Additionally, use of checklists for the information you expect to need helps guide operations as the Company’s presence in the area matures. Eventually, the cell must be able to identify and request patrolling to fill in information gaps.

15. Collection Management. Develop a Synchronization Plan and a Collection (ISR) Management Plan for the assets under the Company’s control as well as assets available to the Company for part time use. All of the assets should have a collection purpose in comparison to a requirement and named area of interest (NAI). These will help to eliminate redundancy, identify gaps in coverage, identify collection requirements, focus efforts to fill gaps, and ensure proper reporting.

16. Red Team Element (RTE). In addition to wargaming COAs the RTE tracks both friendly OPSEC and pattern analysis from a Red perspective. Think of this as an evaluation of what the enemy can learn from observing your operations, ultimately exploiting your weaknesses. Maintain friendly route verification of actions over time. Simple analysis of your actions may reveal areas not addressed or covered and oversights that otherwise would not have been obvious.

17. Intel Binder. Develop 3 ring binders for each platoon that includes at a minimum the BOLO list and HVT list with picture. The Intel Binder gives patrols a ready reference for comparing photos of someone on their list to someone they are talking to.

18. Pattern Analysis. Pattern analysis is the ability to observe a selection of events or actions over a period of time in a defined location or area. The cell should use pattern analysis to determine likely patterns or similarities that lead to logical conclusions that an action or event will occur again in the same location. For example, if the Company is attacked by IEDs (or found/cleared) in the same general area of an MSR, the locations, plotted over time, begin to show a pattern that can be analyzed

and used to plan C-IED operations, such as Small Kill Teams (SKT).

19. Screen Walkins. “Walk-in” is a term used to describe an individual who approach friendly forces in order to volunteer information. While a classic “walk-in” is an individual who present themselves to a FOB, volunteer sources can be encountered almost anywhere, e.g.: at TCPs, while conducting CA activities or during patrols. If no THT personnel are available, cell personnel should assist in screening the walk-ins.

20. Site Exploitation Support (SE). SE is the systematic search of a secure location which permits the collection of information leading to the development of intelligence (tactical, operational or strategic) as well as evidence which can be used in the prosecution and conviction of a detainee. The cell supports SE during the planning and the handling of information and evidence collected, as well as analysis of the information and the development of intelligence.

21. Analysis to help Bn S2. The cell must be closely tied to the Bn S2. If each company does its own intel analysis and comparisons, the resulting info given to Bn will be in the form of a partial picture that can be used to create overall situational awareness of the Battalion’s battle space. If not, the Bn S2 is forced to collate and analyze scattered pieces of information from three or more companies in order to create the Battalion’s situational awareness. Additionally, nobody will know the Company’s battle space as well as the Company itself.

Imperatives

1. Space is a premium. Allocate as much space to the cell as possible and ensure that wall space use is maximized. If incorporated into the Company CP, allocate as little space as is manageable to the activity that is not directly related to the cell. Collocating the Commander, Fire Support Officer, IO, CMO, and

HUMINTers (if any) will aid fusion between information (intelligence) and operations.

2. **It has to work for you, and if it does, it's the right way.** There are innumerable doctrinal references for how to process information and develop analytical tools. Learn the basics and know what the tools are used for then employ them, with modifications as necessary to best suit your level of understanding and ability to develop the information you want from that technique.

3. **Be flexible.** The cell will thrive on continuous learning and adapting where and when necessary. Be willing to do away with someone's good idea (especially a senior leader's) as soon as you determine it's not producing adequately. If a method isn't producing, or at least supporting, the production of useable information, then it's probably wasting time and space. The more resources consumed by the no longer effective good idea, the more imperative this philosophy becomes.

Conclusion- Keys to Success

1. **You MUST pick the best.** The individuals who will execute the daily operation of the cell must be critical thinkers with cognitive skills able to quickly identify changes in the environment and react accordingly. They must be experienced and have the savvy to become a talented analyst. In lay terms, these individuals will likely be your "switched on" junior to mid-level leaders. Canvas your Company and find out what other talent exists within the ranks that may prove useful in the cell. It will be a hard decision to pull your best off the line, but the potential for pay-off at the Company level in fewer casualties and more success will make it worth the cost.

2. **Highly motivated NCOs.** Selecting experienced NCOs from each platoon provides not only a skilled and seasoned soldier to the cell, but also an NCO committed to the mission no matter what their assigned role.

3. **Commander willing to listen.** This is self explanatory. If the Commander is willing to create and use the cell, then likewise, he has to be willing to listen to his "intelligence" advisors during his decision making process.

4. **Stick to it.** Initial set-up, process development, and routine will take time to develop. It will take even longer to develop useable information so the shorter the set-up and establishment time, the sooner the cell can turn out products.

5. **Know/employ the rules, then do whatever it takes.** Be creative to find solutions, but do not employ unauthorized techniques. If you know what you are expressly forbidden from doing, then you can work within those limitations to find methods to achieve what you need. Solutions will most likely not be easy and will often require assistance from higher headquarters.

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FEATURE

The Coming Crisis in Chechnya Strategic Intelligence Paper

By SFC Quinton O. Moffatt

Executive Summary

This study examines and compares strengths and weaknesses of the Russian military which is trying to subdue the rebels in



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Chechnya. It aims to distinguish three courses of action that the Russian military should or should not employ against proven Chechen rebel tactics. Because of Russian military lessons learned from past conflicts, this work posits the three courses of action as three competing hypotheses. The three competing hypotheses are:

- 1. The Russians will appoint a career Army officer as Commander of a large Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) task force.*
- 2. The Russians will solely employ their Specials Operations (Spetsnaz) forces against the rebels.*
- 3. The Russians will appoint a senior executive Federal Security Service (FSB) officer as Commander of the overall task force.*

The three evidences this study will use to indicate the rebels' escalating the crisis are:

- 1. The Chechen rebels will take control of Grozny.*
- 2. The Chechen rebels will take control of rural Chechnya.*
- 3. The Chechen rebels will attack Russian urban areas outside Chechnya (i.e., kidnappings, large-scale hostage crises, bombings).*

Ultimately, this study will reason that Russia's best course of action will be to appoint an FSB senior executive officer to command the task force that will have the ability to completely destroy the Chechen resistance. In addition, the United States (US) government will support such actions in the interest of winning the Global War on Terror.

Since 1995, the Russian Army has successfully defeated the Chechen rebels in two out of three decisive engagements in Chechnya. Since the Chechen struggle for independence began, the Chechen rebels have fought three significant strategies - controlling Grozny (the capital city), controlling rural Chechnya, and attacking Russian urban areas outside of Chechnya. As we have seen in the news, the Chechen rebels have not been afraid to orchestrate kidnappings, large-scale hostage crises, and terrorist bombings in cities as far away as Moscow. However, the most successful Chechen operations have been to control rural Chechnya. The issue of the Chechen resistance to Russian authority is important to the United States because of the Chechen rebels' connections with Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist terrorist organizations.¹ This paper will explore the impacts of a career Russian Army Commander in charge of a Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) force, using a Special Operations (Spetsnaz) force, and a Federal Security Service (FSB) Commander in charge of an FSB force. Ultimately, this paper will postulate that, in light of the rebels' desire to escalate the conflict, a senior executive officer of the FSB will command an overwhelming force that could eliminate the Chechen rebels as a fighting force.

Should the Chechen rebels desire to increase operations in Chechnya, Grozny will continue to serve as the objective of all Chechen rebel operations. Therefore, in accordance with important lessons learned from the last three battles for Grozny (1995, 1996, 2000), the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) would most likely appoint a career Army officer as the Commander of a complete MVD force. The appointment of an Army officer as the Commander would facilitate the Command, Control, and Communications (C3) needed to command the forces involved. "This operation would require both MVD and armed forces special detachments, such as OMON [Special Purpose Police Detachment], GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] ...SOBR [Special Rapid Reaction

Unit] forces, [and] ...Chechen forces."² Predictably, the Russian Commander would employ forces in excess of 50,000 troops to completely surround and blockade Grozny. Additional specific successful tactics learned from the last battle for Grozny would include Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT), psychological intimidation, chlorine bombs, flamethrowers, and the full potential of army aviation/helicopter assets.³ Coordinating these forces and tactics require the knowledge, skills and abilities of a Russian Army officer as an MVD Commander.

Should the Chechen rebels move to control rural Chechnya, the MOD would still most likely appoint a career Army officer as the Commander of a fully operational MVD force. However, as stated in the previous paragraph, the Chechen rebels' primary objective is still to control Grozny. In light of this, the Russian Army would need a force more than twice the previously stated size to simultaneously control a diffuse rural Chechnya plus enough to assault a concentrated rebel force in Grozny. This 100,000+-troop composition would not be the same as previously stated because there would most likely be a heavier compliment of infantry and mechanized Soldiers. Once again, the primary reason for having a career Army officer as the MVD Commander is the wealth of C3 experience he brings to tactical operations involving such a wide array of MVD forces.⁴

On the other hand, should the Chechen rebels attack urban areas inside Russia (i.e., hostages, kidnappings, bombings, etc.) the MOD would most likely not appoint a career Army officer to Command an MVD force. The nature of the Chechen rebels' attacks would be smaller, more restricted, and more isolated to specific High Value Targets (HVT) in the Russian public eye. These rebel operations would not require typical Army aviation, infantry, and mechanized assets; therefore, the MOD would likely not charge a career Army officer with such a command.⁵

Summarily, the likelihood of the MOD appointing a career Army officer as Commander of an MVD force to quell Chechen resistance inside Chechnya is very good. This command structure worked to defeat the rebels in 2000 and there is a good chance that the MOD would use it again in accordance with (IAW) lessons learned from the other two wars in Chechnya.

Should the Chechen rebels control Grozny, the Russian Army would most likely not only use the Spetsnaz against the city. Granted, the Spetsnaz is highly trained and have conducted highly successful 'decapitation' operations dating back to Afghanistan.⁶ However, the Spetsnaz's principle modus operandi is similar to US Special Operation Forces (SOF) - reconnaissance and

long-range surveillance. This also means that Spetsnaz operations typically consist of a small (but highly important) part of a much larger follow-on tactical operation.⁷ In addition, although the Spetsnaz can adapt their training to any terrain, most of the time the Spetsnaz do not conduct their missions in an urban environment. The Russian Army learned from the first battle for Grozny that the Spetsnaz should stay within its specialized training - performing reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

Furthermore, the Russian Army would most likely not solely employ Spetsnaz forces should the Chechen rebels attempt to control rural Chechnya. Once again, the Spetsnaz's primary mission is reconnaissance and surveillance for an advancing operation. Obviously, the Spetsnaz's mission could be that of precision strikes on key command posts for follow-on operations. However, the Spetsnaz's role in singularity would not be compatible with quelling widespread Chechen rebel control of the rural areas of Chechnya. The Spetsnaz would play individual mission roles in a much larger operation in the battle to wrest control from a Chechen rebel controlled rural Chechnya.⁸

The Spetsnaz would, nonetheless, be ideal for a mission against Chechen rebels who decide to attack urban areas outside of Chechnya (i.e., hostages, kidnapping, and bombings). This is also the type of precision strike that this paper referenced previously. The Spetsnaz's highly specialized training and discipline should allow them to easily out-manuever a limited rebel urban operation outside of Chechnya. In summary, the Spetsnaz has limited operational abilities and would not be the singular force of choice against the Chechen rebels in Chechnya.

The political landscape has changed significantly since the Russian Army's victory over the Chechen rebels in 2000. The seating of a former Federal Security Service (FSB - the new KGB) agent, Vladimir Putin, as the President of Russia heavily overshadows the tactics and assets used to secure the Russian Army's victory in 2000. That impact resulted in the MVD moving from under the operational control of the MOD to under the operational control of the FSB.¹⁰ This means that the FSB can now interpret the lessons learned from the previous battles in Grozny and incorporate its own brutal crackdowns.

Therefore, should the Chechen rebels now attempt to control Grozny, the Russian President would undoubtedly appoint a senior executive FSB officer as the overall Task Force Commander. This would have significant impact upon the nature of the operation as all law enforcement, all intelligence services (includ-

ing electronic surveillance), and MVD assets now fall under the control of the FSB. In addition, the FSB is directly responsible for the internal security of the Russian Federation. This includes, but is not limited to, the fight against espionage, organized crime, terrorism, and drug smuggling.¹¹ So, in addition to the assets of an MVD Commander, an FSB Commander would have the assets for all electronic monitoring, all human intelligence monitoring, and complete lawful ability to shut down any independent media outlets. This would also allow the FSB Commander to eliminate all Chechen rebel structure without a timetable or any threat of public retribution for human rights atrocities. An FSB Commander would have the authority, resources, and assets to hunt down and eliminate all Chechen resistance both inside and outside Chechnya.¹²

In light of the above stated information, should the Chechen rebels seek to control rural Chechnya, the FSB would still undoubtedly appoint a senior executive FSB officer as Commander of the operation. In addition to the tactics of an MVD Commander stated in the opening paragraphs of this paper, an FSB Commander would likely emplace an FSB operative team with a large contingent of Soldiers in every village in. Historically, this strategy was extremely effective in destroying separatist movements in the former Soviet Union.¹³ Given this argument, a diffuse Chechen rebel strategy to control rural Chechnya would create a weak Chechen rebel defense. The FSB Commander could more easily isolate and eliminate small pockets of Chechen resistance.

Should the Chechen rebels attack Russian urban areas outside of Chechnya (i.e., hostages, kidnapping, and bombings), the FSB would still likely appoint a senior executive FSB officer as Commander of the operation. However, the FSB Commander would find urban Russia a different Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) than Chechnya. The FSB Commander might find sympathetic media outlets more difficult to control outside of Chechnya than inside Chechnya. Luckily, the Chechen rebels generally do not have public support outside of Chechnya, so the Russian media would most likely support whatever tactical operations the FSB Commander would deem necessary to subdue the Chechen rebels.¹⁴ Once again, the FSB is already responsible for internal security of the Russian state and has operational control of the assets within its own organization to counter such Chechen rebel operations.¹⁵

As introduced, the war in Chechnya has encompassed three Chechen rebel strategies or phases - con-

trol of Grozny, control of rural Chechnya, and Chechen attacks inside domestic Russia. In light of the Russian Army's lessons learned in this operating environment, Russia will most likely appoint an FSB Commander in charge of all operations relating to the rebels' desire to escalate the conflict. Ultimately, the Russian success in Chechnya will help US interests in global terrorism because the Chechen rebels are an important asset of the Al Qaeda terrorist network.

SFC Quinton O. Moffatt is an AGR National Guardsman from Washington State. He currently serves as the Readiness NCO for CO B, 341st MI Bn (linguist) which is stationed on Camp Murray, Tacoma, WA. SFC Moffatt served in the Active Component from 1989 to 1995 as a 98G Cryptologic Linguist after which he transitioned to the National Guard to pursue his civilian education. In August 1999, SFC Moffatt received a BA in Russian from Brigham Young University in Provo, UT. From 1999 to 2003, SFC Moffatt contributed to the Army's success in the Balkans through Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) orders for the 300th MI Bde (linguist) and as a Contract Linguist for Northrop Grumman. He has just come off assignment as the 341st MI Bn (-) S-3 NCOIC while the Battalion HQ went forward to Afghanistan. SFC Moffatt is part of a wonderful family. His wonderful wife, Janet, and three great teenagers – Tanner, Janessa, and Allysha – live in Tumwater, WA.

Endnotes

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2007 Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame

The 20th Annual Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony will be held at Fort Huachuca on 29 June 2007. Including this year's six inductees, only 204 Military Intelligence professionals have been selected for membership into the Hall of Fame. The selection process is deliberate and thorough. Each nomination is judged by a Board of active and retired senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and professional Military Intelligence civilians. The 2007 inductees include Ms. Jean M. Bennett (DISES, Retired), Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Lon D. Castleton, Major General (Retired) Roderick J. Isler, Major (Retired) Yoshio G. Kanegai (Deceased), Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Ivan Sarac, and Colonel (Retired) Lawrence Schneider. Congratulations to this year's inductees on behalf of a grateful Military Intelligence Corps! Always Out Front!

Ms. Jean Bennett, DISES-4



Ms. Jean Bennett served her first ten years with the U.S. Army in a variety of developmental budgeting and programming positions at HQ, V Corps, Germany. Following her service in Germany, she became the Chief, Financial Management Division and Budget Officer in the Office of the Secretary of the Army.

Ms. Bennett began her service in the Intelligence field when she was selected for an assignment as the Chief, Resource Management, Army Intelligence Agency, and then as Chief, Plans and Programs Division in the Intelligence and Production Management Activity. Her first mission as a Senior Intelligence Executive Service (SIES) was to serve as the Director, Intelligence Programs and Analysis, HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Subsequently, she served as the Director, Resource Integration, HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.

As the Director, Resource Integration, HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, Ms. Bennett was responsible for all Army National Intelligence Program (NIP) resources, including the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). She also governed select Joint Military Intelligence programs and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities programs. After the tragic events of Sep-

tember 11th, Ms. Bennett organized her staff to support the Army's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan. Because of her leadership, productivity of the organization spiked during an extremely difficult period resulting in significantly enhanced Army Military Intelligence capabilities. Ms. Bennett also facilitated the establishment of the Army Senior Intelligence Officer, the DCS, G-2, as the integrator for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) within the Army.

Ms. Bennett's career of over 30 years of loyal government service led to the significant enhancement of the Army's Intelligence capabilities and contributed immensely to the Intelligence Community's success. Even after her retirement, her professional, sound advice is still sought after today. Ms. Bennett's is the recipient of the Presidential Rank Award – Meritorious Rank and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Lon Castleton

CW5 Lon Castleton enlisted in the Army in 1973 as a Transportation Movement Specialist. He soon transferred to MI and was selected as a CI Agent. CW5 Castleton served as a NCO in the 470th MI Grp, Republic of Panama; the 525th MI Grp, Fort MacArthur, CA; and the 209th MI Bn in Seoul, Korea.

In 1981, CW5 Castleton was appointed as a CI Warrant Officer. His first duty was to establish the 902nd MI Grp's field office at the newly activated National Training Center at Fort Irwin. Upon completion of the MIWOAC, he was assigned as the Chief of CI and Security at the forward deployed 11th Armored Cav Regt in Fulda Germany.

In 1987, CW5 Castleton was selected for the Great Skill program and served as the project officer in the Army Special Plans Office. He also served as the Program Manager developing extremely sensitive Chemical and Biological Warfare strategic plans. These plans were soon put to the test in support of Operations DESERT



SHIELD/STORM. CW5 Castleton served as the Chief, Operations Branch of the Army Field Support Center where he provided specialized mission support to units throughout the world. He also was selected for an assignment with the newly formed Defense HUMINT Service and was recognized as the DOD expert on counter-drug

and counter-terrorism operations. CW5 Castleton was selected by the Great Skill program to serve as the career manager and senior recruiter for the Area Intelligence Program.

Throughout his career, CW5 Castleton was always committed to training the best Intelligence Soldiers possible. This commitment led to his selection and subsequent assignment as the Chief of the CI and HUMINT Training Committee at the Army Intelligence Center. He was later selected to serve as the Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps and was immediately selected to be the MI representative to the CSA's Training and Leader Development Planning Team. Also during this time, he volunteered for a deployment in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM where he conducted detailed counterintelligence and HUMINT assessments. Currently, he is working as a Security Specialist for the Air Force F-22 Program and is the Adjutant at American Legion Post 129 in Huntsville, Utah.

CW5 Castleton retired with over 31 years of faithful and devoted service to his Military Intelligence Corps and the Warrant Officer Corps. He is the recipient of the Legion of Merit and the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2nd Award).

Major General Roderick Isler



Following his enlisted tour, MG Isler was commissioned from OCS in 1971. He was assigned to the MI School at Fort Devens where he received Signals Intelligence training. MG Isler then attended flight school, serving both as an aviator and battalion adjutant. Following the MIOAC, he was assigned to Fort Lewis serving on the 9th Infantry Division

G2 staff. Subsequently, MG Isler commanded the 335th Army Security Agency (ASA) Company and served as the Bn S3 for the 109th MI Bn.

Following his tour at Fort Lewis, MG Isler completed the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base and was assigned to INSCOM to serve as the Aviation Standardization Officer. Recognized for his exemplary performance, MG Isler was selected to command a new MI Aviation Company. Under his leadership, this new unit was deployed to both Panama and Honduras providing significant and unwavering 24-hour intelligence support.

MG Isler was selected by the Army DCSINT to serve as Director's Fellow, Continental U.S. Army MI Group.

Following this assignment, he was selected to serve as the XO to the Chief of Staff, NSA. MG Isler was subsequently assigned to command the 748th MI Bn (INSCOM) in San Antonio. After a stellar two-year command tour, he was selected to serve as the Chief, MI Branch, PERSCOM. MG Isler served on the DCSINT staff as the Task Force Branch Chief, Plans, Modernization Support Division until he was selected to command the 501st MI Bde in Korea. He was then selected by the Commander, US Forces Korea, to serve as the first Army Assistant Chief of Staff, J2.

Following his selection to BG, MG Isler returned to NSA serving as the Assistant Deputy Director of Operations (Military Support). During this assignment, he was selected by the CSA to serve as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, C2/J2, Peace Stabilization Force (SFOR), Bosnia and Herzegovina. MG Isler returned to NSA and was assigned to the CIA to serve as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. After two years at the CIA, MG Isler was selected to MG and then moved to DIA where he served as the Director of Operations until his retirement.

MG Isler concluded his distinguished Army career of over 33 years when he retired in 2002. MG Isler was the recipient of the Defense Superior Service Medal (2nd Award), the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, and Defense Meritorious Service Medal and was inducted into the OCS Hall of Fame in 1994.

Major Yoshio Kanegai

Major Yoshio Kanegai was a native of Gardena, CA. In 1942, MAJ Kanegai enlisted into the Army. After completing initial training at Fort Sill, he was sent to Camp Savage, MN to the Military Intelligence Language School. He served as the Acting First Sergeant for all incoming Soldiers. While at Camp Savage, MAJ Kanegai's leadership, compassion, and understanding made him a role model for many of the Japanese-American Soldiers he encountered.

From 1943 to 1945, MAJ Kanegai served in the G2, General HQ, in Brisbane, Australia; Manila, Philippines; and Tokyo, Japan. He was discharged in late 1945, but returned to active duty in the spring of 1947. MAJ Kanegai was assigned to the G2/GHQ, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), in Tokyo as part of the Allied Occupation of Japan. This special intelligence section



was moved from Australia to Tokyo, after the war, with the mission of evaluating and disseminating information gathered and extracted from captured documents and prisoners of war.

During the Korean Conflict, MAJ Kanegai served with the 115th Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment and the 441st CIC Detachment in Tokyo, Japan. Subsequently, MAJ Kanegai was sent to Korea where he commanded Company B, 502nd MI Bn (formally the 308th Army CI Corps) in Seoul. His command tour occurred during a period of political chaos and turmoil in the Republic of Korea (ROK) when a group of ROK military officers overthrew the civilian government in the south. MAJ Kanegai was tasked by the G2, Eighth U.S. Army to provide intelligence on the coup and the future plans of the new military government. MAJ Kanegai personally carried out this mission. He was not only able to meet with the coup leader, MG Park Chung-Hee, but he developed a lasting and trusted relationship with him that would eventually lead to the most reliable communications link between the ROK and US governments. MAJ Kanegai's intel accomplishments during 1961 and 1962 were the highlight of his 22-year military career.

MAJ Kanegai retired from the U.S. Army in 1962 and on April 17th, 2004, MAJ Yoshio George Kanegai passed away. He was the recipient of the Legion of Merit and the Republic of Korea Presidential Order of Service Merit (5th Class).

Chief Warrant Officer Five Ivan Sarac



CW5 Sarac enlisted in the Army in 1966. In 1983, he was appointed a Warrant Officer and assigned to the 519th MI Bn at Fort Bragg. He served as the Senior Interrogation Team Chief. Following this assignment, CW5 Sarac was assigned to the 18th MI Bn in Germany. He served in both Munich and Augsburg as the OIC and as the Senior

Strategic Debriefing, increasing the quality and quantity of intelligence reporting during the fiercest fighting in the former Yugoslavia. The UN Peacekeeping Force credited him with saving countless lives. CW5 Sarac's actions contributed heavily to the recognition his unit received when awarded the DOD and National Intel Community's Best HUMINT Collection Unit distinction.

While assigned to the 18th MI Bn, CW5 Sarac volunteered to deploy to Southwest Asia with the 519th MI Bn in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He

supervised interrogation operations and was responsible for over 12,000 Iraqi prisoners. CW5 Sarac was then assigned as Assistant Army Attaché, Domino Anker, to the US Embassy Defense Attaché Office, Belgrade, Zagreb, Croatia and later Sarajevo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. CW5 Sarac and his wife, Theresa, a collection manager for USDAO Zagreb, hold the unique distinction of being the only husband/wife team in the intelligence community to be nominated four times and awarded twice the Director of Central Intelligence Exceptional Human Intelligence Collector Award. He was later assigned to the US Embassy in Sarajevo where he again distinguished himself as the longest serving US diplomat in the Balkans. Upon his departure, Peter W. Galbraith, US Ambassador to Croatia, wrote the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and expressed his gratitude, admiration, and respect for CW5 Sarac concluding that, "CW5 Sarac will be difficult to replace, and this will be a lesser Embassy when he departs." CW5 Sarac was subsequently assigned to the 66th MI Grp as the HUMINT Collection Manager where he leveraged his vast amount of collection experience to focus his unit in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

CW5 Sarac concluded his distinguished 33-year Army career in 2005 when he retired while assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC. He is the recipient of the Defense Superior Service Medal (2nd Award), the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2nd Award), the Meritorious Service Medal (5th Award), and the Croatian Legion of Merit.

Colonel Lawrence Schneider

Colonel Schneider enlisted in the Army counterintelligence Corps in 1964. He served his first tour overseas working undercover on an aggressive counter-espionage assignment. Following completion of Officer Candidate School, he was commissioned as an Infantry officer and qualified in airborne and Special Forces, serving a tour in the Republic of Vietnam, with the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Following his tour in Vietnam, he branch transferred to MI. His first assignment as an MI officer was with the U.S. Pacific Command where he served in a joint intelligence assignment. His subsequent assignment was with the 4th INF DIV at Fort Carson where he served in successive positions as the DIV Counterintelligence Officer, the S2, 2nd Bde, Commander, CSC, 1-77



AR, and the Commander, 4th MI Company (CBTI). Colonel Schneider then served as the Assistant Army Attaché in the Philippines and then commanded the MI Battalion (CE), 902nd MI Group.

Following attendance at the US Army War College, Colonel Schneider served as the G2, 1st Cavalry Division, providing critical intelligence to the Division and Corps during Desert Shield/Storm; the G2 and Deputy Chief of Staff, III Corps, and the Special Assistant to the CG, III Corps, responsible for leveraging emerging technology for the Corps' intelligence and battle command systems.

Colonel Schneider concluded his distinguished Army career of more than 30 years when he retired in 1994. He was the recipient of the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal (4th award), and the Defense Meritorious Service Medal. Following his retirement, he was appointed as a member of the Army Science Board working intelligence, information operations, and asymmetric operations issues.

2008 MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

With the 2007 HoF Induction Ceremony fast approaching, it reminds us that it is time to start thinking about our 2008 nominations. In the Jan-Mar 2004 Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, step-by-step instructions were included on preparing and submitting a nomination package. If you cannot get this past issue of MIPB, send an email to COL(Ret) Bob White, Deputy Director, Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI), bob.whitejr@us.army.mil. He will gladly send an instruction packet to you. Please take a moment and consider nominating a deserving MI Soldier or Civilian. Always Out Front!

Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Nomination Instructions

The Military Intelligence (MI) Corps was activated on 1 July 1987 in accordance with the U.S. Army Regimental System. The following year, on 1 July 1988, the MI Corps established the Hall of Fame to honor MI Soldiers and professional civilians who have made an indelible mark on our Corps and a lasting, significant contribution to the MI Branch and the U.S. Army. As of this writing, we have inducted 204 Army intelligence professionals into the MI Corps Hall of Fame. They represent a cross section of Army intelligence from strategic to tactical, from Soldier to civilian, and from every discipline within MI.

All commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, and civilian intelligence professionals who have

served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position elsewhere within the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. We only accept nominations for individuals and will not consider unit or group nominations.

Nominees may not be serving on active duty but they may continue employment with the U.S. government as contractors or as government civilians. Government civilians who have not served in uniformed service but who are otherwise qualified and retirement eligible may also receive consideration. A recent change permits nomination of recent military service retirees who return to work for the government in the intelligence field and career intelligence civil servants. In the past the criteria precluded such nominees from consideration "until retirement from all forms of federal intelligence service." The purpose of the change was to expand the pool of those eligible for nomination.

Although nominees must have served with Army intelligence at some point during their careers, the supporting justification for their nomination may and should include accomplishments from other portions of their careers, not merely their periods of service in Army intelligence. In some cases, this will help to round out the file and may provide appropriate insight into the individual's accomplishments and contributions. Likewise, there may be instances where a single heroic act may be its own sufficient justification. Therefore, it is best to submit a complete picture and let the Nomination Board decide.

The Nomination Board convenes annually at the direction of the Chief of the MI Corps (the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca), usually during September/October. Its purpose is to provide a prioritized list of nominees to the Chief of the Corps for selection of new inductees. The Adjutant of the MI Corps presides as President. The remainder of the Board comprises at least one Hall of Fame member; the Honorary Colonel, Warrant Officer, and Sergeant Major of the Corps; a senior intelligence civilian; and representatives (either Command Sergeant Major or Colonel) from an MI Brigade. The participants, except for the Adjutant and the Honoraries, normally change with each Board. The Board results are normally officially made public in January once approved by the Chief of the MI Corps and the selectees have been notified.

Each Hall of Fame nomination packet must include the following:

- A nomination letter signed by the nominator to include his or her current address and telephone number, and email address.
- The full name and official rank or grade held by the nominee at time of retirement, leaving active or Re-

serve service, civil servant nomination, or death.

- A career summary that includes critical assignments (dates/units/positions) and any specific accomplishments that would further support the nominee's case for induction into the Hall of Fame. A copy of the nominee's officer record brief (ORB), Enlisted record brief (ERB), or other official supporting documentation, to confirm dates and accomplishments is very useful. Without official documentation, letters of support from various firsthand witnesses to the accomplishments are necessary.

- A narrative justification or biography specifically stating the major accomplishments and achievements of the nominee and his or her impact on the Army, MI, and the MI Corps.

- The current address and telephone number of the nominee or the address and telephone number of a surviving family member.

- The nominee's social security number or service number (if available).

- An 8" x 10" photograph of the nominee (if possible). If an 8" x 10" is not available, any clear and visible photo is acceptable.

Nomination packets must be complete before submission to the Board for consideration. Any nomination packet received without these items will not be reviewed until receipt of the missing or incomplete item(s). The Hall of Fame Action Officer will help you by reviewing all packets and contacting the nominator for additional information if needed. Nominators must base the information provided on firsthand knowledge or thorough documented research.

Nomination packets of those not selected for the Hall of Fame will be kept on file indefinitely and automatically sent before the Board three successive times for consideration. If after three separate Board reviews the nominee was not selected, his or her packet will then go in an inactive file. At any time, the package may be reactivated with submission of additional supporting information.

You may request nomination guidance by either writing to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (HOF), 110 Rhea Avenue, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7080, or by sending an email message to OCMI@hua.army.mil. We will notify nominators of a packet's receipt and the date of the next Selection Board.

CSM Doug Russell Award 2007

Corporal Steven Heigh distinguished himself through meritorious conduct and outstanding service to the U.S. Army and the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps as the team leader of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Team (HCT) 630, C Company, 163rd MI Battalion during Operation Iraqi Freedom VI. Corporal Heigh's display his leadership



potential early on when he was selected to fill this position, normally held by a staff sergeant or above, just days before moving from Kuwait into Iraq. Corporal Heigh took immediate charge and moved with his team to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Caldwell. His team provided direct support to the 5/73 Cavalry Squadron, 82nd Airborne Division at this remote FOB near the Iranian border. As a Corps level HCT, he and his team had never before worked with their supported unit and the HCT he inherited was unfocused and mismanaged. Despite this, Corporal Heigh quickly integrated him team into the squadron's operations and built a diverse and effective HUMINT source network from nothing.

In just the first three months of the deployment, Corporal Heigh and his three-man team used their HUMINT source operations to produce 65 draft Intelligence Information Reports to meet the squadron's requirements. The previous team produced just 89 reports during the year prior to Corporal Heigh's arrival at Caldwell. Corporal Heigh fiercely targeted insurgent networks engaged in anti-coalition activities. His reporting led to multiple combat operations that detained a prolific Tawhid Wa Al Jihad financier; identified and neutralized a Sunni insurgent training camp, and seized six substantial weapon caches containing more than 500,000 small arms rounds, 50 mortar rounds, one 82 mm recoilless rifle, grenades, and artillery rounds. Additionally, Corporal Heigh and his team produced intelligence that led to the seizure of a vehicle containing a large quantity of improvised explosive device (IED) making materials. Corporal Heigh's collection and dissemination of accurate, actionable

information enabling the squadron to take a proactive stance toward combating insurgent networks in their area and greatly contributed to the change from a re-active posture to offensive operations.

Corporal Heigh's many accomplishments are all the more notable in that his area of operations encompassed all of eastern Diyala Province and was non-permissive to HUMINT collection operations. One hundred percent of HCT 630's collection was obtained from sources Corporal Heigh spotted and assessed during 40 combat patrols covering nearly 2,000 miles over three months. During that time, the team was engaged four times with IEDs and sustained small arms fire. Corporal Heigh and all the members of his team earned the Combat Action Badge.

Although only a private first class when the 163rd MI Battalion was reactivated in January 2006 and with no noncommissioned officer, Corporal Heigh recognized his own need for development in preparation for deployment. He aggressively sought resources and tirelessly studied available HUMINT and tactical skills publications. He used much of his personal time to maintain a 3/3 score on the Persian Farsi Defense Language Proficiency Test. These qualities and skills proved instrumental in his ability to effectively train his HCT, and plan and conduct the HUMINT collection mission.

Corporal Heigh's supported squadron and brigade commanders commented on a regular basis as to how greatly they valued his professionalism and focus on intelligence collection that drove their operations. The 5/73 Cavalry Squadron recognized Corporal Heigh and his contributions by awarding him combat spurs and the 82nd Airborne Division combat patch. Finally, HCT 630 provided reporting and tactical HUMINT support that drove a major squadron operation that resulted in approximately 60 insurgent KIA and was featured in the 21 November 2006 Mideast edition of the Stars and Stripes. This recognition of Corporal Heigh's achievements strongly emphasizes the relevance of HUMINT collection in the Global War on Terrorism.

New Knowlton and Golden Rose Nomination Form

In order to improve the processing and handling of Knowlton and Golden Rose award nominations, we are implementing a new form for your submittals.

Please feel free to copy the form on page 22 of this issue of the Vanguard. You will also find an electronic version of this form at www.micorps.org.

When is the Army MI CMF scheduled for Transformation?

MOS Conversions From -To -Conversion Effective Date -Conversion - NOFC/Cycle

96B1 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35F INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96B2 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35F INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96B3 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35F INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96B4 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35F INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96B5 INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35F INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96D1 IMAGERY ANALYST
35G IMAGERY ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96D2 IMAGERY ANALYST
35G IMAGERY ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96D3 IMAGERY ANALYST
35G IMAGERY ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96D4 IMAGERY ANALYST
35G IMAGERY ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96D5 IMAGERY ANALYST
35G IMAGERY ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96F1 PSYOP SPEC
37F PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
01 Oct 1990

96F2 PSYOP SPEC
37F PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
01 Oct 1990

96F3 PSYOP SPEC
37F PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
01 Oct 1990

96F4 PSYOP SPEC
37F PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
01 Oct 1990

96F5 PSYOP SPEC
37F PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
01 Oct 1990

96H1 COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
35H COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96H2 COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
35H COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96H3 COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
35H COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96H4 COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
35H COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96H5 COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
35H COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS) OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96R1 GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS OPERATOR
This MOS will not be converted to any other MOS
01 Oct 2008 0504-26

96R2 GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS OPERATOR
This MOS will not be converted to any other MOS
01 Oct 2008 0504-26

96R3 GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS OPERATOR
This MOS will not be converted to any other MOS
01 Oct 2008 0504-26

96R4 GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS OPERATOR
This MOS will not be converted to any other MOS
01 Oct 2008 0504-26

96R5 GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS OPERATOR
This MOS will not be converted to any other MOS
01 Oct 2008 0504-26

96U1 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
35K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96U2 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
35K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96U3 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
35K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96U4 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
35K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96U5 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
35K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

96Z5 INTELLIGENCE SENIOR SERGEANT
35X INTELLIGENCE SENIOR SERGEANT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97B1 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
97E HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
01 Oct 2006 0404-27

97B2 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
35L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97B3 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
35L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97B4 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
35L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97B5 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
35L COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AGENT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97E1 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
35M HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97E2 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
35M HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97E3 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
35M HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97E4 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
35M HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97E5 HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
35M HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97G1 MDCI ANALYST 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

97G2 MDCI ANALYST 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

97G3 MDCI ANALYST 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

97G4 MDCI ANALYST 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

97G5 MDCI ANALYST 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

97L1 TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
35Q TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97L2 TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
35Q TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97L3 TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
35Q TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97L4 TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
35Q TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97L5 TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
35Q TRANSLATOR/INTERPRETER (RC)
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

97Z5 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE/HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
SENIOR SERGEANT
35Y COUNTER INTELLIGENCE/HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
SENIOR SERGEANT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

98C1 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35N SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

98C2 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35N SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

98C3 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35N SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

98C4 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
35N SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

98C5 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
98Z SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) /
SENIOR SERGEANT / CHIEF
01 Oct 2001 0010-12

98D1 EMITTER LOC/IDENT 98H 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

98D2 EMITTER LOC/IDENT 98H 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

98D3 EMITTER LOC/IDENT 98H 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

98D4 EMITTER LOC/IDENT 98H 01 Apr 1998 9804-11

98G1 CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
35P CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06

98G2 CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
35P CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98G3 CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
35P CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98G4 CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
35P CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98G5 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST
98Z SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) /
SENIOR SERGEANT / CHIEF
01 Oct 2001 0010-12
98H1 COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/LOCATOR
98G CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98P MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
98H2 COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/LOCATOR
98G CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98P MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
98H3 COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/LOCATOR
98G CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98P MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
98H4 COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/LOCATOR
98G CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/
LOCATOR
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98P MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
98H5 COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTOR/LOCATOR
98Z SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) /
SENIOR SERGEANT / CHIEF
01 Oct 2001 0010-12
98J1 ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE INTERCEPTOR/
ANALYST
98C SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
98J2 ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE INTERCEPTOR/
ANALYST
98C SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
98J3 ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE INTERCEPTOR/
ANALYST
98C SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
98J4 ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE INTERCEPTOR/
ANALYST
98C SIGNALS INTELLIGENCEANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23

98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
98J5 ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE INTERCEPTOR/
ANALYST
98Z SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) /
SENIOR SERGEANT / CHIEF
01 Oct 2001 0010-12
98K1 SIGNAL COLLECTION/IDENTIFICATION ANALYST
98Y SIGNALSCOLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98K2 SIGNAL COLLECTION/IDENTIFICATION ANALYST
98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98K3 SIGNAL COLLECTION/IDENTIFICATION ANALYST
98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98K4 SIGNAL COLLECTION/IDENTIFICATION ANALYST
98Y SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2005 0304-23
98K5 SIGNAL COLLECTION/IDENTIFICATION ANALYST
98Z SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) /
SENIOR SERGEANT / CHIEF
01 Oct 2001 0010-12
98P1 MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
35U MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98P2 MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
35U MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98P3 MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
35U MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98P4 MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
35U MULTI-SENSOR OPERATOR
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98X1 EW/SIGINT RECRUIT
35W EW/SIGINT RECRUIT
01 Oct 2007 0504-06A
98Y1 SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
35S SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98Y2 SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
35S SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 20070504-06
98Y3 SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
35S SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98Y4 SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
35S SIGNALS COLLECTOR/ANALYST
01 Oct 2007 0504-06
98Z5 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC
WARFARE) / SENIOR SERGEANT / CHIEF 35Z SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) / SENIOR
SERGEANT / CHIEF
01 Oct 2007 0504-06



For additional Conversion information,
contact Vicki Jones (703)325-3278
victoria.jones@hoffman.army.mil

MICA AWARD NOMINATION FORM

Please write award justification on the back of this form.

Please Select: LTC Thomas Knowlton Award Golden Rose Award

STEP 1 Nominator Information (Nominator must be a current MICA member)

Name		
Email Address		Telephone
MICA # (optional)	Providing your MICA # speeds processing, but is not essential for this nomination	

Please do not proceed on to STEP 2 unless you are a current MICA member in good standing. If you are not a member and would like to join or renew your membership, please go to www.micorps.org.

STEP 2 Point of Contact (POC) for Communication and Handling

POC Name		
Email Address		Telephone
Shipping Address		
Date Needed By		

STEP 3 Nominee Information (Please attach a separate document with Award Justification)

Full Name		
Rank		
Unit/Branch		
In the following two lines print exactly how you want the name and date to appear on the certificate		
Name		
Date		

STEP 4 Approving Authority (MI Lieutenant Colonel and above OR a MICA Chapter President)

Approved By	Print:	Signature:
-------------	--------	------------

STEP 5 Include Payment and Submit by Mail or Email

Cost	\$30.00 per award for standard delivery (Check or Money Order); allow 10 business days to process.
Nomination requests for expedited processing will result in an assessment of an additional \$10 handling fee plus actual express shipping costs if required.	

Please do NOT write a credit card number on this form. If you need to pay by credit card, please indicate here:

Credit Card payment required; (the MICA administrator will contact the POC entered above for the billing information before the nomination is processed).

MICA Mailing/Contact Information

Mail to:	MICA National Headquarters, ATTN: Knowlton/Rose Award, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020
Email to:	administrator@micorps.org



Military Intelligence Corps Assn.

Do Not Write Below This Line - For In-House Processing Only

	Date	Initial
Received	/ /	
Approved	/ /	
Shipped	/ /	
Shipped Via		

BY LAWS OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CORPS ASSOCIATION



ARTICLE I

MEMBERSHIP MEETINGS AND QUORUMS

1. MEETINGS.

a. A general membership meeting of the Association may be called at the discretion of the Executive Council for transaction of such business as may be brought before the meeting. It shall be the duty of the President to cause notice of each general membership meeting not less than 15 days prior to such meeting.

b. Special meetings shall upon written request of ten (10) individual members be called by the President. It shall be the duty of the President to cause notice of each special meeting not less than 30 days prior to such meeting.

c. Notices shall be deemed to have been given when published in an issue of the Association's publication *The Vanguard*.

2. QUORUMS.

Ten (10) individual members present shall constitute a quorum at any scheduled meeting.

ARTICLE II

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

1. The business and property of the Association shall be managed and controlled by the Executive Council. Every Executive Council member shall serve for the term for which elected or appointed.

2. The Executive Council may hold their meetings and have an office and keep records of the Association in such place or places in the State of Arizona or outside the State of Arizona as the Executive Council determines.

3. Executive Council and Executive Committee meetings shall be called at the discretion of the President. These meetings shall be conducted at least semi-annually. The Secretary shall give notice in advance of each meeting.

4. The majority of the Executive Council members (three) shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of Association business.

5. At meetings of the Executive Council, business shall be transacted in such order as the President may determine.

6. Written contracts of the Association shall be executed on behalf of the Association by the President or Vice President and attested by the Treasurer.

7. It shall not be necessary for a Council member to be a resident of the State of Arizona.

ARTICLE III

FISCAL YEAR

The fiscal year of the Association shall begin on the first day of January in each year and end on the last day of December in each year.

ARTICLE IV

COMPENSATION

Officers and Executive Council members shall receive no compensation for their services and shall not profit monetarily from the acts of the Association.

ARTICLE V

GENERAL SAVING CLAUSE

These Bylaws are intended for the government of the Association and its members pursuant to the laws of the State of Arizona. If any provision of these Bylaws shall be, or at any future time shall become inconsistent with the laws of the State of Arizona, such provision shall be inapplicable to the extent of such inconsistency but shall in all other respects remain in full force and effect.

ARTICLE VI

AMENDMENTS

The Executive Council shall have power to make, amend, and repeal the Bylaws of the Association, by vote of a majority of all of the Council members at any regular or special meeting of the Council.

ARTICLE VII

FISCAL MATTERS

SECTION 1. MEMBERSHIP FEES

The matter of Association fees shall be determined annually at the first meeting of the newly elected Chapter Executive Council. Association fees may be fixed or revised by the Executive Council at a minimum level consistent with good business practice, achievement of the objectives of the Association, and the costs of Association administration. The current schedule of fees shall be as published on the Association's Internet website at <http://www.micorps.org> and in the Association's publication *The Vanguard*.

SECTION 2. FUND RAISING FOR ASSOCIATION SUPPORT

Funds may be raised to support the objectives and

specific programs of the Association. Fund raising events or activities may be planned and organized upon receipt of local approval of the installation commander, as required, and in accordance with AR 210-22. In all fund raising efforts, volunteer workers and supporters must work without benefit of compensation and all profits must be reported to the Treasurer for approval by the Executive Council.

SECTION 3. Corporate Revenue Share Plan (CRSP)

The CRSP is intended to support local chapters by providing financial resources for local community activities and events which support the goals of MICA as outlined in the Constitution. Upon request of a local chapter board member, the Executive Council will provide up to fifty percent (50%) of collected corporate membership fees as an incentive to local chapters that actively recruit or sustain a corporate sponsor.

ARTICLE VIII

INSURANCE COVERAGE

Insurance coverage is not required at this time. However, this requirement will be reviewed as required, but at least annually, to ensure compliance with AR 210-22.

ARTICLE IX

AWARDS AND GIFTS

Certificates of appreciation and other forms of recognition (e.g., Knowlton Award, Golden Rose Award and Certificates) may be given by the Association to members, employees, or other deserving individuals as deemed appropriate and approved by the Executive Council.

ARTICLE X

HIRING AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES

The President supervises all Association employees and exercises contracts and hiring and firing on behalf of the Executive Council. Discrimination with regard to race, race, marital status, age, creed, national origin, lawful political affiliation, labor organization membership, physical handicap, or sex will not be permitted in employment practices of the Association. The laws pertaining to the Fair Labor standards and to equal opportunity will be followed.

ARTICLE XI

LOCAL ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. CHAPTERS

A Chapter is a subordinate activity chartered by the Association and is designed to bring local members together to further the goals and objectives of the Association. A Chapter may exist at an individual installation, post or related activity, or in a geographic area (e.g., Europe or Korea). A Chapter shall abide by the Association's

Constitution and Bylaws and gains Association sanction and charter when all of the following conditions have been established:

- Has ten members of good standing willing to affiliate as a Chapter
- Elects Chapter officers
- Submits a charter request and gains Association approval of the Chapter Constitution and Bylaws

To maintain good standing within the Association a Chapter must conduct, at a minimum, semi-annual meetings, events or activities (e.g., professional development sessions, Chapter meeting, or MI Ball) that support the goals and objectives of the Association.

A Chapter in good standing will be eligible for membership fee sharing funds, provided space in the Association's publication *The Vanguard* to publish Chapter news and articles, and be eligible for Association recognition.

SECTION 2. CLUBS

A Club is a subordinate activity of the Association designed for posts, installations, and related activities that do not meet the conditions for a Local Chapter (e.g., deployed units, spouses, or small remote units). A Club exists to provide local members a means to meet to support or further the goals and objectives of the Association. A Club abides by the Association's Constitution and Bylaws and gains Association sanction when the following conditions are met:

- Has a minimum of three members of good standing willing to affiliate as a Club
- Elects a Club President
- Submits a request and gains Executive Council approval

To maintain good standing within the Association a Club conducts, at a minimum, annual meetings, events or activities (e.g., professional development sessions, or Club meetings) that support the goals and objectives of the Association.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

This is to certify that on September 21, 2006 a quorum of the Executive Council of the Military Intelligence Corps Association met and approved unanimously the revised Constitution and Bylaws of the Association.

Larry D. Bruns
President
MI Corps Association

Christopher L. Friend
Secretary
MI Corps Association

Submissions Guidelines

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the MICA membership. The goal is to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

When writing for *THE VANGUARD*, please consider the following:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not counting graphics without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.

- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.

- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take more than a year to publish some articles.

- Be aware that submissions become property of *THE VANGUARD* and may be released to other government agencies or non-profit organizations for republication upon request.

What we need from you:

- Cover Letter – A cover letter with your work and home email addresses, work telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published. We accept electronic or hardcopy cover letters.

- Security Release – A security release signed by your local security officer stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, non-sensitive, and releasable in the public domain.

- Publication Release - A publication release if your organization requires it. Please include that release with your submission.

- Graphics – Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (who, what, where, when, why and how), the photographer's credits, and the author's name on the photos. Please note where they should appear in the text.

- Biography – The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address and phone numbers with the biography.

In what format:

- Text - Your article in Microsoft Word. Do not use special document templates.

- Graphics - Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in .tif or .jpg formats.



MICA is the national professional fraternal association of the US Army Military Intelligence Corps.

The objectives of MICA are to:

- Preserve history
- Educate leaders
- Honor professionals
- Share knowledge
- Provide support programs

Awards Program

The *Knowlton Award* recognizes select individuals who have contributed significantly to Military Intelligence

The *Golden Rose Award* recognizes a spouse whose volunteer service contributes to mission accomplishment

Scholarship Program

MICA provides scholarships for members and their families

Museum Program

MICA supports the Military Intelligence Museum

MICA is a non-profit organization


Join online at www.micorps.org/join

THE VANGUARD staff will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for the journal. From time to time, we will contact you during the edit process to ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Submit articles and graphics to vanguard@micorps.org or mail (on disk or CD) to:

MICA Vanguard
P.O. Box 13020
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020

If you have any questions, please email us at vanguard@micorps.org.



LTC Thomas Knowlton, MI Hero

THE VANGUARD

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