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Publisher

COL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retired

Managing Editor

SFC Michael C. Taylor, USA, Retired

Associate Editor

Ms. JoNell Elkins

Design Director

Mr. Les Siemens

Subscription Administrator

Ms. Tara Glaus

Editorial Office

P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ
85670-3020

Phone: (520) 538-1185

Fax: (520) 459-5022

Email: vanguard@micorps.org

Website: <http://www.micorps.org/vanguard.htm>

Purpose: *THE VANGUARD* is the official journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) for its members and sponsors. The quarterly journal serves as a professional forum for sharing knowledge, preserving history, and honoring civilian and military members of the Military Intelligence Corps.

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From the Editor

As we approach Veterans Day, I would like to thank the members of the MI Corps who have served and continue to serve our Country in times of peace and conflict. Your vigilance and dedication to the intelligence profession are indispensable to the defense of our Nation and greatly appreciated. The news releases in this issue about CPL Charles Chibitty and CW3 Richard Black exemplify the modesty and the professionalism of the veterans in our Corps.

Hurricanes have devastated areas of the Gulf Coast this year. The images of destruction and suffering from Hurricane Katrina are indelibly etched in our minds. It will take many years for the survivors to recover and the region to rebuild. For those who can, please continue to lend assistance to our fellow Americans through your support of charitable activities and nonprofit organizations.

Thanks to the authors of the articles in this issue. The MICA National Executive Committee had to select one author from these fine authors to be Writer of the Quarter. For this quarter, the Committee selected Mario Adams as the Writer of the Quarter for his article, "Building a Better Intelligence Analyst: Revamping the 96B for Current World Contingencies." Congratulations to Mario plus a well done to David Pendall and Scott Swanson. For those with an article in the works or photographs to share, the submission deadline for the Winter issue is 2 December.

Finally, we received several comments about the Summer issue. It is great to receive comments and recommendations. In the sustain area, readers liked seeing *THE VANGUARD* serving as a forum for professional discussion and ideas like Captain Faint's article on Special Forces. In the needs improvement area, several readers voiced concern about the negative perception of MI that the cover photo of two soldiers fishing could impart to others. While putting a human face on the MI soldier, the cover photo did not adequately reflect the professionalism and the dedication of our MI Corps.

Please keep those comments, articles, and photos coming. It's your journal; help shape it.

— Michael C. Taylor

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President's Message

For those who have not visited the MICA Website over the last few months you will notice a significant change. Les Siemens has worked extremely hard to improve not only the look but also the content of the site. You will find new links to the Gift Shop, on-line membership, and the Knowlton and Golden Rose Award programs.

Michael Taylor has endeavored to improve the quality and look of *THE VANGUARD*. In this issue, he has selected three superb articles that I would recommend for your professional reading. Scott Swanson has taken on the issue of Indications and Warnings Post 9/11 in an article titled, "Analyzing Enemy Intent." Major Dave Pendall has explored the concepts and ideas behind "Military Epistemologies in Conflict." Lastly, Mario Adams has written an insightful piece titled, "Building Better Intelligence Analysts: Revamping the 96B for Current World Contingencies." Mario's article was selected by the MICA National Executive Committee as the best submitted for the Fall issue of *THE VANGUARD*.

I would like to commend all of those who took the time to share their ideas and thoughts on our Profession. From my view these efforts are the soul of *THE VANGUARD*. It remains our best forum for capturing experiences, sharing ideas, and expanding our professionalism.

In the Summer issue of *THE VANGUARD*, many of you may have noted a membership tri-fold. The tri-fold designed by Dennis Schmitt and Joe Arsenault, provides not only a membership form but also a list of reasons to join MICA. October is our MICA membership drive month and we are trying to increase membership by ten percent. We are asking each member of MICA to seek out a friend, contemporary, or colleague and ask them to join MICA.

It is time to nominate individuals to fill the National Executive Committee positions of Vice President and Secretary. Please submit your nominations to me at president@micorps.org or the current National Secretary at vicepresident@micorps.org. We will accept nominations until 31 December 2005.

— Larry D. Bruns

COVER CREDIT: Arthur L. Money presents Charles Chibitty with a cased American flag that was flown over the capitol during ceremonies in the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes. The 78- year-old Chibitty is the last surviving World War II Army Comanche "code talker." Money was the assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence. Photo by Staff Sgt. Robert Broils, USA.

MICA National Executive Committee

President

COL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retired
president@micorps.org

Vice President

1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired
vicepresident@micorps.org

Secretary

CW4 Joseph P. Arsenault, USA, Retired
secretary@micorps.org

Treasurer

1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retired
treasurer@micorps.org

Other MICA National Executive Committee Points of Contact

Administrator

Ms. Tara Glus
administrator@micorps.org

Awards

COL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retired
knowlton@micorps.org

Chapter Chairperson

COL Calvin E. Boyles, USA, Retired
chapters@micorps.org

Corporate Membership

1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired
corporate@micorps.org

Managing Editor, *THE VANGUARD*

SFC Michael C. Taylor, USA, Retired
vanguard@micorps.org

Gift Shop

1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retired
gifts@micorps.org

Individual Membership

1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired
membership@micorps.org

Mentor Program Coordinator

COL Robert C. White, Jr. USA, Retired
mentor6@micorps.org

Scholarship Program Coordinator

SGM John L. Corley, USA,
scholarship@micorps.org

Chapter Points of Contact

See Chapter News for individual chapter points of contact or visit <http://www.micorps.org/chapters.htm>.

Building a Better Intelligence Analyst: Revamping the 96B for Current World Contingencies

By Mario A. Adams

In October 2002, I found myself quickly approaching the end of the 96B (all-source intelligence analyst) course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. During this time, there was constant talk about going to war in Iraq and whether President Bush would finally depose the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. By the time of graduation at month's end and a subsequent assignment to Fort Riley, Kansas, Iraq had become not a question of "if" but "when." In May 2003, I rolled into Baghdad as a member of 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, to relieve elements of the 3d Infantry Division. As I entered the city, concern, shock, and horror reared their heads – along with what can only be described as a sick sense of elation at the prospect of actually having the opportunity to apply my 96B training. It did not take long, however, to realize that Iraq was far removed from the 96B training. Months of 1st Armored Division's occupation of Baghdad yielded several observations about the reality of war in Iraq and the state of 96B training.

96B in Contemporary Military Culture

The ground situation in Iraq, after the initial maneuver operations and the eventual capitulation of the Iraqi army, was in no way representative of the Korean scenario faced in the final weeks of my 96B instruction or the grandiose maneuver frays typical of training in the Mojave Desert. Iraq reflected a grim reality of fluid and incoherent unconventional warfare carried out by brash, culturally atypical men (and women) with nothing to lose and a willingness to die for their religiously infused ideology. These insurgents were not inhibited by doctrine and did not seem to be encumbered by a lack of modern weaponry. The lack of technology and maneuver forces actually became a point of strength for these men.

Additionally, my observations of the situation extended inward toward the analysts manning S2 shops across the 3rd Brigade, and to a point, the 1st Armored Division itself. What was apparent was that by and large the division's analysts were ill prepared and unqualified (myself included) to face the cultural and tactical issues facing the American presence in Baghdad and throughout Iraq. Moreover, the majority of enlisted analysts found in S2 shops were, of course, young men and women barely

out of high school. This led to an obvious and observable lack of confidence in the division's analysts by staff officers and commanders. Trust and confidence in analytical output had become vested mainly in products published by echelons above the brigade level.

The lack of trust and confidence in the abilities of enlisted analysts was certainly a result of a persistent culture of distrust of inexperienced analysts and the audacious nature of the one-size-fits-all approach of analyst training up to that point. The majority of enlisted analysts, armed with nothing more than a high school education, were simply too young to be relevant at Fort Irwin, much less Iraq. They did not enjoy even a general appreciation of world affairs, regional histories, foreign cultures or military theory that would have lent themselves, and certainly proved appropriate, for intelligence operations in Iraq. Analysts were not trained for the realities of Iraq.

The result of this condition was a stable of unqualified analysts and an enfeebled intelligence apparatus in the 1st Armored Division's S2 shops. Don't get me wrong, we got the job done, but overall, enlisted analysts below division were not actually capable of producing intelligence that commanders could use to plan and execute their operations with absolute confidence. The majority of analysts were relegated to operating the radios and producing routine information for the purpose of propagating incident databases and the generation of an abundance of enemy activity reports. Analysts were lacking a full appreciation for the urban warfare environment that Baghdad had become following the last week of May 2003. Iraq's cities, the areas of most contention, were savage and foreboding, completely foreign from what the Army has trained to fight for years at Fort Irwin's National Training Center. Completely aware of this truth, commanders had quickly become accustomed to filling the roll of analysts themselves, simply because they could not depend on the competencies of their intelligence professionals aside from their S2 "Actual.."

96B Training Environment

A key component of the competent analyst, actually serving as the basis for continued learning, would in fact be relevant training provided through the US Army Intelligence Center. Relevant training being a study of current global contingencies (and their precursors spanning the entirety of the 20th century) in which the US finds itself committed, and future potential conflicts that pose threats to American policies abroad. As a reclassification student in the 96B course in mid-to-late 2002, I found intelligence preparation of the battlefield – the fundamentals – the most useful portion of the course, and expected more in regard to the current US worldwide offensive posture. However, near course's end, the class received multiple weeks of instruction highlighting



SGT Adams searches the site of an improvised explosive device in 2003 for clues about the bomb's construction.

the mechanics of the All-Source Analysis System. There was a generous effort given to impressing upon the class the importance of this technology on military intelligence operations. While the systems has its benefits, in comparison, the subject of terrorism only warranted two and a half days of very general scrutiny in post-9/11 intelligence training.

There was a tremendous focus on Soviet-era maneuver doctrine, which certainly readied us for Fort Irwin's National Training Center but did little in the way of preparation for what the Army currently faces in Iraq. The shock and awe maneuver warfare that opened the war was not very extensive. Once the Iraqi army capitulated, the current insurgency took form and is clearly where the lion's share of US military intelligence resources is now diverted. The bottom line is now is the time to sincerely commit to the old maxim of "train as you fight." New training is certainly taking form at the Intelligence Center, as it has been since 9/11; however, there is much more to be desired before frontline units take delivery of "green" analysts. I applaud the current efforts of training modernization but would encourage

leaders throughout the military intelligence community to keep moving toward an analyst course more representative and reflective of current world contingencies.

Recommendations

After only a few months in Iraq's capitol, it was apparent to me that US combat operations would be better served with the inclusion of better trained analysts, those attuned to the nature of modern revolutionary warfare—that is, insurgency, its multiple models, and the factors and implications vis-à-vis military objectives in any given theater of combat and US military capabilities. Such an analyst can be produced by an intelligence culture of continued learning, relevant training, and an elevated sense of pride and professionalism. This new analyst is achievable through the infrastructure that the Army and other Services already possess. What this environment would lead to would be military intelligence analysts that are energized, competent, and as vibrant as their civilian counterparts.

From this author's observations, amassed over the course of 12 months in Baghdad, the main failing of the current 96B is a lack of knowledge. This "knowledge

void" is very telling and speaks directly to the maturity and age of the rank-and-file analyst. It is truly unreasonable and negligent for senior Army leadership to expect commanders to place their complete and unfettered faith in an 18-year old intelligence analyst, only a year, or a couple of months, removed from high school. The education afforded by high school coursework does not provide even a springboard, much less a foundation, for the expertise needed to thrive as an analyst. A high level of competency is what the military intelligence community should endeavor to foster and cultivate in its all-source analysts. More should be expected of the 96B (and indeed the entirety of the military intelligence community), in much the same way that the military expects more from its Special Forces operators versus standard light infantry.

To this point, the training of the 96B should be an extensive undertaking — intellectually rigid — beyond today's standards. I propose continued education beyond Advanced Individual Training at Fort Huachuca. This education would focus on foreign cultures, national security policies, area studies, foreign military capabilities and strategic culture. For instance, courses on Middle Eastern culture, Islam, US security objectives in Southeast Asia, North Korea country studies, US national security and Eurasia, the institution of a European Union (EU) security force, the military capabilities of China, and a course on a multitude of analytical methods (e.g. LAMP method) are all relevant to today's international strategic posture. Such courses would (1) expound on the knowledge garnered through resident 96B coursework at Fort Huachuca, and (2) provide and feed the competence of the analyst. The overall intent would be year-round instruction and the retention, buttressing, and enforcement of this acquired knowledge through annual testing à la Common Task Training.

The US Army presently has a vehicle capable of supporting this envisioned All-Source Continued Training System in the form of the Army Education System infrastructure that already extends through the entirety of the Army. Ideally, these academic courses could be integrated into each respective post's civilian education institutions; taught and provided by professors and experts from local universities. Career Noncommissioned Officers from the Combat Arms branches also could be utilized as instructors in courses that bring analysts up to snuff on the capabilities of foreign individual and crew-served weapons. Another upside to this system would be the applicability of courses towards a degree, as these courses are actually collegiate level studies. Classes could be taught through resident instruction as well as through distance learning internet classrooms. Furthermore, the Army, through its propagation of this system, which in reality would be requisite for continued retention in the

Military Intelligence Corps, would be building a qualified pool of candidates for military intelligence Warrant Officer and Commissioned Officer consideration, both of which have experienced high turnover rates in past years. There exists all types of possibilities with an All-Source Continued Training System. The end result is an intellectually equipped analyst who has a far better grasp on the overall tactical picture and its geo-strategic implications in present and future global contingencies.

Pride in the Military Intelligence Corps

There exists a tremendous amount of pride within the Military Intelligence Corps. This was apparent the moment I arrived at Fort Huachuca in 2002. Yet, an elevated sense of pride and professionalism will make analysts that much more of a boon to their assigned organizations and overall missions. This is a leadership and mentoring issue, but it stands to reason that continued learning and relevant training would both do wonders in enhancing and intensifying the esprit de corps of analysts and the entirety of the Military Intelligence Corps. A better-trained analyst will have the necessary competence and confidence to attack their duties with increased fervor. Equipped with this new spirit, the 96B can be looked upon as an intelligence professional equally as knowledgeable in their analytical craft as civilian counterparts rather than pseudo-intellectuals only effective in the task of pointing out the terrain features of "The Whale" of National Training Center fame.

Conclusion

For the Military Intelligence Corps' efforts, should it choose to tread such a daring path of reform, I believe the reward will be a highly trained, competent, confident analyst, capable of truly holding his own in any future contingency or current theater of combat. This will be an analyst that commanders can invest their trust in and rely on for increased mission support and input; an analyst that is able to operate at all echelons and helps lighten the load of the Corps' taxed, young staff officers. A step in the direction of reform will allow analysts to be ever ready, vigilant and, of course, remain "Always Out Front!"

Mr. Mario Adams is currently a Dissemination Imagery Analyst at the 480th Intelligence Wing at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. Prior to leaving the Army in 2004, Mr. Adams was a 96B for two years, half of that time spent deployed in Iraq with the 1st Armored Division. Mr. Adams has a Bachelors degree in Intelligence Studies with a concentration in Asian Studies from the American Military University. He is currently pursuing a Masters degree in National Security Studies with a concentration in Middle Eastern Studies from the American Military University. Mr. Adams is also writing a book dealing with unconventional tactics of insurgents in Iraq. Readers can contact Mr. Adams at mario.adams@langley.af.mil.

Military Epistemologies in Conflict

By Major David W. Pendall, US Army

Military Epistemology? Epistemology is nothing more than the study of how we know what we think we know—a justified belief. Justified beliefs drive how military force is best applied and how military forces are best developed. In the military lexicon, this can also be called doctrine, rooted in military “science.”

Collective belief in the Ptolemaic solar system lasted 1500 years, even during the emergence of scientific evidence to the contrary. The truth was, the earth is the center of the universe.

The father of medicine himself, Hippocrates, was the first to attribute disease to natural rather than supernatural causes over 2300 years ago—Hippocrates’ theory of the Four Humors. Not until the 16th century that an alternate theory emerged, asserting that disease came from outside the body, disputing much of the Humors theory.

Newtonian science explains our physical world, the universe, and shapes much of our Western philosophy. Yet Newton cannot, or does not, explain quarks, theories of relativity, or the properties of photons. It seems quantum physics is also true. Rather than replacing Newton, however, quantum theory has its own place in explaining truth and the meaning of phenomenon.

For Newtonian and quantum physics to be different and yet true, we realize we lack a universal theory in explaining our world and the varied contexts we live within. In a new science world of Chaos and Complexity Theory, we begin to think that just maybe a Brazilian butterfly can cause a storm in Texas, six or less people may link me to you, or that wasps really do follow three simple rules in the creation of vast and efficient colonies. Just maybe.

Truth has a date-time stamp. It always has. A review of civilizations reveals the truths of the age more than likely reflected the mainstream science and social beliefs of that age. Breakthroughs in science, which may better explain the world around us, gain acceptance over time.

A Basis for Acting

Relating epistemology to the “Intelligence” discipline is simple-and fundamental. How we think determines what we consider to be true. What is considered true provides a basis for action. In foreign policy and national security matters, intelligence provides truth about adver-

saries to the policy maker and the warfighter. Intelligence drives action. Sometimes intelligence becomes the justification for action. In a complex, interconnected, increasingly ambiguous and dangerous world, “actionable” intelligence gets premium billing.

In intelligence, the meaning from observed fact or actions comes from the body of previously applied evidence and peer acceptance of the analysis. The correlation of observed facts, however, may not always translate into meaning. Ambiguous facts or activities may impede appropriate action; other times it may prompt action against the wrong target.

Lack of “actionable intelligence” limited the United States in acting decisively against al Qaeda prior to September 2001. Air strikes in 1999 against a Yugoslav military facility in Belgrade hit the location as planned but the actual tenant was the Chinese Embassy. The 1998 missile strike against a pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing precursors for VX nerve agents in Khartoum may well have been justified; however, dual-use technologies and materials raise the level of ambiguity for intelligence analysis and meaning to a higher level.

Given that the US has a preemptive National Security Strategy focused on the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Effect, confidence in acting on intelligence requires understanding of both the facts and the meaning, beyond the peer vote standard.

Actionable intelligence is some set of actions taken on the basis of what we believe to be true. If what we believe to be true were false, then do we have actionable stupidity?

Epistemology and Military Science, or rather, How to Act

Military “science” lags the “real” science of the world. Said another way, military epistemologies follow the social and scientific “truths” of the greater society rather than leading them. The military science predominant in the US military is firmly rooted in Newtonian science. Carl von Clausewitz was the first to use analogies to Newtonian science and metaphors about physical matter to describe warfare.

Subsequent interpretations of Clausewitz’s abstract theories on war imbued military planners and practitioners with desire to control the battle space of physical war by applying linear calculation and cause-effect planning against enemy forces. Ironically, Clausewitz emphasizes the unpredictability of real war, the impact of chance, and fog (inadequate intelligence) and introduces the notion of friction. All cannot be known.

The dominant themes of current military theory continue with these analogies and describe war and

the interaction of combatant armies and supporting nations as a clash of closed systems. War planning is an attempt to sub-divide war and warfare into delineated battle space and frameworks. This is a reductionism approach, decomposing opposing elements and their properties to understand them (observation, induction and deduction), to determine where to apply force. These behaviors are consistent with industrial age scientific principles.

New Military Science

Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and effects-based operations both address new science theories such as cybernetics and the interdisciplinary Chaos Theory and Complexity Theory. Service Battle Labs incorporate Artificial Intelligence, Neural Network Theory, and Advanced Simulation Modeling into weapons system components, sensors and planning systems. Other professional disciplines have incorporated new sciences and theories, much earlier and more deeply than the military. Examples of how these professions have adopted new science to drive many of their actions include:

- Transaction analysis assists investigators looking for fraudulent financial exchanges, helps sales and marketing departments discover new or emerging consumer buying patterns, and supports stockbrokers in evaluating stocks and business mergers.
- Epidemic models for disease outbreaks are now using agent-based modeling and behaviors as well as network theory to improve assessments of outbreak potentials.
- Human Genome Project insights lead pharmaceutical companies to create new drugs and treatments operating at the level of the genetic code.

Non-military professions embraced new sciences because of their improved explanatory power. New applications provide increased levels of confidence in the actions they take, recognizing required change when dealing with the external environment consisting of open, complex systems. Traditional decompositions and analysis of the parts cannot explain the emergent behaviors of the whole.

Systems Thinking has not yet induced significant change in service doctrines and cultural views toward war, yet it is creating niche activities and “cells” within staff structures and command and control nodes. Even so, the incorporation of advanced technologies and the introduction of new science have been applied in the context of adapting them into the industrial age precepts. For the mainstream military, little has changed in the world of military science since the age of Napoleonic campaigns. In a period of continuous change and rising ambiguity in the actions of our current and potential adversaries, can we afford this latency in the application of potential tools or thought as we prepare for and conduct war?

Conflicting Epistemologies

The underlying “science” of the agrarian, industrial, and information age societies differ in regard to how we know what we know. This challenges what is considered to be the truth or conversely untrue. What we believe to be true leads us to take action.

As briefly described, the basis of truth lies in the underlying knowledge structures and beliefs about our physical world and the world of human behavior. Epistemologies themselves can be in conflict. Meaning can be the referent of an object or fact. This usage contains implications based on language. A “lady” has different meanings and implications ranging from deep respect to an epithet. The propositional usage of meaning adds context and accounts for the structural environment for which the object or fact resides. These become key determinants in what is considered true in meaning.

Truth has been assumed to have an absolute quality, one of verifiability, or at least the presence of objective fact. Mathematical certainty, the scientific method, and observations leading to explanation of cause and effect all shape the idea of what we believe to be truth.

Epistemologies of times past filled gaps in the mental framework of men by explaining remaining uncertainties in the face of science. The truth—similar to beauty—therefore can be found in the eye of the beholder as

Table 1. Differences in Science and Belief Characteristics.

	Epistemology	Systems View	Characteristics	Natural State
First Wave	Direct Observation Natural Rhythms Lore/Religion/Customs	Nature	Independent Observed Entities	Natural Order
Second Wave	Science/Scientific Method Induction/Deduction Analysis/Synthesis	Closed	Independent Complex	Equilibrium
Third Wave	Discern Behavioral Patterns Multi-Systemic Exchanges Emerging Characteristics	Open	Interdependent Complex	Disorder Continuous Adaptations

often as it is present in the laws of Newtonian physics. And, just as truth can vary, the epistemologies vary as well.

Thinking in Waves

The world is tri-sected. We cannot clearly demonstrate the boundaries between First Wave (Agrarian Age), Second Wave (Industrial Age) and Third Wave (Information Age) environments, nation-states, or societies. The Somali tribesmen use cell phones. Microsoft engineers still rely on agriculture for daily bread. The steel worker watches CNN as he surfs the World Wide Web. And so on. Even tri-sected military worlds co-exist. Tribesmen use machetes with deadly efficiency as helicopters ferry peacekeeping troops to remote areas of Rwanda. Coalition partners in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated second- and third-wave characteristics in terms of equipment, munitions, organizations and information systems. Information warriors and cyber terrorists attempt to disrupt second-wave institutions and cultivate first-wave fears. Table 1 describes the differences in science and belief characteristics among the three waves.

The First Wave. In the first wave society, truth came from direct observation of the physical environment and the behavior of other men and animals. Gaps in understanding were filled by tradition, religious precepts, social taboos, and tribal lore. Direct observation of the enemy clan, tribe, or army provided a truth and a basis for action, especially when combined with understanding of the seasonal timing and social history between the combatants—the warrior could see his enemy directly or through the eyes of his scouts and spies. He could count the men and objects of war. The objects of war, for the most part, were extensions of the man and required muscle power to achieve a killing effect. He related these facts to the understanding that the harvest was complete and that his tribe had sacked the enemy last season. He created meaning from these direct observations and the understanding of human behavior. The knowledge required for making war on an enemy included very basic elements such as intention, time, location, and numbers.

As the first wave world ceded totemism, taboos, and simple human observation to second wave “scientific” explanations of disease, the universe (and the terrestrial world), truth changed for civilizations. It seemed Newton trumped the superstitious chieftains and clerics in explaining how the world really worked.

The Second Wave. In the second wave, science and philosophy ruled the mind of man. Industrial production required mass education, standardization, and engineered solutions to complicated (but solvable) problems.

From the atom to the Milky Way, things could be analyzed, reduced to its basic elements, and characterized according to the appropriate scientific discipline. The second wave was an age of deconstruction and reassembly. Unexplained phenomenon, if it existed, was reformed to fit into mental frameworks and made to conform to the science that best explained it.

Warfare theorists established separate theories of control and application of science onto segmented battle space. The industrial age, characterized by the dominance of machines over muscle, cast the nation’s ability to wage war into the metaphor—the war machine. Increasingly sophisticated machines, under the control of man, delivered the munitions and effects to kill other men and machines. Some man-machine weapons attacked the production capacity of the enemy. Quests in preparing for and conducting war became quests of enhancing firepower and the efficiency of delivering massed violence.

Embedded technologies within the killing systems enhance their “combat power” and provide the operational edge on the battlefield. Men learned to produce, employ, combine, sustain and repair these systems. Systems are purposely built for war. Science led to extensions of the human senses through radar, sonar, electronic signal intercept, and advanced optics. Medical science led to industrialized chemical and biological weapons. Formations respond to commands from the top. Commands flow through a standardized hierarchy and through standardized communications systems with standardized procedures and protocols. Operations adhere to strict schedules and occur within lines of operations.

The truth, or rather the intelligence supporting industrial age war, focuses on the enemy’s offensive production or killing capacity resident in weapons produced in his industrial base. We seek the Center of Gravity. The location of killing systems and the size of military formations still matter, as they did in the first wave, but on an exponentially larger scale. Intelligence requirements expand to include enemy campaign objectives, technical characteristics of weapons, training proficiency, support systems, and his lines of operations and logistics.

Meaning also comes from the assembly of facts about the enemy military-industrial complex and through an assessment of the political aims and objectives a nation-state may have in regard to its interests. Posturing of capabilities indicates hostile intent or hostile will to conduct hostile acts. The means to destroy the will of the nation-state focuses on the destruction of the combined capacity of the military and supporting industry to conduct war.

Table 2. Influences of the Various Epistemologies.

	Organization	World View	Key Influence	Actions	Power (Element-Dependency)
First Wave	Cooperatives	Local	Family/Tribe	Controlled by Phenomenon	Wealth-Land Violence-Man Knowledge-Observed
Second Wave	Hierarchy	Regional	Nation-State	Attempt to Control Phenomenon	Wealth-Industry Violence-Mass Knowledge-Science
Third Wave	Network	Global	Transnational	Attempt to Exploit Phenomenon	Wealth-Knowledge Violence-Information Knowledge-Networks

The Third Wave. The third-wave world represents yet another shift in the science and philosophic underpinnings of truth. Information—who has it; how they got it; and most importantly how they use it—changes the characteristics of power. Information substitutes for capital and for violence in the third wave. Individual humans and social groupings gather, process, and create knowledge from disparate data and convert it to power.

The ability to rapidly turn data into information and subsequently into knowledge becomes the “sine qua non” of winners in the third-wave competitive environment, but only if the potential winner is able to act appropriately based on the knowledge created and do it faster than the loser in relative terms. Actors operate with outcomes in mind, self-organize, and self-direct actions to accomplish those outcomes. Continuous innovation is required to keep winning.

The third wave complicates the notion of truth by reinforcing the idea that meaning can exist separate from truth or the existence of objective facts. Power structures are more reliant on knowledge than force. Third-wave entities are more conscious of the importance of information as a commodity and recognize networks as transaction arenas or market places for the negotiation of truth. Meaning may come from how information is exchanged, who exchanges information and why the information is being assembled. The ability to link specific brains to other specific brains for specific purposes becomes increasingly important.

Ambiguous Will

Identifying or counting hostile means in the third-wave world cannot determine hostile will. Unique military warfare systems, controlled hierarchically, are competing with equally dangerous flat networks of “Super Empowered Individuals.” Moreover, the knowledge and technologies involved in creating the super empowering capabilities flow through open communication channels and come from commercial and often dual-usage components. Proliferation activities, as well as the actual production, hide within legitimate commercial or academic activities.

The rise of dual-use technologies and materials increases ambiguity and changes the meaning of many things relevant to second world intelligence analysis and meaning. Box cutters, commercial airplanes, computer code, live small pox strains, and nitrogen-based agricultural fertilizer all have legitimate use. With dual use comes dual meaning. Observation of the underlying objective facts (their holistic context), attendant connections to people and organizations, and systematic discernment of patterns of behaviors offer a greater certainty of the truth with meaning.

Newtonian science still makes sense of much of our universe; nuclear medicine still drives many medical treatments, and rational actor theories drive some economic and political theories. Quantum physics, the Human Genome Project, Holistic Medicine, and Complexity Theory all explain phenomena applicable to the universe, health, economics, and political behavior in their own right. New sciences create new insight and shape how industries compete. The old science, by itself, doesn’t explain as much as it used to.

First- and second-wave epistemologies remain valid in the trisected world. Rather than replace the first- and second-wave thinking, third-wave science should act to complement, challenge, and provide additional insight to inform actions. Table 2 describes the influences of the various epistemologies across the three waves.

Shortcomings of “Actionable Intelligence” in the Third Wave

1. a. It is Not Predictive Using All the Science of Our Age. Except for small (but growing) elements within selected organizations, intelligence analysis continues to rely on databases populated by non-integrated sensor feeds from traditional collection disciplines. Much of the information is in the form of “data,” collected and processed in such a form it loses the surrounding context in which it was sensed or collected. Relationships among the data and the conversion of data into information or knowledge are difficult to determine. Predictive intelligence is difficult when using old methods and analytic cultures to attack new problems.

Examples of second-wave methods failing to predict adversarial behaviors and limiting necessary action range from failure to predict the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union, the attacks on September 11, 2001, the rise of terrorism and disorder in Iraq following the end of the Saddam regime. Second-wave science and analysis missed the key links among the 9/11 cells and murderers. Policy and nonintegrated information systems prevented the sharing and collective analysis of intelligence data in disparate, nonintegrated databases. Limited analysis for operations in Iraq following the end of major combat operations did not provide the insight to what the vacuum of power following the destruction of the Ba'ath regime would lead to.

1. b. Recommendations:

- Master the New Sciences as a Community. New theories and commercial tools offer great capabilities. Many of them have 3- to 5-year track records in large-scale data pattern analysis and anomaly detection. Human interaction leaves signatures. Type or characterize these identified signatures as “markers” and share them broadly across the analytic community. These signatures may be different from the second-wave that science expects to find, but they are likely to be there just the same. Network theory describes the places to look and the behaviors to look for. Analyst training and development are part of this. Infusing the community with skilled professionals from the fields of financial analysis, risk management, biological science and pathology offer another approach. Show customers how these techniques meet their needs.

- Broaden the Analyst Pool. Third-wave, second-wave, and first-wave sciences are all valid. Anthropologists and complexity theorists can explore tribal patterns and influences on behaviors. Computer science experts can model these hypotheses and run scenarios to determine likely behaviors and adaptations to our operations. Hire and develop broad skill sets from across these wave sciences. Retirees, even working from home with secure, biometric and encrypted systems can assist in analytic surges or work long-term, non-time sensitive reviews. Academia, industry, and selected partners can provide select expertise when required, or more importantly, when asked.

- Integrate New Technology. Integrate the technologies of the new science with the human analyst trained in the newest theories. Automation and smart filters assist in the volume problem. Artificial intelligence and modeling assists in the prediction process. Humans will still control these tools.

2. a. It Presents Point Solutions and Sub-Optimizes. Current Intelligence methods are based upon the intel-

ligence cycle. Much like the first-wave man, governed by the seasons and the daily solar and lunar schedules, so are many single “INT” analysts. Collection orientations affect some analysts by making them overly dependent or overly confident in one type of collection or collection system. The daily “take” becomes the focus of effort in analysis and often presents the analyst with only a narrow view of target. Narrow views on the input often lead to a narrow range of analytical perspectives. Narrow perspectives in the analysis process lead to limited outputs and “INT” centric views of the truth. Actions taken on these “INT” centric products may limit the full range of options otherwise potentially capable. Thus, intelligence is suboptimized, and actions are oriented on point solutions.

Persistent collection and time-sensitive targeting also create pressure to produce actionable products in tighter and tighter response times. The linear process is too slow. Moreover, the linear process produces that which it can rather than that which it must. Analytical focus on the collection of facts and the observed truth can miss the underlying patterns or characteristics that may actually provide better targets and result in more effective actions.

2. b. Recommendations:

- Create a Community Culture Versus an “INT” or Agency Culture. Charge into the future as an army of analysts rather than as a confederation of “INT” minded analysts. Increase the cross-discipline exchanges by design rather than by individual preference. Champion success stories that are multi-INT and customer focused. Operational elements deployed to support military operations in places like Afghanistan and Iraq quickly become solid teams and informally task-organize to support missions without the interference rice bowl or parochial bias. Learn from them and advertise their great successes. Single source or single “INT” successes reinforce the point solution and sub-optimization problem.

- Reorganize Community Programming and Budget Processes. Shift the bulk of programming funds into collaborative analytic ventures. Increase funding to cooperative projects leading to operational successes. Partner with the customer and make him an advocate of the analytic funding to specific programs.

- Unite Operations and Intelligence. The closer an analyst is to the supported customer or customer set, the better the product will be. Presentation formats add mission-specific relevance and require less manipulation at the end-user level. This enhances speed of action. Operators who know what intelligence can and cannot do will plan actions accordingly. Intelligence will drive many operations in the future and sets the pace

for current continuous operations. Intelligence supports operations and operations gain further intelligence. This is an increasingly symbiotic relationship. It is time to integrate.

3. a. It is Produced by Industrial Age Processes and Systems. Admiral James Ellis, former Commander of the United States Strategic Command, said: "...if you apply computing power to a flawed process, you merely get the wrong answer faster."

Intelligence hierarchies and collection systems are functionally organized based on structures akin to the five senses. Hierarchies form within each domain. Peer factors limit the range of outputs. Analysts may be risk adverse. Worst-case analysis and caveats fill the gaps and cover uncertainty. Reaching the wrong conclusions while using accepted analytical practices is accepted more readily than being wrong by using innovative analytic practices. Automating or applying new tools without rethinking the structural changes and budget procedural changes required to break down cultural barriers limits the ability to achieve desired outcomes.

3. b. Recommendation:

- Network the Community and the Customer. Speed the demand to response times. Allow customers to interact with the producer. Integrate new customers with demands for new types of intelligence. The culture should change to view analysts and customers as one integrated group.

- Expand the Application of Scientific Tools. Many tools are already proven in other professions. Integrate them into intelligence. Commercial systems should increasingly be applied to the analytic environment. Demands from the intelligence analytic community should drive some commercial ventures.

- Network Global and Local Experts. Organize analysis into phenomenon and regional teams using multiple analytic approaches. In essence, what will occur is a culture of cross-cueing leveraging multiple analytic insights or techniques. An approach like this fosters learning, adaptation, and "teams" multiple analytic perspectives against discreet problems.

- Support Diversity in Analysis and Among Analysts. Patience and visible support for alternative methods and backgrounds will be required. Traditional analysis and analysts are not being cast aside. Identify risks inherent to each analytical approach. Customers require confirmation from multiple sources, why shouldn't they inherently demand analysis from multiple sciences?

Conclusion: Resolving Conflicts of the Mind

Our preemptive National Security Strategy really has a knowledge gap to cross if we are to go from detection of hostile intent or hostile will to actions involving global manhunts and the preemptive application of force (violence).

The ability to describe the assembly of hostile capability by observing the production chain from the "foundry to the foxhole" doesn't cover dispersed, networked minds and the simultaneous engineering of the new tools of warfare. Discerning exactly which brains and knowledge processes are connected to what other brains and knowledge processes matter. Rather than replacing second wave military theory perhaps these third-wave concepts should at least broaden the thinking and provide alternatives to traditional analysis.

More than one perspective (science/theory) is required to examine potential dangers in a tri-sected world. There is no universal military theory and analytic perspective to enable action. Military and analytic art should match the circumstances of the problem presented, be it a first, second, or third wave. This is like matching Newtonian science to the right physical science problem, while at the same time, recognizing when to apply quantum physics to other problem sets found in our universe.

Limiting or constraining the application of new and emerging knowledge structures and technology limits our ability to assert confidence in the resulting "truths." Resultant actions, based on our belief of what is true, therefore, may be incomplete, inappropriate, or just plain wrong.

Major Pendall is currently assigned as a G2 plans officer with the Headquarters, US Army V Corps. He is a graduate of the US Army's Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Major Pendall served as a strategic plans officer within the National Security Agency and within the US CENTCOM Forward Headquarters during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He has served as a Military Intelligence Battalion S3, a Brigade Combat Team S2, an Armor Battalion Task Force S2, and a Division G2 Plans Chief. His experience also includes command and staff positions during unit deployments to Bosnia, Korea, Kuwait and the three Army maneuver training centers. He has a BA from Ohio University, an MS from Central Michigan University, and an MMAS from the Army Command and General Staff College (Advanced Military Studies Program). Major Pendall is also a recipient of the Knowlton Award. Readers can contact Major Pendall at david.pendall@us.army.mil.

Indications & Warning Post-9/11: Analyzing Enemy Intent

By Scott Swanson

With terrorist attacks against the Western interests in the last few years, there has been a massive shift in how the world is viewed with regard to enemies both known and unknown who continue to undertake devastating, surprise action without prior declaration of war or other conventional warning. Further, the decentralized organizational and operational structure of terrorists and their activities further complicates threat mitigation for both law enforcement and intelligence agencies alike. While numerous efforts have been made to develop the appropriate concepts, processes, and tools to prevent surprise acts of aggression toward the US, these approaches have typically been focused toward politics, diplomacy, military, science, and economics.

Despite the years of improvements toward a working methodology and practice of spotting indicators and creating early warning, failures persist and new evolving threats shift faster than those improving models can detect the many threats on the rise. Speculation would have it that many missed indicators were due to a failure to fully understand the enemy and their intentions from the enemy's view and removing the biases built-in to some analysts' or field collectors' views. Most efforts to correct the errors have focused on restructuring the warning system and have ignored potential problems in the analysis or collection tasking.

Whether past challenges have been due to faulty models, overwhelmed analysts, poor collection, or uninterested policy makers, this writing's intent is to address some viable go-forward components to construct new methods and approaches to analysis requirements for early warning. The focus is to identify critical processes and analytics used to see threats and understand hostile intentions, and improve their reliability by moving from an emphasis of simple cause-and-effect relationships to more intuitive, non-linear associative forms of pattern recognition to understand the enemy.

Warning Analysis

Warning analysis accepts the presumption of surprise and incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive research upon which to build the case for specific warning. Within the research, there is a requirement to understand the attitudes and disciplines of potential adversaries as well as their capabilities, their history, their culture and biases. This means that perhaps the easiest

task in an indications and warning (I&W) effort is assessing the adversarial capabilities, but the linchpin and most difficult task is predicting the intentions of adversaries.

To understand the adversary, research and analysis cannot merely be a compilation of facts; it includes an intangible abstract perception and belief based on a comprehensive intimate understanding of the adversary. Religion, and its influence on behavior and belief structures, is a perfect example. Today's terror threats are directly linked to religion, culture, doctrine, tradition, and ideology. The will of any social group comes from the culture of the people and is seated within the belief system of those people or within the people. While will is deeply driven, it can shift with a new understanding of concepts or new experiences, and can be suppressed through means of instilling fear upon an individual's will. The influences, however, if it has permeated the foundational belief system, can be so deep that suppression and changes in experiences may never fully override the core will of an individual.

Belief as Enemy

Understanding that mind makes reality; one must then understand why belief itself can be the actual enemy a nation must fight. Hitler, Stalin, and other dictators realized that through controlling what people believe there becomes a method of oppression better than armies or criminal penalties. Those who can get others to believe in an ideology have power through controlling "reality." Intelligence analysts who recognize certain ideological principles—norms, morals, ideals—will find that it is not disparaging to see that some are practices of social control.

Beliefs pertaining to authority, divine right, etc. are particularly useful for political, economic, and social control. We are seeing this today. Beliefs about the natural world, unlike beliefs about the social world, are given stronger truth-claims, due to the ideological nature. Terrorists following this pattern are rarely mindless or indiscriminate in their attacks, although they may appear to be so to observers who have not examined their ideological beliefs.

There are also a quantity of other variable factors which need to be considered when trying to explain or understand the selection of targets or intent by any terrorist group: such as the security environment within which they operate, the desire to maintain traditional sources of support, and the situation of the group's logistics. Nevertheless, even after taking these reservations into account, it is still ideology, which provides terrorists with the moral and political visualization that inspires their violence; shapes the way in which they see the world; and defines how they judge the actions of people and institutions. This in turn forms their views as

to who or what may be seen as a legitimate target. And to a degree, it allows the terrorists to dehumanize those individuals whom they intend to harm—seeing them as symbols rather than as flesh-and-blood human beings. By establishing such parameters, the influence of ideology is crucial in determining the range of terrorists’ potential targets.

Ideology – The Power Behind Belief

Like scientists, there is great value in intelligence analysts also understanding the basic concepts of the mind’s capabilities to shape reality. Psychologists are beginning to understand how cognitive structure (personality, attitudes, preconceptions, worldview, socialization, enlargement, etc.) shapes the perception of reality. An ideology is the collection of beliefs, values, principles, and objectives by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims. Some ideologies—particularly separatism and politicized religion, but others as well—may include elements of historical, semi-mythical, and supernatural beliefs. What is important is that ideology provides a motive and framework for action.

There may be a distinction between the professed ideology of a group and the actual beliefs of individual members. The leaders of political groups usually have a fairly specific ideology with clear political objectives, but for many of their followers a sufficient motive for belonging to the group is provided by adherence to the group or an intuitive dislike of an “enemy.” What this means to intelligence analysts is that even in small cells, opinions and beliefs may differ as well as the degree by which one is willing to go in an attack. This can also be a consideration for military, security, and intelligence professionals operating in the field. Whether through observations, interviews, or interrogation, certain indicators that may be apparent in one who is prepared to die would be different for another who favors making an escape or one who is entirely unaware that they are even involved in an attack plan.

Mindset on Beliefs

When biased contemporary Western perspective is taken to gain ideological insight on religious extremism, time and again it misunderstands the impact that religion has on belief foundations. Experienced strategic analysts are mindful of this dynamic, which is gained through extensive regional research, direct exposure, or interaction and more communication with specialists in the focus area. This consideration in I&W analytical methodology is more of a mindset from a linear thinking pattern to include more abstract “out of the box” creative thinking that will embrace a combination of both intuitive and structured methods to fully examine the potential scenarios and the views of ever changing free will and perceptions that alter indications and nullify possibilities.

Mindset does become more formalized when it is employed in the use of Red Team exercises.

To avoid surprise, a formal yet creative approach with Red Teams is used for studying adversaries (“Red Team” comes from the Cold War practice of assigning some officers to play the part of the Soviet). In this approach, teams try to analyze adversarial motives and methods trying to learn how they operate and how they think. This is done by developing mock attacks against critical infrastructures and national assets in order to understand events, improve security, prioritize mitigation, and provide actionable information for decision makers. The Offices within the CIA have been very proactive in the expanded use of outside substantive experts to generate and test analytic assumptions. Analysts have increased their use of techniques such as Red Teaming, Devil’s Advocacy (deliberate challenge of a DI team’s strongly held analytic views), and Team A-Team B analysis (competitive assessments) in order to focus greater attention on High Impact-Low Probability threats to US national security interests.

Other government agencies prior to 9/11 were concerned about the hijacking possibility by terrorists and had speculated in their analysis about various scenarios. The difficulty for some of them was to flesh out those scenarios, then figure out a way to turn a scenario into practical action. Regrettably, it never happened to the extent of being a conceivable option. Similarly, today’s terror attacks against commuters and insurgent attacks against defense positions have been noted in threat assessments, but to defend against disparate individuals operating largely on their own initiative is quite difficult to diminish as a constant threat. Many of the surprise events in the history of global conflict have been far beyond range of the targets’ comprehension. To address new hostile intentions, a bolder freethinking analytical thought pattern should continue to be encouraged throughout intelligence groups and can be used in conjunction with an unprecedented knowledge of what makes the adversary tick.

The vague perceptions of what adversaries are thinking, feeling, and how important the current issues are to them is fundamental to an I&W system’s ability to understand what threats are at large by the knowledge or recognition that an adversary has decided to do something and what their intentions may be.

Conclusion

In presenting an approach to employ and encourage regular out-of-the-box emphasis on history, religion, and culture to leverage intelligence analysis for a better understanding of the enemy and their intentions is not to say that it is not being done today. As terrorists and other international criminals are constantly evol-

ing so too must analytical methods across the entire Intelligence Community. Leveraging influencers such as social, cultural, and political indicators to create insight to the terrorist intent through beliefs also creates insight to their most basic thought and planning process. Therefore, even at ground level when collectors come across inferences and indicators along these less empirical lines, those findings can still be pushed up as valuable intelligence. Field intelligence inferences and a continued study of adversarial behavior systems brings an analyst that much closer to actually thinking like the enemy in order to help preempt the next terrorist or insurgent threat and transforms an intelligence product to a more useful “good” intelligence warning.

Scott Swanson specializes in strategic and tactical intelligence collection and analysis with additional projects in corporate information protection and anti-trust investigations. He has given a number of presentations and published articles on Globalization, Human Asset Development, I&W Threat Analysis, Intellectual Property Containment, Intelligence Requirements Definition, and Maritime Security Vulnerability/Threat Assessments. Latest research includes piracy in the Malacca Strait and LTTE “Sea Tiger” activities. His educational background consists of a MS in Strategic Intelligence and a BA in Foreign Language (French, Arabic, and Spanish). Readers who wish to read the research paper from which this article was extracted can contact Mr. Swanson at s2@delphiresearch.us.

Last World War II Comanche Code Talker Laid to Rest

By Rudi Williams

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 29, 2005 — When Charles “Charlie” J. Chibitty, the last World War II Comanche code talker, was buried July 26, a friend wrote in the eulogy, “Charlie’s life has no foreshadowing or ending. As long as wind blows, his life and legacy will continue to twist and turn along courses only wild horses know.”

Chibitty died July 20 in Tulsa, Okla. He was 83. He was invited to the Pentagon three times -- in 1992, 1999 and 2002 -- in honor of his service to the nation as a World War II code talker. He, along with 16 other Comanche Indians, was part of an Army company of code talkers who befuddled the Germans during the invasion of the beaches of Normandy, France.

During his 2002 Pentagon visit, Chibitty said his unit hit Utah Beach in Normandy “the first or second day after D-Day.” His first radio message was sent to another code talker on an incoming boat. Translated into English, it said: “Five miles to the right of the designated area and five miles inland, the fighting is fierce and we need help.”

“We were trying to let them know where we were so they wouldn’t lob no shells on us,” he explained with a chuckle. “I was with the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. We talked Indian and sent messages when need be. It was quicker to use telephones and radios to send messages, because Morse code had to be decoded and the Germans could decode them. We

used telephones and radios to talk Indian, then wrote it in English and gave it to the commanding officer.”

The Comanche Indians frustrated enemy code breakers by translating Army messages into their native language. The enemy never broke the code.

Chibitty enlisted in the Army in January 1941. He earned the World War II Victory Medal, European Theater of Operations Victory Medal with five bronze stars, Europe-African Middle East Campaign Medal and the Good Conduct Medal. In 1989, the French government honored the Comanche code talkers by presenting them the Chavalier of the National Order of Merit.

He was presented the Knowlton Award, created by the Military Intelligence Association, in 1995 to recognize significant contributions to military efforts. In April 2003, Chibitty attended the dedication ceremony for a monument to Choctaw and Comanche code talkers of World War I and World War II at Camp Beuregard in Pineville, La., where he trained during World War II.

When he visited the Pentagon in 1992, then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney presented him a certificate of appreciation for his service to the country. Chibitty also received a special proclamation from the governor of Oklahoma, who honored him for his contributions to that state and the nation.

When Chibitty visited the Pentagon in November 2002, he donned his feathered Indian chief’s headgear and offered a prayer in the Pentagon Chapel for those killed in the terrorist attack on the building. The aging World War II code talker then went to nearby Arlington National Cemetery and placed a wreath and offered an Indian prayer at the Tomb of the Unknowns. His 2002

visit included a meeting with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Before returning home to Tulsa, Chibitty spent some time with researchers at the U.S. Army Center for Military History for oral history sessions.

“Laying the wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns really meant a lot to him,” Chibitty’s adopted daughter, Carrie V. Wilson of Fayetteville, Ariz., said during a telephone interview.

“When he talked about his code talking days, he always said he wished that all the other code talkers could have gotten the awards, attention and recognition that he did,” said Wilson, a cultural resource consultant. “But by the time they really recognized the Comanche code talkers, most of them were dead.

“He never thought about any of the awards without thinking about all the others who had gone before him,” Wilson noted. Pointing out that Chibitty was a traditional Comanche speaker, Wilson said his death is a huge loss to the Comanche community. “He tried to teach Comanche to whomever showed an interest in it,” she noted.

“He was a big powwow Indian, and he took me into his family more than 35 years ago,” said Wilson, a Quapaw Indian, who is a former Miss Indian Oklahoma and a Quapaw tribal princess. “He adopted me, and put his daughter’s clothes on me, and took me out to a big powwow in Tulsa. He told everybody that he gave me permission to wear Comanche clothes because he’d taken me into his family as his daughter.”

Wilson said she has many fond memories of Chibitty, including going to powwow dances with him and his brother. Both of them were nationally known for their Indian championship dancing. “When he and his brother and other Comanches came out onto the dance floor, they looked like royalty,” she said. “They were always recognized in the Indian community as championship dancers.

“We’d laugh and tease, and he was always fun to be around,” Wilson said. “But an important thing is that he was always there for anyone who needed help, whether they had problems with drinking or just needed someone to talk to. He was always available to listen to them and give advice, or be a friend.

“Every night before he went to bed, he’d sit on the edge of his bed and pray,” she noted. “He was a very sincere person. He knew what war was about and how precious life is. And, he believed that education is one of the most important things.”

Chibitty’s son, a promising attorney, was killed in a car accident in 1982, and his daughter died about 10 years later, Wilson said. “After that, his wife died,” she noted.




Photo by Rudi Williams

“So my role as a daughter became more real. Before his wife died, she told me to take care of him - I tried.”

In addition to Wilson, Chibitty is survived by two grandsons, Chebon Chibitty and Acey Chibitty, and another adopted daughter, Lacey Chibitty, who reside in Tulsa. He also leaves behind a number of nieces and nephews.

Musical tributes included the Cricket Rhoads Connywerdy, Comanche Sovo drum, Comanche hymns at the graveside. Chibitty was given full military honors, including a 21-gun salute by the Fort Sill Honor Team.

“They sang the Comanche code talkers’ song, which is a beautiful song, as they were putting him into the ground,” Wilson said. The Comanche Indian Veterans Association, Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 577, American Legion Post 1, Masonic Rights and Millennium Lodge 543 attended his funeral.

First American Winner of Prestigious Ministry of Defense Trophy

By Defence Press Office (East), Ministry of Defence, Sorley Block, RAF Brampton, Huntingdon, Cambs, PE28 2EA, 6 June 2005

Last Saturday (4 June) at Blenheim Palace, the Medmenham Trophy was presented to Chief Warrant Officer Three Richard Black from the Joint Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence Centre at RAF Brampton. Richard (44) from Houston, Texas, is the first-ever American to be presented with this prestigious award – his citation said that ‘Without CW3 Black’s outstanding dedication, professionalism and support during the last year, the UK would not have its current imagery intelligence capability’.

Every year the Medmenham Trophy is presented to the Imagery Analyst (previously known as Photographic Interpreter) who made the most significant contribution to Imagery Analysis during the previous 12 months. Members of the Medmenham Club, now in its 59th year, are serving and retired personnel from the Imagery specialisations employed in the Defence community.

The location of Blenheim Palace for the award was appropriate as it is the home of the Churchill family – Winston Churchill’s daughter Sarah was a Photographic Interpreter at the Allied Central Interpretation Unit at RAF Medmenham, near High Wycombe, during WWII.



Mr. Black accepting the Trophy and the Award Certificate from Air Commodore Martin Hallam (left), Director of Defence Geospatial Intelligence (DGI). On the right is Mr Mike Stanbridge from Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Defence. This year, for the first time, the Trophy was sponsored by EDS Defence Limited in recognition of the invaluable contribution to intelligence made by all Imagery Analysts.

DEPARTMENT

MICA Membership

By 1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retired

The new MICA corporate web link will be available soon on our MICA homepage at www.micorps.org. This link will allow new and existing corporate members as well as individuals to join and renew their membership more easily than ever before. Additionally, our MICA Membership Trifold will be available for download through this site. The printed version of the MICA Trifold is also available for local chapter use, please contact Dennis Schmidt at membership@micorps.org and the membership page at <http://www.micorps.org/membership.htm> for more information.

DEPARTMENT

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| Ace Hardware | JB&A |
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CORPORATE MEMBER PROFILE

James Benvenuto & Associates

James Benvenuto & Associates (JB&A) is a Service-Disabled, Veteran-Owned Small Business which provides consultative and facilitation services to agencies and activities of the US Government. The company is currently comprised of 125 full-time employees operating principally in

the National Capitol Region with other operating locations at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and Huntington Beach, California. JB&A provides a variety of services concentrating on force modernization and financial and manpower analytical support within the Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE), the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the Presidential and Congressional Budget Processes. JB&A offers core teams and independent senior professional operations, resource management and manpower experts who provide services for:

- Strategic planning architecture and strategic communications.
- Information technology architecture studies and implementation.
- Organizational analysis and force structure management.
- Resource and contract management.
- Executive level summary analysis and detailed financial analysis.
- Training for PPBE, NIP and Budget Execution Processes.
- Automated decision support applications design and other information technology services to facilitate analysis of resources and manpower.

JB&A customers include the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Headquarters Department of the Army, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, the US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca.

For more information on this MICA Corporate Member, visit the JB&A website at <http://www.jb-a-inc.com>.

CORPORATE MEMBER PROFILE

Oberon Associates, Inc.

Oberon Associates is an information technology (IT) services company incorporated in Virginia on 15 January 2002. Oberon is a Woman-Owned, Service Disabled Veteran-Owned, small business.

As a federal IT services provider, our capabilities are a direct reflection on Oberon's technical personnel. In a little more than two years, Oberon has developed a staff of over 180 dedicated technical personnel to supporting multiple contracts as a subcontractor and as a prime. In addition, Oberon has developed a prospective personnel database of over 100 former co-workers and technical individuals with 80 percent holding top-secret clearances. These personnel have technical skills and experience in the following areas:

- Systems Development – specializing in prototyping and iterative systems development. Most personnel have experience in CMM Level 3 and above processes; C, C++ and Java software languages; UNIX operating system; and various databases including Oracle.
- Systems Integration – including legacy applications integration.

- Biometrics – 1,500+ Tactical Biometrics-based (Fingerprint/Iris Scan/Facial Recognition) Systems Deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.

- Communications Systems Engineering – Tactical and Department of Defense Wide (GIG-BE).

- Knowledge Management – including portals to capture and share information.

- Special Studies and Analyses – functional experts in many federal IT areas who understand the customer's unique requirements.

- Computer-Based Training and Distance Learning.

- Simulation and Modeling – including real time simulations on UNIX based command and control systems.

- On-site Systems Training and Field Support – including Iraq & Afghanistan.

Oberon's personnel possess not only technical capabilities but also the specialized expertise in developing, maintaining, and supporting systems for the Department of Defense Joint, US Army, US Air Force, US Navy, US Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration, US Intelligence Community agencies, and several other federal organizations. This functional experience encompasses but is not limited to:

- Command and Control
- Tactical Intelligence Systems
- Communication Systems
- National Intelligence Systems
- Biometrics
- Exercise\Training Support

Oberon Value to Our Customers include:

- Proven Oberon Management – Track record with Mystech, Sterling Software FSG, Computer Associates, and Northrop Grumman. Oberon leadership has spent careers supporting the Department of Defense and military services.

- Experienced, High Quality Personnel – Capable, Known talent cleared with relevant experience.

- Small Business – Rapid Response; Short Decision Cycles; Flexible.

- New Business – Teaming Partners – Not Vendors. Recognize that customer satisfaction is key to growth.

- Small, Woman-Owned, Disabled Veteran-Owned Company – Assist customers in achieving small business sub-contract goals while providing high quality support.

Oberon is registered in the Central Contractor Registry and the Small Business Administration's ProNet database. Oberon has a Top Secret Facility Clearance granted by the Defense Security Service and our Commercial and Government Entity code is 1WYV5. As Oberon completed its first full year of operation with \$4.7M in revenue and exceeded \$15M for FY05, we qualify as a small business under most NAICS codes including 541330 and 541511.

For more information on this MICA Corporate Member, visit the Oberon website at www.oberonassociates.com.

DEPARTMENT

Chapter News

The following pages provide chapter information and news (activities, elections, awards, upcoming events, etc) on active MICA chapters. *THE VANGUARD* will update this information based on updates from the chapters and the Chapter Chairperson. We at *THE VANGUARD* look forward to publishing news about chapter activities and achievements of MICA members.

Arizona

Chapter: Huachuca
Headquarters: Fort Huachuca, AZ
Founded: 18 November 1994
President: Mr. Richard Laszok
Vice President: LTC Kenneth Diller
Secretary: Ms. Monica DeGroot
Treasurer: Mr. Lou Frere
Special Events: Mr. Rob Davies
Corporate Sponsorship and MI Museum Fund Raising:
Mr. Bill Morgan
Point of Contact: Mr. Rich Lazock,
huachuca@micorps.org

California

Chapter: Desert Rat
Headquarters: Fort Irwin, CA
Founded: 2003
President: MAJ Marc Spinuzzi
Vice President: vacant
Secretary: vacant
Treasurer: vacant
Point of Contact: MAJ Marc Spinuzzi, marc.spinuzzi@us.army.mil

Colorado

Chapter: Mile High
Headquarters: Aurora, CO
Founded: 7 March 2001
President: LTC David Tohn
Vice President: MAJ Ralph Taylor
Secretary: CPT William Adams
Treasurer: Mrs. Deborah Beckworth
Point of Contact: MAJ Ralph Taylor,
ralph.taylor1@us.army.mil
Address: 743d MI Battalion, Stop #73, 17950 E.
Steamboat, Buckley AFB, Aurora, CO 80011-5936

Kansas

Chapter: Leavenworth
Headquarters: Fort Leavenworth, KS
Founded: 1 May 2003
President: LTC Jim Burcalow, USA, Retired

Vice President: Vacant
Secretary: Vacant
Treasurer: LTC Kelly Snyder
POC: Dr. (COL) Jack Kem, USA, Retired,
kemj@leavenworth.army.mil
Address: PO Box 3386, Fort Leavenworth, KS
66027

Massachusetts

Chapter: Patriots
Headquarters: Fort Devens, MA
Founded: 23 January 1999
President: COL Dennis Barletta, USA, Retired
Vice President: LTC Chris Webber, USAR
Secretary: vacant
Treasurer: vacant
Point of Contact: Professor James Ellsworth,
jim.ellsworth@us.army.mil
Address: Post Office Box 5162, Newport, RI 02841-0102

News: In August, the Patriots Chapter welcomed ten MI majors and lieutenant colonels as members of the Naval War College's Class of 2006. These officers—several reporting from assignments at US Army Intelligence Center—will earn masters degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies while studying the integrated employment of the military (and other) instruments of power in service of national policy objectives. This year, for the first time, the Chapter hopes to recognize the best student paper considering Intelligence issues in these topics as part of the College's awards program.

Of wider potential interest, the Chapter is working with the MICA National Executive Committee leadership to assume oversight of the Professional Writers Program. In addition to the MICA Professional Writer of the Year Award, this program will include other awards (such as the one mentioned above) to encourage our MI professionals to contribute to the literature of the field, including but not limited to MICA and USAIC newsletters and journals. Be on the lookout for additional details as they emerge in the next few months.

Patriots Chapter was also proud to assist the leaders of a local MI unit this summer in nominating several of their Soldiers for the Knowlton Award, and securing shipment of the awards to the unit in time for a special ceremony at a site near and dear to many of our members: the former Fort Devens. We add our kudos and appreciation to these four exemplary MI professionals—and applaud their unit for the effort and dignity with which they recognized their service.

Minnesota

Chapter: North Star
Headquarters: Rosemount, MN
Founded: 7 January 1998
President: LTC James E. Taylor
Vice President: MAJ John Chandler
Secretary: MAJ Angela Ellefson
Treasurer: CPT Andrea Luhman
Point of Contact: LTC James E. Taylor,
james.taylor@mn.ngb.army.mil
Address: 13865 South Robert Trail, Rosemount, MN
55068-3438

New Jersey

Chapter: Garden State
Headquarters: Fort Monmouth, NJ
Founded: 21 February 2001
President: Ms. Ellie Cintron
Vice President: Ms. Peggy Gleman
Secretary: Mr. Brian Tonkovich
Treasurer: CSM Jack Chlapowski, USA, Retired
Point of Contact: Brian Tonkovich,
brian.tonkovich@mail1.monmouth.army.mil
Address: Building 600, Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703

North Carolina

Chapter: Arrowhead
Headquarters: Fort Bragg, NC
Founded: 26 July 2002
President: Mr. Edward Nelson
Vice President: Mr. Martin G. Sutherlin
Secretary: SGM Sterling McCormick, USA, Retired
Treasurer: SGM Sterling McCormick, USA, Retired
Point of Contact: Martin Sutherlin, martys@nc.rr.com
or msutherlin@nc.rr.com
Address: ARROWHEAD Chapter, MI Corps
Association, FB# 433, Bldg 4-2070 / UPS STORE
#4787, Reilly Road, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000

Pennsylvania

Chapter: DELMARPAE (Delaware-Maryland-
Pennsylvania-East)
Headquarters: Carlisle, PA
Founded: 1 October 2003
Chairman Pro Temp: Dr. Green
Presidents Pro Temp –
Delaware: vacant
Maryland: Mr. Thomas Keller
PA-East: Mr. William H. Bennett, Jr.
Vice President:
Delaware: vacant
Maryland: Mr. Carmine Meola
PA-East: Mr. Joseph D’Orazio

Secretary: vacant
Treasurer: vacant
Point of Contact: Dr. R. Don Green,
drdg@prodigy.net

News: An unrevealed number of active DELMARPAE Chapter members received invitations to attend the “Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) & Office of the Director of National Intelligence Conference” held Thursday, 29 September, 2005 at Bolling AFB, Washington, DC: “Managing the Future During a Time of Change: A Conference on Intelligence Reform;” featured keynote speaker Ambassador John Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence. This is just one of many annual conferences held at Defense Intelligence Analysis Center. Registration included refreshments, luncheon at the Bolling Air Force Base Officer’s Club, and a post-conference reception. At last year’s conference, former Secretary of State General Alexander Haig received an Honorary Doctorate from JMIC at the officer’s club luncheon, where General Haig personally autographed a book for Dr. Green, DELMARPAE’s Chapter Chairman Pro Temp. Dr. Green reciprocated by giving to General Haig, whom was once SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) a copy of the book “Sword of Islam” by John F. Murphy, Jr. (Honored Tri-State Military Historian, DELMARPAE Chapter). See <http://www.fbcinc.com/jmic-dni/> for information about the 2005 Conference.

MICA members interested to meet at US Army War College are encouraged to send an email to Dr. Green (drdg@prodigy.net): Please include your name, email address, and MICA chapter affiliation. By doing so, you will also receive “INKognito,” the chapter’s e-newsletter. One correction for Vanguard, Summer 2005 issue, “Ms.” was a typo: Mr. Carmine Meola is Chapter V.P., Maryland.

Virginia

Chapter: Potomac
Headquarters: Arlington, VA
President: MG John Thomas, USA, Retired
Vice President: COL Bill Torpey, USA, Retired
Secretary: LTC Collin Agee, USA, Retired
Treasurer: Harry Clark
Point of Contact: Bill Torpey,
william.torpey.ctr@mda.mil
Address: PO Box 26125, Arlington, VA 22215



DEPARTMENT

Knowlton Awards

The Knowlton Award recognizes individuals who have contributed significantly to the promotion of Army Military Intelligence (MI) in ways that stand out in the eyes of the recipients, their superiors, subordinates, and peers. These individuals

must also demonstrate the highest standards of integrity and moral character, display an outstanding degree of professional competence, and serve the MI Corps with distinction. This award was established in 1995 by MICA, in support of the MI Corps. MICA is the sponsoring agency and provides financial resources, administrative control, and publicity.

Who may receive a Knowlton award?

Any officer, warrant officer, or enlisted soldier may receive the award. Civilians who have demonstrated outstanding support of the MI Community or a specific intelligence unit also may be presented the Knowlton Award. A nominee for the Knowlton Award must have demonstrated excellence in intelligence or superior support to MI, either in the military or civilian community; must have the highest standards of integrity, moral character, dedication to duty, demonstrated superb professional competence and leadership in a MI unit; and must be nominated for the award by a MICA member. The nominee need not be an active duty member.

Who may nominate a person for this award?

Any active MICA member may submit a nomination by filling out the Nomination Form. At present all G2, MI Commanders in the rank of LTC, Installation Senior Intelligence Officers, MICA Chapter Presidents, and any MI Colonel or MI General Officer may approve the award. The approval authority forwards the completed nomination packet to the Knowlton Committee of MICA. The MICA National Chapter will mail the certificate and medal to the person making the nomination.

How and when is it worn?

Holders of the Knowlton Award should wear their award with intense pride and decorum. They must, however, be extremely judicious in their choice of the occasions for wear. The medallion should be worn only

at functions such as the MI Corps birthday celebration, MI Balls, Dinings-In and Out. Inappropriate occasions are social functions such as AUSA meetings, etc. When worn with the Army Blue Mess or Army White Mess uniform, the Medallion should be worn with the ribbon around the neck, outside the shirt collar, and inside the coat collar. The Medallion should hang at full length on the ribbon.

Details

1. There is only one level of the Knowlton Award. No other degrees of this award are authorized, or sanctioned by MICA.

2. The approving authority is decentralized down to the President of each local MICA Chapter. If there is no local MICA Chapter, then the first MI Lieutenant Colonel within the chain of command can approve the nomination. If the individual is not serving in a Military Intelligence unit, then the senior LTC in the geographic area is authorized to approve the nomination.

3. The nomination packet must contain the Nomination Form and \$30 per award (Check, Money Order, Visa, Mastercard, No Cash!). If the award is disapproved, the money is returned.

4. Mail the approved packet and money to: MICA National Headquarters, ATTN: Knowlton Committee, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 85670-3020. Please allow three weeks for delivery.



DEPARTMENT

Golden Rose Awards

This award is intended to recognize a spouse whose volunteer service contributes substantially to the mission accomplishment of a Military Intelligence (MI) unit, activity, command, or staff agency. Established in 2004 by MICA in support of the MI Corps, the Golden Rose Award is not intended for recognition of a single, short-term event or contribution. It is a prestigious award to recognize volunteer service that makes a substantial contribution to the MI Corps and has a positive impact on the quality of life of soldiers and their families.

Who may receive a Golden Rose award?

The spouse of any MI professional (officer, warrant officer, enlisted soldier, or civilian) may receive the award. No individual may receive more than one Golden Rose Award.

A nominee must have demonstrated exemplary volunteer service in support of the MI Community and the Army family. Eligibility criteria are listed below:

- A nomination will cover at least one year of service within the unit submitting the nomination.
- Service or achievement should result in tangible benefits to the MI Community.
- A nominee will have demonstrated a high degree of initiative and/or originality.
- A nominee will have exhibited outstanding leadership in planning, organizing, or directing a program or made a significant contribution in carrying out of a program or programs.
- A nominee will have established a demonstrable pattern of service excellence and achievement.
- Long periods of service do not of themselves constitute sufficient basis for conferring this award.
- MICA will exercise overall program administration and sponsorship of the Golden Rose Award.

Nomination procedures:

- Any individual may nominate a spouse of any MI professional (officer, warrant officer, enlisted soldier, or civilian) by filling out the Nomination Form.
- The nomination of a volunteer whose contributions are believed to merit recognition should be endorsed by the first MI lieutenant colonel (LTC) in the chain of command and must be approved by the President of the

local MICA Chapter. Should there not be a local MICA Chapter, then the first MI LTC within the chain of command may also approve the award. If the nominee is not serving with an MI unit, then the senior MI officer, in the rank of LTC or above in the geographic area is authorized to approve the nomination.

- Nominations will be prepared using the MICA Nomination Form. The Nomination Form consists of administrative background data and a volunteer service record of the nominee.

- A separate Letter of Justification detailing the nominees' contributions to the MI Community will accompany the nomination packet.

- A check for \$30 payable to the "Military Intelligence Corps Association" will accompany the nomination packet.

- A complete nomination package will include the MICA Nomination Form with Volunteer Service Record, a Letter of Justification, and a check payable to MICA.

- The completed nomination packet must be received by the Administrator, MICA, a minimum of 45 days prior to the planned presentation.

How and when is the award worn?

Holders of the Golden Rose Award should wear their award with intense pride and decorum. They must, however, be extremely judicious in their choice of occasions and clothing for wear. The medallion may be worn at almost any military function such as the MI Corps birthday celebration, MI Balls, military Dining-Ins and Outs. It may be worn with either formal or informal dress. Wearing it with casual wear is considered inappropriate. The Golden Rose Award is not intended for wear with the military uniform but should an occasion occur where a spouse, who is also a service member, receives the award then its wear would be in accordance with guidance provided for the Knowlton Award. The Golden Rose pin may be worn on any civilian attire as either a pin or tie tack. It may not be worn on a military uniform.

Knowlton and Golden Rose Award Recipients for 3rd Quarter 2005

Knowlton Awardees

CW2 Stanley C. Allen
MAJ Michael Bryan Allison
CW3 Richard E. Anderson
CW4 Nicholas Ashby
SSG Marvin Joshua Ashton
1SG Pedro J. Ayala
MAJ Brent Rex Baxter
CW3 Peter M. Becola
LTC Craig Alan Bell
CW2 Gregory G. Billeaud
1SG Steven L. Blevins
1SG Mark P. Borzain
GG-12 Gregory Neil Brayson
SSG Marco Enrique Briones
CPT Michelle Bush
CW4 Daniel R. Cady
CW3 Gary Lyndon Callister
SFC Roland Castillo
CW2 James R. Cayton
SFC Percy S. Childs
1SG Steven B. Cochran
SFC Mark Wayne Conder
SFC Dwayne Cortes
1SG Brian Robert Cowan
MAJ Tyler C. Craner
CPT Wayne T. Dawson
CPT Dorothy L. DeLeon
CPT Nicole Douglas
CW2 James Dunn
CW2 David E. Ellis
MAJ Alexander Paul Faletti
SFC Johnny M. Fekete
1SG Hiedi H. Fields
MSG Michael E. Gallagher
SGT Jacob Henry Gardner
GG-0132-12 Deborah L. Gearty
LTC Daniel C. Glad
GG-13 Paul Godlewski
CW2 Kevin S. Gould
CPT Jerry J. Hall
CPT Gregory P. Hardy
GG-14 Steve Harris
SFC Donald Hayden

MAJ Roderick D. Herron
SSG Susan D. Howley
MAJ Mark Christian Hult
CW4 Robert G. Jacobson
MAJ Craig R. Jenkins
MSG Fredrick Lee Jennings
CSM James A. Johnson
SFC Hugh J. Kanter
SFC Stu Kidd
SFC Joseph D. Krob
MG John A. Leide
CPT Loleta L. Lewis
1SG Charles E. Lipscomb, Jr.
SSG William A. Little
SFC Mark Lobner
MAJ Gregg G. Lofgran
1SG Michael Bradbury Lofland
1SG Calvin Madsen
MSG James D. Manning
1SG Neil D. Matteson
COL Thomas F. McCord
SFC Douglas M. McWilliams
MAJ David B. Melton
WO1 Theodore S. Mozeleski
Dr. Michael E. Mulhollen
SGT Matthew D. Nermoe
MSG Rick Arnold Obermueller
1SG Charles David Odd
CPT Paul Oh
MSG Randal D. Oliver
SGM Alan Kent Paxton
WO1 Conan W. Payne
1SG Carlos M. Perezcabrera
SFC Charles M. Perkins, Jr.
MAJ Noel Scott Reading
CW4 Dennis E. Renken
CW3 Don E. Sammons
MAJ Robert L. Sanchez
SFC Kelly M. Sanders
SSG Joseph Scott Schmolke
1SG Robert L. Scott
MAJ John Kelly Sharp
LTC David R. Shaw
CPT Duane A. Sheely

SGT Alan C. Sirois
1SG Jacob Allen Sizemore
CSM James Edward Slade
MAJ Sidney Smith
CSM Joseph Spencer
LTC Gary E. Starkweather
MAJ Tammy L. Stocking
GG-14 Michel M. Strack
SFC Robert K. Stober
CW4 Richard L. Teal
SFC Michael F. Titus
MAJ Mark Unruh
SFC Ty Waller
MAJ Russell J. Warr
MSG Mark Weathersby
GG-13 Kenneth J. Weiman
SFC Raymond P. Weldon
1SG Gregory Vernon White
SFC Michael L. Wight
CW3 Lizanne Wilke
SGT Spencer L. Willardson
CW5 Rex A. Williams
GG-14 Frederick B. Wirth
1SG Raymond J. Witham
CPT Brian Reeve Wood
CSM Lorene A. Wright
CPT Nelson J. Zambrano
CW2 Maria D. Zaragoza-Haynes

Golden Rose Awardees

Mrs. Michelle Ballard
Mrs. LoriAnn Sanchez
Mrs. Shannon Valenzuela

DEPARTMENT

MICA Scholarship for 2006-2007

By SGM John L. Corley

This year MICA awarded two \$1,000 scholarships and four \$500 scholarships. All packets submitted for the 2006-2007 MICA Scholarships were of high caliber, and the competition was intense. The MICA Scholarship Committee considered input provided by the recommendation letters, the applicant's essay, demonstrated leadership potential, intellectual promise, and accomplishments. All of the applicants are leaders within the community, are active in athletics, members of valued organizations, and freely provide assistance with volunteer projects. We are proud of their great accomplishments. I believe that all the applicants will continue to set and attain goals, set the example, and honor their family's morals and values.

As Chairman of the MICA Scholarship Committee, it gives me great pleasure to announce the recipients of the 2006-2007 MICA Scholarships. The recipients are:

Amanda L. Purciello	(\$1000.00)
Amanda K. Nicholas	(\$500.00)
Alexander T. Miller	(\$500.00)
Patrick R. Larcom	(\$1000.00)
Richard A. Laszok	(\$500.00)
Samantha M. Haubrich	(\$500.00)

Again, congratulations on your accomplishments and, on behalf of the MICA membership, I wish you much success in your future academic endeavors.

DEPARTMENT

MICA Mentorship Program

COL Robert C. White, Jr. USA, Retired

The MICA Mentorship Program pairs experienced officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers with up-and-coming soldiers in order to provide a low risk personal forum for discussion of topics of mutual concern.

Finding a Mentor

If you are interested in taking part in this program, review the available mentors on the MICA Mentorship Program page (<http://www.micorps.org/mentoring.htm>) and see which one you might be interested in engaging in discussion. You can click on the individual's name to find complete information about military and civilian

experience.

Once you have selected an individual, use the email address given to contact him or her. Mentors have agreed to respond to your inquiry within 72 hours if possible. Normally, you can expect much faster turn time than that, but for sake of a rule, 72 hours was settled upon.

Becoming a Mentor

If you would like to become a mentor, contact COL (Retired) Bob White at email mentor6@micorps.org.

DEPARTMENT

MICA Gift Shop News

by 1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retired

The MICA Gift Shop is off to a good start with the first sale on 15 August, and we have already moved into a new store front on eBay. Our seller name is MICAGIFTSHOP. Although there were only 16 items listed at the time of this writing, we hope to post more items over the coming weeks, so keep checking www.micorps.org, select the Gift Shop button on the right, and on the next page, select the Gift Shop button on the left, or you can go directly to <http://stores.ebay.com/MICA-Gift-Shop>. Another way to find the gift shop is to search by seller for MICAGIFTSHOP.

The eBay store front allows us to accept PayPal payments. PayPal offers the quickest way to make payment. If you desire to pay with a credit card or check, please use the form in this issue of *THE VANGUARD* and send payment by mail. Please do not send credit card information by email as this is not a secure method of payment.

Our current fulfillment time from payment receipt to delivery to the post office is three to four work days. We are working on a fulfillment solution to reduce this to two working days between payment and shipment.

Our featured items for this month is *Cookin' with the Corps, Top Secret Recipes from the Military Corps Association*. This first class Morris Press published cookbook includes easily over 500 recipes in 256 pages spanning: appetizers and beverages; soups and salads; vegetables and side dishes; main dishes; breads and rolls; desserts, cookies, and candy; and this and that. It includes an index and one of those super tough covers needed in the kitchen. The book is about 9-1/4" by about 7". It is a great cookbook to have in every kitchen and it makes an excellent gift for nearly any occasion.

MICA Gift Shop Item List and Prices

MICA GIFT SHOP – ITEM NAME	PRICE	WEIGHT
BOOKS, FLAGS, & PRINTS		
Book, Cookin' with the Corps, Top Secret Recipes from the MI Corps	\$ 15.95	16 oz
Book, SPY CATCHERS of the U.S. Army in the War with Japan, by Duval A. Edwards, Signed	\$ 13.95	16 oz
Book, The History of Electronic Warfare, by Alfred Price, Vol. III	\$ 39.95	32 oz
Flag, MI, Embroidered, Unframed	\$ 29.95	15 oz
Flag, MI, Embroidered, Wood Frame w/o Mat	\$ 69.96	45 oz
Flag, MI, Embroidered, Metal Frame w/o Mat	\$ 77.95	45 oz
Flag, MI, Embroidered, Metal Frame w/ Mat	\$ 99.95	40 oz
Print, "Before the Patrol" , Don Prechtal, Unframed, Signed and Numbered	\$ 64.95	16 oz
Print, "Before the Patrol" , Don Prechtal, Framed, Signed and Numbered (Allow 6-8 weeks)	\$ 184.95	120 oz
JEWELRY		
Charm, MI Branch	\$ 3.95	1 oz
Tie Tac, MI Corps, 1/2"	\$ 4.95	1 oz
Tie Tac, MI Branch, 1/2"	\$ 4.95	1 oz
Lapel Pin, MI Corps, 5/8"	\$ 4.95	1 oz
Lapel Pin, MI Branch, 5/8"	\$ 4.95	1 oz
CLOTHING		
Cap, Baseball, Blue, MICA, Embroidered	\$ 14.95	6 oz
Cap, Baseball, Black, MICA, Embroidered	\$ 14.95	6 oz
Patch, MI Corps Crest, Iron On	\$ 5.00	1 oz
Tie, U.S. Army, Silk Army Colors	\$ 29.95	4 oz
Tie, MI Corps, Silk w/ Embroidered MI Corps Logo	\$ 29.95	4 oz
Sweat Pants, MI and Army Logo, S, L, XL	\$ 12.95	16 oz
T-Shirt, Gold on Black Corps Crest, <i>Military Intelligence</i> , L, XL	\$ 14.95	8 oz
T-Shirt, Gold on Black Branch Insignia, <i>Military Intelligence</i> , L, XL	\$ 14.95	8 oz
PLAQUES & PLAQUE SUPPLIES		
Crest, MI Corps 1-1/2", No Pin on Back, For use on Plaques	\$ 3.95	1 oz
Shield, Brass MI Corps Crest, For use on Plaques	\$ 7.00	2 oz
GIFTWARE		
Coin, MI Corps Commemorative	\$ 4.95	1 oz
Key Chain, Metal, MICA	\$ 3.00	1 oz
Key Chain, Plastic, MI Branch Insignia	\$ 3.00	1 oz
Key Chain, Plastic, MI Corps	\$ 3.00	1 oz
Key Ring, Brass	\$ 8.00	1 oz
License Plate, MICA	\$ 15.95	7 oz
License Plate, U.S. Army Military Intelligence	\$ 15.95	7 oz
Lighter, Zippo, Gold MI Branch Insignia on Blue Case	\$ 19.95	3 oz
Lighter, Zippo Lighter Shell, Gold MI Branch Insignia on Blue Case	\$ 8.95	2 oz
Money Clip, Brass w/ MI Corps Crest	\$ 15.00	1 oz
Mouse Pad, MI Corps Crest	\$ 8.00	4 oz
Mouse Pad, Spook	\$ 3.95	2 oz
Pen, MI Corps Crest Enameled Cap, Gift Boxed	\$ 12.95	3 oz
Playing Cards, Plastic Case, Gold on MI Corps Crest	\$ 4.00	4 oz
Playing Cards, Plastic Case, Blue on Gold MI Branch Insignia	\$ 4.00	4 oz
GLASSWARE		
Glass, Pilsner, 20 oz	\$ 7.95	17 oz
Glass, Iced Tea, 15 oz.	\$ 6.95	11 oz
Glass, Water, 13 oz.	\$ 4.95	11 oz
Glass, Rock, 11oz	\$ 4.95	10 oz



MICA GIFT SHOP ORDER FORM



Member ID # _____
 Name _____
 Address _____
 City _____
 State _____ Zip _____
 Phone/Email (_____) _____

Send Orders to:
 MICA
 ATTN: Gift Shop
 PO Box 13020
 Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020

Send questions to: GIFTS@MICORPS.ORG

ITEM NAME	QTY	Weight Per Item	Total Weight	Price Per Item	TOTAL COST
		oz	oz	\$	\$
SUB-TOTAL:			oz		\$
ACTIVE MEMBER DISCOUNT (10%):					-\$
SUB-TOTAL:					\$
(See table below) SHIPPING & HANDLING:					+\$
TOTAL:					\$

***** ITEMS ARE SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY *****
 We will fill partial orders and return funds for items not fulfilled.

We accept cash, check, money order, VISA, and MASTERCARD.

Credit Card # _____/_____/_____/_____

Circle one VISA MASTERCARD

Expires _____

Signature _____

SHIPPING & HANDLING (Total oz / 16)	
0-1 lb	\$ 3.95
1-2 lb	\$ 4.95
2-3 lb	\$ 6.25
3-4 lb	\$ 7.25
Add \$1 for every additional pound	

Please do not email your credit card number!

Submissions Guidelines

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the MICA membership. The goal is to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

When writing for *THE VANGUARD*, please consider the following:

- Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not counting graphics without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take more than a year to publish some articles.
- Be aware that submissions become property of *THE VANGUARD* and may be released to other government agencies or non-profit organizations for republication upon request.

What we need from you:

- Cover Letter – A cover letter with your work and home email addresses, work telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published. We accept electronic or hardcopy cover letters.
- Security Release – A security release signed by your local security officer stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, non-sensitive, and releasable in the public domain.
- Publication Release - A publication release if your organization requires it. Please include that release with your submission.
- Graphics – Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (who, what, where, when, why and how), the photographer's credits, and the author's name on the photos. Please note where they should appear in the text.
- Biography – The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address and phone numbers with the biography.

In what format:

- Text - Your article in Microsoft Word. Do not use special document templates.
- Graphics - Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in .tif or .jpg formats.

THE VANGUARD staff will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for the journal. From time to time, we will contact you during the edit process to ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.



**Is the professional association of the
Military Intelligence Corps**

MICA is the national professional fraternal association of the US Army Military Intelligence Corps.

The objectives of MICA are to:

- Preserve history
- Educate leaders
- Honor professionals
- Share knowledge
- Provide support programs

Awards Program

The Knowlton Award recognizes select individuals who have contributed significantly to Military Intelligence

The Golden Rose Award recognizes a spouse whose volunteer service contributes to mission accomplishment

Scholarship Program

MICA provides scholarships for members and their families

Museum Program

MICA supports the Military Intelligence Museum

MICA is a non-profit organization

Join online at www.micorps.org/join

Submit articles and graphics to vanguard@micorps.org or mail (on disk or CD) to:

MICA Vanguard
P.O. Box 13020
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020

If you have any questions, please email us at vanguard@micorps.org.



LTC Thomas Knowlton, MI Hero

THE VANGUARD

Military Intelligence Corps Association
P.O. Box 13020
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020

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